Scandinavia’s segregated cities – policies, strategies and ideals

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This report compares the strategies to counter segregation which the governments of Denmark, Sweden and Norway launched in 2018. The comparison is conducted at two levels. Firstly, the report carries out a comparison of the “problem definition” in each country, looking at factual, explanatory and normative claims made about segregation. Secondly, the report compares the overall policy design and combination of focus areas of each strategy. The strategies are found to differ significantly both with regard to the highlighted dimensions of segregation, the causal explanations which are advanced, and the proposed policies which are intended to address segregation.
Forord

Denne rapporten er en sammenlignende analyse av de skandinaviske landenes nye politiske strategier for å motvirke segregering, finansiert av Nordisk ministerråd. Dette temaet ble aktualisert av at Danmark i begynnelsen av 2018 lanserte strategien “Et Danmark uten parallelsamfund: Ingen ghettoer i 2030”.

I Danmark har denne problemstillingen vært tett knyttet opp til debatten rundt innvandring og integrering, i større grad enn i Sverige og Norge. Vi har derfor sammenlignet skandinaviske forskjeller også i hvordan disse ulike debattene og problemstillingene kobles sammen og aktualiseres, i etterkant av de store asylankomstene i 2015.

Prosjektet har vært ledet av Anne Balke Staver ved By- og regionforskningsinstituttet (NIBR), og hun har også forfattet rapporten. Jan-Paul Brekke ved Institutt for Samfunnsforskning (ISF) har gjort viktige bidrag når det gjelder det analytiske rammeverket, og Susanne Søholt (NIBR) har bidratt inn med forståelse av og tekst om boligpolitikken og tidligere politiske innsatser mot segregering og for områdeutvikling. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen ved Københavns Universitet og Rebecca Stern ved Uppsala Universitet har bistått med kvalitetssikring.

Oppdragsgivers kontaktperson har vært Catrine Bangum. Vi takker for et hyggelig og konstruktivt samarbeid.

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Sammendrag


Det at de tre skandinaviske landene på omtrent samme tid presenterte slike nye strategier, var et godt utgangspunkt for et komparativt prosjekt. Sammenligning av de tre landenes strategier for å redusere segregering er relevant fordi disse landene ellers ligner mye på hverandre og har lignende innvandringshistorier. Samtidig har tidligere forskning vist at de har ganske ulike tilnærminger til integrering, og at de har svært ulike boligmarkeder. Denne siste faktoren har trolig en del å si for segregering, i tråd med tidligere forskning.

Hva er problemet med segregering?

Vi undersøker hva slags påstander som fremkommer i hvert lands strategi om ulike segregeringsdimensjoner, segregeringens årsaker, og normative påstander om hvordan ting «bør være» eller «skal bli». De tre landene har ulikt fokus. Mens den danske strategien er rettet mot etnisk boligsegregering er den svenske strategien rettet mot sosioøkonomisk segregering. I Sverige omtales etnisk segregering i hovedsak som et symptom på underliggende sosioøkonomisk segregering, og ikke et problem i seg selv. I Norge er fokus mest på opphopping av levekårssituasjoner, som i hovedsak er knyttet til sosioøkonomisk ulikhet.

De tre landenes forskjellige fokus bygger på forskjellige kriterier for å definere segregerte områder. Denne landenes strategi er rettet mot etnisk boligsegregering i hvert land, og den norske strategien er rettet mot sosioøkonomisk segregering. I Sverige omtales etnisk segregering i hovedsak som et symptom på underliggende sosioøkonomisk segregering, og ikke et problem i seg selv. I Norge er fokus mest på opphopping av levekårssituasjoner, som i hovedsak er knyttet til sosioøkonomisk ulikhet.

Årsaker til segregering


Normative påstander og ambisjoner for fremtida

Mens den danske strategien annonsert et maksimalt utvalg for å undersøke segregeringens årsaker, er det ikke slike tydelige kriterier, men samtidig som Integreringsstrategien ble annonsert, oppnevnt et utvalg for å undersøke segregeringens årsaker, men utvalgets mandat tilsier at de spesielt skal undersøke levekårssituasjoner og kjennetegner ved boligmarkedet.
Dette er ikke trukket fram i de andre landene i like stor grad, men både Sverige og Norge går mot å styre bosetting av nyankomne flyktninger vekk fra innvandrertette områder.

**Foreslåtte tiltak**

Den danske strategien legger vekt på boligrelaterte politikktiltak, med infrastruksurendringer og mer kontroll over hvor folk bor. Personer som mottar sosialstønad kan få utbetalingene redusert om de flytter til de såkalte “harde ghettotene”. Det er mye fokus på kriminalitet, spesielt med såkalte skjerpede straffesoner der lovbrudd kan medføre dobbel straff. Det er også en rekke tiltak som er rettet mot barn og utdanning, med obligatorisk barnehage og språktesting. Her er det også innført sanksjoner, med trekk i barnetrygd om barna ikke møter opp.


Den norske strategien er fortsatt fokusert på områdepolitikken. Som i Sverige er det mye fokus på arbeids- og utdanningsrelaterte innsatser, samt tiltak rettet mot barn og deres oppvekst. Som i Danmark ønsker man at alle barn skal få i barnehage, men dette vil man oppnå gjennom positive insitamenter som gratis barnehage, og ikke gjennom sanksjoner. De boligrelaterte tiltakene handler i stor grad om subsidier for å hjelpe lavinntektsfamilier inn på boligmarkedet og til å beholde bolig.

**Tre tilnæringer til segregering og integrering**

De tre landene er opptatt av å sette inn tiltak overfor segregering i byer, men de definerer problemet på forskjellige måter og har forskjellige oppfatninger om årsakene. En måte å oppsummere forskjellene på er at de svenske og norske strategiene er mer opptatt av strukturer og begrensninger enn den danske strategien. Den er i stor grad basert på sanksjoner rettet mot individer, mens de to andre landene er mer opptatt av å styrke individene i møte med strukturelle hindringer (inkludert diskriminering og ulikhet). Denne forskjellen sammenføler med forskjell i bruk av forskning i politikkutvikling. Mens det i Norge og Sverige er hyppig bruk av ekspertkunnskap for å forstå segregeringsproblemet og utvikle tiltak, er det få slike referanser til forskning i Danmark. Samtidig har Danmark, med flere sosialboliger og lavere andel som eier egen bolig, noen politiske virkningsmidler som ikke er tilgjengelig i Norge og Sverige.
Executive summary

In this report we conduct a comparative policy analysis of recent Scandinavian policy initiatives targeting segregation. Denmark presented a new strategy against so-called ghettos or parallel societies in early 2018. Around the same time, Sweden announced its new long-term strategy against segregation. Later in 2018, Norway announced its new Integration Strategy, part of which addresses segregation. At the same time an expert commission was established to investigate the causes of residential segregation. We look at these strategies in comparison, first addressing the “problem representation” in each country and then comparing the “mix” of policies which are proposed to reduce segregation and mitigate its ill effects.

The announcement of three such similar policies in the Scandinavian states lends itself particularly well to comparative investigation, given the broad similarities of the three states and their relatively comparable histories of immigration. However, past research has shown that they have different approaches to integration, and that they also have different housing markets. The latter is likely of particular importance with regard to segregation, based in previous empirical research.

Defining the policy problem of segregation

When examining each country's problem representations, we compare factual, explanatory and normative claims made in each strategy. The highlighted dimensions of segregation vary in each country. The Danish strategy is primarily focused on ethnic residential segregation, whereas the Swedish one targets socio-economic residential segregation and sees ethnic segregation primarily as a symptom of socio-economic inequality. In Norway, the focus is primarily on “accumulations of welfare challenges” at area level, which is tied to socio-economic inequality.

Tied to these differences in focus, the three states highlight different types of administrative statistics to define the target areas of policies. Only the Danish strategy emphasizes the ethnic composition of the areas as a criterion. Denmark also uses crime statistics to define target areas. In Sweden and Norway, there are no precise criteria for distinguishing target areas, but the emphasis is largely on employment, education and welfare indicators such as health and obesity.

The target groups also vary in each country, with the Danish strategy targeting ethnic minorities and the other two states targeting all residents in the relevant areas.

Understanding the causes of segregation

With regard to explanatory claims, the three states present different causal understandings of why segregation exists and how it came about. In Denmark, there is a relatively simple causal model which emphasizes that immigration coupled with insufficient sanctions and requirements have led immigrants to “clump together”. In Sweden, there is a much more complex explanation relying on increasing socio-economic inequality over time, and how this has led to segregation along residential, educational and labor market lines, which is also linked to differences in democratic participation and vulnerability to crime. In Norway, the announcement of the Integration strategy was accompanied by the establishment of an expert commission tasked with examining the causes of residential segregation. The mandate indicates that the commission should look closely at mechanisms of the housing market.
Normative claims and ambitions for the future

The Danish strategy aims to eliminate “ghettos” completely by 2030, whereas the other two countries aim to lower segregation and increase employment, education and participation. The Danish strategy implies that there should be low immigration going forward and new immigrants should settle outside of the defined “ghetto” areas. The other two countries are less explicit about any link to immigration policy, but both support some dispersal of refugee settlement away from immigrant dense areas.

Proposed policy measures

The Danish strategy emphasizes measures related to housing, through significant infrastructural changes and through more targeted direction of settlement. Social assistance beneficiaries may have their benefits cut if they move to so-called “hard ghettos”. There is also a significant focus on crime, with increased police presence and the new concept of having tougher penalties for certain crimes in designated areas. There are also a range of measures targeting early childhood and education, with compulsory kindergarten and language testing for children. Here, as well, there is a focus on sanctions with the withdrawal of benefits from parents whose children do not attend kindergarten or standardized tests.

In Sweden, the strategy has five areas of intervention: housing, labor market, education, crime and democratic participation. With regard to housing, the strategy announces simplification of planning processes to encourage new construction. There is also a reform of the self-settlement policy for asylum seekers, to avoid concentration in certain areas. Labor market measures are targeted in particular towards newcomers, young persons, women and the long-term unemployed. Recently, the new January 2019 coalition government agreed to introduce a new “start job” and reform the Employment Service. The Swedish strategy is the only one with a strong emphasis on democratic participation.

The Norwegian strategy remains oriented around the existing area-based policies. Like in Sweden, there is a strong emphasis on labor market and education oriented efforts, as well as policies targeting children. Like in Denmark, the Norwegian strategy has as its objective to increase kindergarten participation, but instead of through sanctions, they want to achieve this through the provision of free kindergarten. The housing related measures mainly involve subsidies to help low-income families into and to be able stay on in the housing market.

Three approaches to segregation and integration

While the three states share a common concern with regard to residential segregation in urban areas, they define the problem differently and they have different understandings with regard to its causes. One way to summarize these differences is that the Swedish and Norwegian strategies are more concerned with structural forces and constraints than the Danish one, which largely emphasizes negative reinforcement and sanctions towards individuals, while the other two are more focused on enabling individuals and mitigating the structural constraints (including discrimination and inequality). This difference also maps on to the use of research in policy development. While in Norway and Sweden there is a significant reliance on expert knowledge in order to understand the problem and develop policies to tackle it, there are very few references to any research in Denmark. Denmark does, however, have access to some policy tools which are not available in Norway and Sweden, due to the much larger social housing sector and lower rates of home ownership.
1 Introduction

The 2015 “Refugee Crisis” is by now widely understood to mark a watershed moment in Scandinavia, Europe and beyond. Governments of receiving countries reacted to the record number of asylum arrivals by introducing stricter asylum and immigration policies (see e.g. Brekke and Staver 2018). In the Scandinavian countries, the crisis led to significant changes to immigration regulation and practice, but in addition to these direct immigration policy measures, the three states also implemented changes to integration policy (see Hernes 2018). This focus on integration spans several different dimensions. Notable aspects of integration of newcomers concern language acquisition and assistance toward entering employment – objectives toward which all three Scandinavian states have tailored specific introduction programs for refugees (Hernes and Tronstad 2014).¹ However, integration broadly speaking also touches upon wider societal issues, including socio-economic and ethnic segregation not just of newcomers but of immigrant populations more broadly. In many Scandinavian cities, populations are distributed spatially along socio-economic and ethnic lines. As a result, neighborhoods are separated along dimensions such as income, school results, employment, housing standards, health outcomes and crime.

In 2018, the issue of ethnic segregation was put firmly on the political agenda in Scandinavia through the announcement of the new Danish “ghetto strategy” (Danish Government 2018). The announcement of the strategy reached international news media, and elicited considerable controversy due to its “tough approach” (e.g. Barry and Sorensen 2018). While the other two Scandinavian countries have not received this kind of international attention for their new policy initiatives they have also sought to address segregation, which is seen as a challenge to the egalitarian welfare states across the region. Ethnic segregation, which is the main focus in Denmark, tends to co-vary with segregation along other dimensions, leading to what is usually referred to as an “accumulation of welfare problems” in the Norwegian context (see e.g. Tronstad, Nygaard, and Bask 2018). In this context, Sweden also launched a new national strategy in 2018 (Government Offices of Sweden 2018), and Norway introduced a new Integration Strategy in which one chapter addresses segregation (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a).

While these three strategies – announced in three similar countries – are all aimed at the policy problem of segregation, they are quite different from each other, both in their understanding of the policy problem, and in their approach to solving them. In this report, we compare them to each other. We carry out a structured reading of the policy strategies in the three countries, asking certain key questions:

- What kinds of visions and challenges to integration are presented in each country’s strategy, and what kinds of factual, explanatory and normative claims are made to support them?
- What are the overall focus areas of each country’s strategy?
- What types of policy design and policy instruments are used in selected policy areas?

We believe that asking these questions can lead us to interesting insights about both policies and politics addressing integration and segregation in the Scandinavian countries. There will be somewhat more attention paid to Denmark and Sweden, given that they launched new

¹ “Refugee” as a legal category refers to someone who fits into the Geneva Convention definition. In this report, it is used somewhat more broadly to refer to any person who obtained a residence permit in a Scandinavian state following a request for asylum, whether they were given Geneva Convention status, complementary protection or a residence permit on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. In the integration policy realm, these different legal categories are often treated the same or similarly.
strategies during 2018 which were more specifically targeted toward residential segregation than Norway’s new Integration Strategy, where this was one aspect among several. Before addressing these strategies, the remainder of this introductory chapter will provide relevant empirical and research background as follows:

- A brief overview of immigration stocks and flows in Scandinavia
- A brief overview of past policy initiatives aimed at vulnerable urban areas
- A brief overview of past research on immigration regimes, settlement and segregation
- A guide to the rest of the report

Background: immigration to Scandinavia and selected past policy initiatives

In this section, we will provide some key empirical background. First, we will provide a brief overview of immigration in the three Scandinavian states, and then we will outline key past policy initiatives in the area of segregation. The most recent policy initiatives, analyzed in this report, followed on the record asylum inflows of 2015. As the figures show, however, the 2015 inflow – and the resident immigrant population – were the smallest in Denmark, where there has been the most controversy over the links between integration and segregation.

Immigration in the Scandinavian states

The Scandinavian states have histories of immigration with many commonalities, but some distinctive features. After a long period as primarily countries of emigration, all three received labor migrants in the 1960s and early 1970s, with different countries of origin dominating inflows. In Norway, many migrants came from Pakistan; in Denmark many came from Turkey, and in Sweden, many came from former Yugoslavia; however the immigrant populations are quite diverse. After the end of the initial phase of labor market immigration, the three countries received a larger share of migrants through family and asylum streams, although the recent composition of migration inflows has been quite different. During the past decade, Denmark has seen a lower share of family migration and a somewhat different composition of immigration flows. The most recent figures from OECD suggests that intra-European free movement makes up the largest share of immigrants coming to Norway (42.5 per cent in 2016) and Denmark (45.6 per cent in 2016). In Sweden in 2016, intra-EU free movement made up 22.1 per cent of in-migration, compared to 51.8 per cent “humanitarian” (asylum-related). That same year, humanitarian migrants made up 26.8 per cent of migration flows to Norway and 12.3 per cent to Denmark (OECD 2018). Sweden has generally seen higher levels of overall immigration than the other two states in recent years (see Figure 1.1), and also higher numbers of asylum applications (see Figure 1.2).

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2 According to Eurostat statistics on first permits per reason (migresfirst dataset), between 2008 and 2017 28 per cent of first permits in Denmark were issued for family reasons, compared to 43 per cent in Sweden and 41 per cent in Norway. Conversely, 28 per cent of first permits issued in Denmark were for educational reasons (international students), compared to 10 and 13 per cent respectively in Sweden and Norway. This dataset does not include international protection/asylum permits as a category, and it is therefore not possible to compare the share of such permits based on this data.
The difference between the three states in the scope of migration inflows has been particularly notable during the past decade, with Sweden seeing significantly larger asylum inflows. While Norway also saw its highest ever number of asylum seekers in 2015, at over

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3 Graph produced from the Nordic Statistics database, https://www.nordicstatistics.org/population/migrations/. Comprises non-Nordic citizens who obtain a residence permit or a work permit for a period exceeding at least three months and Nordic citizens who move permanently to another Nordic country. Please observe that the registration method differs from one Nordic country to another (the Danish number includes persons from Greenland and the Faroe Islands; and is persons who gained a residence permit valid more than 3 months. In Norway it is persons with a residence permit valid more than 6 months and in Sweden a permit valid more than one year.

30,000, this pales compared to the over 160,000 applications lodged in Sweden. This peak in 2015 is an important context for changes to integration policy, as we have already noted. However, since then asylum arrivals have dropped. In Norway, 3,577 persons were issued protection permits in 2018, out of almost 30,000 non-EEA immigration permits. In Denmark, 1,652 protection permits were issued, out of a total of approximately 37,000 non-EEA immigration permits. While Sweden issued a much larger number of protection permits in 2018 (25,114), this was out of a total of approximately 125,000 non-EEA first permits.

If we look instead at “stocks” or each country’s immigrant population - that is, all residents who were born in any other country, including the other Nordic countries - we can note that it is also larger in Sweden, where 1.9 million, or 19 per cent of the Swedish population, is foreign-born. Following the refugee crisis, Syrians have overtaken Finns as the largest group. In Denmark, the foreign-born population is approximately 600,000, or 10.4 per cent of the population. Norway, again, falls in the middle with approximately 765,000 foreign-born, making up 14.4 per cent of the population.

A long history of measures to counter segregation

In the following we will briefly mention some past measures addressing segregation in the three countries. This is not a comprehensive overview of past policies, but a brief contextualization of current initiatives.

15 years of Danish “ghetto strategies”

The 2018 announcement of a new Danish “ghetto strategy” elicited significant international attention. However, this was not the first time Danish politicians had used this loaded term to describe residential segregation in Danish urban areas. Danish immigration and integration policies underwent a significant overhaul around the turn of the century, in particular following the 2001 election which brought into power a coalition government of the right (Venstre and Conservative People’s Party), supported by the Danish People’s Party. During 2002-2004 a series of new restrictions were introduced in immigration legislation which have received significant attention in the scholarly literature and in public debates (see for instance Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Mouritsen and Olsen 2011). In 2004, the Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Refugees launched a strategy against “ghettoization” (Danish Government 2004), following Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen’s 2004 New Year’s Address in which and the concept of “immigrant ghettos” [indvandrerghettoer] played a prominent part (Fogh Rasmussen 2004). Parts of the urban affairs portfolio had been moved to this ministry following the disbanding of a short-lived Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (Grünenberg and Freiesleben 2016, 50). The government argued that it was a good time to address segregation, in light of the “restrictions in the immigration act, the falling immigration numbers” and new housing rules which would “reduce pressure on public housing in urban areas (Danish Government 2004, 7). It was very explicit that the “strategy against

7 https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.4cb46070161462db113174/1550131463060/Beviljade_uppeh%C3%A5llstillst%C3%A5nd_2018.pdf
8 This measure counts all foreign-born persons, regardless of their country of origin, so counted among these are other Nordic citizens, persons from other European countries and so on.
9 https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/utrikes-fodda/
11 https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/faktaside/innvandring
12 For a discussion on terminology, see chapter 2.
ghettoization is [...] a part of the strategy part of the strategy for better integration (ibid, 11, emphasis in original).

The strategy emphasized that the formation of ghettos was “not the result of free persons making free choices”, and that they were “not created because someone wants them” (Danish Government 2004, 7 emphasis in original). Rather, it was emphasized that a key reason for the formation of ghettos was not the choices of their residents to move there, but past policy failure and “unintended consequences” (ibid, 14) of former planning decisions, integration and labor market policies (ibid, 7), such as having only public housing in an area (ibid, 14), combined with the difficulty immigrants can have in accessing the private housing market.

In the 2004 strategy, ethnic segregation was presented not as a problem in and of itself (although the same cannot be said about the prime minister’s New Year’s Address), but as becoming a problem when combined with other challenges such as low labor market participation. Such a combination of local challenges could create situations that were not conducive to integration, through physical distance from “surrounding society”, possible stigma in the labor market, and possible development of communities where “Danish norms and values to a large extent remain unknown” (ibid, 12). These values were not clearly identified, and it was noted that they were to some extent “unwritten” (Danish Government 2004, 34). While this first strategy did not include a precise definition of a “ghetto”, it listed the following possible indicators: 1) a high proportion of adults receiving social assistance, 2) a low level of education, 3) large public housing projects, 4) uneven patterns of persons moving in and out, and 5) lack of private investment and entrepreneurship (ibid, 15). While the percentage of immigrants or descendants was not among the listed criteria, a table of the “possible” ghetto areas included almost exclusively areas which were more than 50 per cent ethnic minority and had the percentage listed in the table (Danish Government 2004, 16).

In 2010, the Danish government again presented another ghetto strategy, targeting a much longer list of residential areas (Danish Government 2010). By now, the rhetoric and framing had changed substantially, and the immigration angle was more explicit not just in political debate and discourse but in the strategy document itself. Ethnic segregation in and of itself was now framed as problematic: “Today more than six out of ten residents in the 29 ghettos are immigrants or descendants from non-Western countries. This is not acceptable". As Grünenberg and Freiesleben note, by this point “non-Western immigrants were established as an independent variable in the definition of ghettos, thus positioning ethnicity as one of the main focus points in strategies against ghettoization” (Grünenberg and Freiesleben 2016, 50). The definition of “non-Western countries” in Danish statistics is anyone who is not from any of the following countries: “28 EU countries and Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, Vatican State, Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand”, and the Danish statistics agency specifies that this, along with the concept “immigrants and descendants”, are concepts that “do not occur in other countries”.\(^\text{13}\)

Whereas the 2004 strategy included references to sociological research on dynamics which lead to residential segregation as well as an admission of past policy failure, the 2010 strategy is less explicit on the possible causes of the problem. The physical and social isolation of certain residential areas is highlighted as a cause, and by mitigating this through renewal as well as through amended rules for public housing, new residents with more

resources could be attracted to move to these areas in order to ensure more mixed populations (Danish Government 2010, 16).

**Swedish efforts against segregation and for integration**

In Sweden, an early large-scale effort against segregation was the reform program known as “Blommanpengarna” or “Blommansatsningen”, starting in the mid-1990s and targeting eight areas in major cities (Swedish Integration Agency 2000). The reform program was launched by Minister of Integration Leif Blomberg. Its explicit objective was to address ethnic residential segregation through increasing the skills of immigrants in order to improve their prospects in the labor market. This was to happen through action plans developed locally, with cooperation among various actors. This suggests that the ambitions of the program also included inducing change in how different levels of government worked and cooperated with each other. In 1999, this reform program was replaced by Storstadsatsningen, a policy reform program aimed at large cities which was coordinated by an inter-ministerial working group led from the Ministry of Justice. Seven municipalities with a total of 24 vulnerable urban areas were part of this reform program, and this time there were more rigorous rules and frameworks for cooperation across levels of government. Here, again, there was a strong emphasis on local engagement. This program ran until 2004. In 2007, the government entered into development agreements with 21 municipalities concerning 38 vulnerable areas (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 12). Instead of project-based efforts, these agreements aimed at developing existing institutional structures and linking together different policy areas (local development, employment, education and safety (ibid.). Some of these 38 areas, including 15 urban areas, continued with a second phase of efforts during 2012-2014. According to the current strategy, these former programs have had positive effects locally and at individual level, but show that segregation must be addressed in a broader perspective and not only locally (ibid, 13).

In 2016, at Almedalsveckan, the Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven, a Social Democrat in coalition with the Green Party, presented a new reform program against segregation on which the 2018 strategy builds (Regeringskansliet 2016). It addressed the same five policy areas as the 2018 strategy, but in a somewhat different order: crime, long-term unemployment, improving schools, improving social services and reducing housing segregation, and supporting civil society and democracy.

**Norwegian area policies**

Norway, like Sweden, has a history of area-based policy interventions for urban improvement. Like the long-standing Swedish policies since the mid-1980s, Norway’s approaches to address the challenges of particularly vulnerable areas has built on cooperation between levels of government from Ministries to cities and city districts, different sectors, the Norwegian State Housing Bank, the Directorate of Immigration (1997-2001) and civic organizations. Such area policies have, as their general aim, to improve the environment, housing and living conditions in a specific area, and thus mitigate certain vulnerabilities and make these areas more attractive. A key program has been the long-term development projects in the Grorud Valley, which we will refer to with its Norwegian name *Groruddalssatsingen*. The first program period ran from 2007-2016, and covered four program areas:

- Environmentally friendly transportation
- Green areas, sport and culture in the Alna area
- Housing, urban and local development
- Childhood, education, cultural activities and inclusion
The renewed ten-year Groruddalssatsningen for 2017-2026, with a somewhat altered focus from the first program period, will be examined in chapter 3. Similar projects, tailored to their local context, have been employed in a few other parts of Oslo as well as in Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Drammen.

The Groruddalen area strategy builds on a range of former programs aiming at improving living conditions in urban areas. The first comprehensive program was The Urban Renewal program in Oslo (1977 – 1990) which included most of the inner city districts on the east side of the urban center. The aim was physical improvement including indoor plumbing, family dwellings and, not least, a change from private rental dwellings to ownership, mostly in housing co-operatives. In the mid-1980s, a committee with representatives from the Cooperative Housing Federation of Norway, the Ministry of Local Affairs and the Union for Construction workers launched a report for better suburban housing. Researchers from NIBR and later the Norwegian Institute for Building Research were responsible for program implementation (Bolig- og miljøfornyelse i etterkrigstidas boligområder – BOM, 1985-1989) in suburban housing co-operatives in five cities. The program was financed by and in co-operation with the Ministries for Local Authorities and Environment, the Norwegian State Housing Bank, the Co-operative Housing Federation of Norway, and the Housing Associations in the respective cities. One point of departure was the Ammerud report (Sæterdal and Hansen 1969) which criticized the massive housing production and lack of local services in the new suburban areas. The BOM program built on evaluations of Statens nærmiljøprogram [the State program for local environments], especially when it came to how to include residents and local organizations in the problem definition process and implementation, and how to anchor the policies locally. The implementation of the BOM program was under the umbrella of action research and resulted in a lot of sharing of experiences and ‘to do’ guides directed towards local implementers and disseminated to municipalities and Housing associations all over the country. The program was followed by smaller programs, including ‘Urban neighborhoods’ (1990-1993), ‘Multicultural neighborhoods’ (1989-1991) and the Development program of Multicultural Housing Environments (1997-2001), all with strong research involvement. The experiences from all these programs aimed at improving urban neighborhoods were transformed into an Advisory service (Bomiljøtjenesten) facilitating urban neighborhood development. The Advisory service was financed by the Norwegian State Housing Bank and run by researchers at the Norwegian Institute for Building Research. Thereafter Oslo city initiated the Handlingsprogram for Oslo Indre Øst [Action program for Oslo’s Inner East Side] (1997-2007). Experiences from this program inspired the aims, organization of and the implementation of the Groruddalssatsingen. In retrospect, the diverse urban programs are interesting in that they were directed towards the overlap of vulnerable groups in the urban housing market and vulnerable neighborhoods. After the urban renewal, the Norwegian urban area programs have followed the mobility patterns of the population with immigrant background, from the inner city east to the suburbs in the north and south of Oslo. For the immigrants, this mobility was part of a housing carrier from private rentals in old buildings to homeownership through housing co-operatives and more modern and spacious dwellings. However, the ongoing Groruddalen area programs are comprehensive and directed towards all people living in these areas.

Previous research

In this last part of the introduction, we will review selected relevant literature on Scandinavian integration, settlement and housing policies, showing how they are linked with each other and how they are expressed differently in the three Scandinavian states. It is not intended as
an exhaustive literature review, but it will provide a context for the empirical chapters and the discussions that follow, and is drawn on for analytical tools. The research presented here is primarily identified through snowballing methods and is focused on publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals. It should be noted that there is also a significant “grey literature” on migration, integration and segregation – especially in Norway on Sweden – made up of commissioned research reports and evaluations. Indeed, this report is one such publication.

**Research on immigration regimes in the Scandinavian welfare states**

There is an extensive literature examining the similarities and differences between Scandinavian immigration and integration policies, termed collectively their “immigration regimes” (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010; for other examples see Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Olwig 2010; Valenta and Bunar 2010; Larsen 2010; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen 2017). Part of the allure of comparing these three states lies in their similarities along many lines of inquiry – indeed, they are often confused for each other in other parts of the world – lending themselves to most-similar-systems-design studies. All three states are small, open economies with comprehensive welfare states – which, intriguingly, exhibit stark differences in their immigration regimes. In the 2000s, Sweden and Denmark have generally been found on opposite ends with regard to both immigration and integration policies, with Danish policies being some of Europe’s strictest and Sweden’s among the most liberal (for example in the MIPEX index of integration policies, published most recently in 2015, with pre-2015 data). The immigration restrictions implemented in Sweden in 2015 changed this picture somewhat, although the Scandinavian states arguably retained the same position relative to each other.

Norway has historically held a middle position, drawing on influences from both states (see Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen 2017). Some studies have therefore only examined Sweden and Denmark, as examples of “extreme cases”.

Karin Borevi has recently advanced an interesting historically informed argument about why Sweden and Denmark have such similar welfare states and such dissimilar immigration policies. Noting the well-known argument from political science that there is a trade-off between diversity and welfare provision (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), she highlights that elite discourses in Sweden and Denmark evince different understandings of the link between social cohesion and the welfare state and how they can be combined. She argues that in Denmark, a “society-centered perspective” or bottom-up understanding is dominant, whereby homogeneity is understood as a necessary precursor to the welfare state. She links this to the strongly assimilationist stance seen in much of Danish immigration and integration policy and the high “barriers to entry” in the sense of migration restrictions. In Sweden, by contrast, a state centered or top-down perspective leads to the conclusion that the state can promote and create social inclusion among a diverse populace (Borevi 2017). This insight could lead us to expect different policy approaches among the two states, with a more proactive, top-down, integration policy in Sweden and a stronger focus on the individual migrant and their responsibilities in Denmark.

There has also been a strong interest in recent years in empirical research on immigration and integration, often with a view to developing comparable evidence and data to support policymaking. Within the Nordic region, the Nordic Council of Ministers has sought to support knowledge building in this area, since “policymakers need solid evidence and data” (Karlsdóttir, et al. 2018). In 2018 the National Statistical Offices of the Nordic countries

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14 The MIPEX has not been updated since 2015, and therefore it does not reflect the post-2015 situation, however since all three states implemented restrictions one can assume that they moved in absolute terms but retained largely the same position relative to each other.
collected and published a Nordic database with harmonized and comparable migration and integration statistics. There is a significant amount of research on integration into the labor market, in particular, since labor market integration is seen as key to immigrant integration overall and also important for the sustainability of Nordic welfare states. However, labor market integration is arguably linked to other aspects of integration. A recent study finds that immigrants are much more likely to accumulate welfare problems compared with natives, and such problems are strongly associated with low labour market attachment (Tronstad, Nygaard, and Bask 2018). Importantly, new Norwegian research suggests that education and formal qualifications, especially completed after arrival, can be crucial for immigrant labor market participation (Bratsberg, Raaum, and Røed 2017), and both can co-vary with residential patterns.

Segregation, housing regimes, and settlement policies

There is a significant body of research on patterns of segregation and segmentation in Scandinavian cities. One comparative study found that Stockholm has the highest level of ethnic segregation of the Nordic capitals (Skifter Andersen et al. 2016). An interesting finding is that the Nordic welfare state might slow down processes of spatial assimilation compared to e.g. North American cities, since policies which improve services in the local area mean that immigrants will have less of an incentive to move away if their incomes increase (and if their incomes do not increase and they remain dependent on welfare they will also remain in place) (Wessel et al. 2017).

Patterns of segregation are widely assumed to have some correlation with housing regimes and housing markets in the Scandinavian cities. Just like in integration policies, comparative research has shown that there are stark differences between the housing policies and markets of Scandinavian states, and there have therefore been similar comparative projects examining housing regimes (see e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2006). Denmark has a large proportion of rental housing, either in the form of private renting or in the form of social and public housing (Andersen, Turner, and Søholt 2013, 28). Sweden also has a fairly large rental housing market, and a social housing share of approximately 14 per cent. In Norway, the market is dominated by cooperative housing and individual ownership, with only a small share of the housing market (about 4 per cent) made up of by social housing (ibid). An explanation for these differences can be found in decisions made early on in the development of housing policies, and in how the Scandinavian states responded to housing shortages after World War II relying on tools at their disposal. These decisions arguably set the Scandinavian countries off on different policy paths and limited choices down the line (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2010; see also Bengtsson et al. 2006). Because of these differences in the housing market, immigrants have differential access to types of housing. There are also different compositions of tenure types in the Scandinavian countries. Immigrants in Norway are more likely to own their own home than in the other two countries, whereas they are more likely to live in social housing in Denmark, where such housing is more accessible (Andersen, Turner, and Søholt 2013). The distribution of different home tenure types in geographical space is determined by urban and planning policies. In Oslo, owner-occupied housing is spread across the city, meaning that also lower-income areas will have a more mixed tenure (Wessel et al. 2017). Ethnic segmentation across housing tenures is linked to residential segregation due to how tenure types are distributed (Andersen et al. 2016).

The most direct link from immigration and integration policies to housing policies are the policies concerning settlement of newcomers, in particular of refugees. While housing

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15 https://www.nordicstatistics.org/population/migrations/
policies more broadly have a larger element of choice, and are to varying degrees
determined by market forces (more so in Norway), there are several reasons for which the
question of choice has been treated differently for this group. Borevi and Bengtsson identify
three arguments for restricted choice: 1) the legal status of newcomers as a legitimation for
intervening in their choice of housing; 2) their limited resources as an argument for providing
housing, and 3) the collective needs for a good social environment in order to advance
integration (Borevi and Bengtsson 2015). In this policy area we can also identify significant
differences between the Scandinavian states (Hernes 2017; see also Søholt and Aasland
2019). Sweden has had a long-standing policy of “own choice” settlement, even for asylum
seekers (although it is currently undergoing reforms, as we will get back to). Denmark and
Norway have had dispersal policies aimed at determining where accepted refugees settle,
although they work differently. Refugees cannot choose where they want to live. In Denmark,
the central government determines the allocation of refugees to each municipality, whereas in
Norway the central government makes a request for municipalities to take in refugees and
then the municipal council determines how many they will accept (Askim and Hernes 2017).
Denmark has to some extent also sought to direct where reunited family members reside
during their first years. Through dispersal policies, initial settlement can be ensured away
from urban areas where social challenges have been identified, in keeping with Bengtsson
and Borevi’s third argument about ensuring good social environments for integration (2015),
although the evidence for such an argument is mixed as it could depend on a variety of
factors such as the local labor market. Recent research from Sweden suggests that co-ethnic
concentration in the “point-of-entry” neighborhood can have significant effects on long-term
employment prospects, although the effects differ by gender, with negative outcomes for
certain groups of women (Andersson, Musterd, and Galster 2018). In another recent project,
AI has been found to be useful to optimize matching of refugees with settlement locations in
order to improve short term employment outcomes (Trapp et al. 2018).

What this report does, and what it does not do

This report is not an empirical analysis of segregation patterns, its causes and effects.
Rather, this report conducts a policy analysis of recent strategies, what understanding of
observable reality they are based on, and how they propose to address it. As such, this
report examines how existing perceptions of evidence is turned into policy, through the
definition of policy problems and elaboration of possible policy solutions.

The report will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 will outline the material and analytical
approach. Chapter 3 is the first main analytical chapter, in which we examine and compare
the problem definition in recent strategies. Chapter 4 examines the policy mix which is
proposed. Chapter 5 has discusses the findings from empirical chapters in relation to existing
research findings.
2 Material and approach

In this chapter we will introduce the material analyzed in this report as well as the analytical approach used to examine it.

Material

This report is based on recent policy documents issued by the three Scandinavian states. While Denmark and Sweden issued strategies which directly addressed segregation, Norway launched a new Integration Strategy which also addresses this issue. We also refer to earlier policy documents addressing segregation in the three countries, as well as relevant secondary literature.

Denmark

In early 2018, the Danish government (a coalition of the right-of-center parties Venstre, Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party) presented a new political action plan to address residential and ethnic segregation, which they presented as an extension of recent measures in immigration and integration policy. Noting that the inflow of new asylum seekers and migrants had slowed down, and that measures had been taken with regard to newcomers, they argued that it was now time to turn to people already residing in Denmark – just as they did in 2004. The document is called “A Denmark without parallel societies: No ghettos by 2030” [“Et Danmark uden parallelssamfund: Ingen ghettos i 2030”]. The strategy was followed by several political agreements concerning its implementation. The strategy makes up the key Danish document examined in this report. It is also compared to previous analogous strategies from 2004 and 2010, and supplemented by other recent agreements on the implementation of the strategy. The most recent example, the law proposal L140 (Minister of Immigration and integration 2019), was presented and passed through the Danish Parliament during the writing of this report. It is therefore not addressed in detail, but mentioned where relevant.

Sweden

Following on a political announcement in the summer of 2016, the Swedish government (a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens led by Social Democrat Prime Minister Löfven) also presented a new strategy to tackle segregation in 2018. Compared to the Danish strategy, this is a longer and more comprehensive report entitled “The government’s long-term strategy to lessen and counter segregation” [“Regeringens långsiktiga strategi för att minska och motverka segregation”. This is the key Swedish policy document examined in this report, in addition to previous research and selected policy documents and reviews of past strategies (e.g. Swedish Integration Agency 2000). In 2019, Stefan Löfven formed a second cabinet. It is still a coalition with the Greens, but reliant on support from the Center Party and the Liberals. They reached a political agreement [överenskommelse] in January 2019 which will be referred to on certain points in this report (Social Democratic Party, Center Party, Liberal Party and Green Party 2019).

Norway

Norway has not made an exactly analogous policy move during 2018. However, in October 2018 the government (a coalition of the Conservatives, the Progress Party and the Liberals)16 launched a new Integration strategy primarily focused on education and qualification, which

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16 The Christian Democrats subsequently joined this coalition government in January 2019.
in its “Everyday integration” chapter outlines a series of measures against segregation. Furthermore, the government created an expert commission tasked with examining the problem of residential and ethnic segregation which will produce a Norwegian Official Report (NOU) on this issue. In order to carry out a relevant comparison with Norway, the following documents have been considered:

- Integration strategy ch. 3 “Everyday integration” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a)
- The mandate of the expert commission (2018)
- The program plan for the second phase of the Grorud Valley Integrated Urban Regeneration Project [henceforth “Groruddalssatsingen”] (2017-2026), including the mandate and agreement between the state and the city of Oslo (signed in 2015)

The latter of the three represents the largest single local program against segregation, covering four boroughs in Oslo. These Norwegian documents operate at different levels of government, and as such at different levels of specificity. The Groruddalssatsingen Program Plan is a meso-level document which attends in particular to the practical aspects of governance and coordination, which are somewhat less relevant here, so we will focus on the general and policy oriented aspects rather than the programmatic and organizational aspects of the document. This means that there is no direct comparison between the Norwegian documents and the Swedish and Danish ones, but based on each theme examined we draw on the relevant comparator.

**Approaches to policy analysis**

In the following, we will briefly outline the analytical tools we draw on from the policy and political science literature in order to carry out a structured reading of the above-mentioned documents. We draw on Adrian Favell’s analytical schema of so-called “public theories”, through which he has analyzed what he has termed “philosophies of integration” (Favell 1998). This approach was further adapted and refined by Brekke (2001), and we draw on this application, summarized in Figure 2.1. To identify a public theory, we can examine policy documents and discourses with a view to identifying 1) epistemological claims, 2) explanatory claims, and 3) normative claims. Epistemological claims are factual claims about what is, and in this case they could include official statistics and measurements and other references employed in order to describe the policy problem. Explanatory claims are claims made about causality. Such claims could be about the past, in the case of claims made about the causes of the problem. They could also be about the future in the sense of presenting causal arguments about how the problem should be addressed. Normative claims are claims about values, how things should be and how people should behave.

This approach to analysis can also be tied to other, similar, approaches to public policy analysis. Notably, the search for epistemological and explanatory claims is quite similar to the approach to public policy analysis developed by Carol Lee Bacchi (1999, 2009), which is often referred to by its central analytical question: “what is the problem represented to be?” Asking this question leads one to investigate the implicit or explicit diagnosis of the problem that a given policy is designed to address. As such, this is a form of discourse analysis in which we investigate dominant public discourses and arguments in favour of a given policy solutions. We will also draw briefly on Schneider and Ingram (1993), who have argued that public policies contain within them a social construction of the target groups of the policies. They theorized that the characteristics of these social constructions could have predictive properties with regard to the types of policies that were employed; notably, a negative social
construction is tied to punitive policy measures whereas a positive social construction will be associated with policies that are more beneficial to the target audience. Tying this to the above mentioned public theory approach, we can look for normative claims about policy target audiences. Where such normative claims have a negative valence, we can expect that the associated policies – and explanatory or causal claims about how policy goals should be reached – will be “harsher” or more punitive.

Figure 2.1: Levels of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public theory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>epistemological claims</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy development</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>instruments</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social reality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>effects of policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on translations and terminology

All translations from the Scandinavian languages are by the authors. Where the phrases are ambiguous or the original phrasing seems particularly pertinent, the original is included in brackets. Any errors of translation remain the responsibility of the authors.

This report deals with a contentious political issue, where intra-Scandinavian differences begin with terminology used to describe similar phenomena. Words that are commonly used in one country can be perceived as stigmatizing in the others. Most notably, the word “ghetto” has been used widely in Danish policymaking and public for 15 years, but would be considered impolitic by many in Sweden and Norway. It could also in and of itself be part of the reason of the negative international media attention which the Danish strategy received in 2018 (e.g. Barry and Sorensen 2018), since the term ghetto in English has clear negative connotations both historical and current (see for example Anderson 2012). There is, of course, awareness of such negative connotations in Denmark and there has been contestation over the use of this term, but it is employed today among politicians from major parties on the right and left.

The Danish strategy also consistently uses the term “parallel societies”. This term is to some extent used in Norway, but less so in Sweden. The areas targeted by Swedish policies are referred to as “areas with socioeconomic challenges” ["områden med socioekonomiska utmaningar"], and the strategy explicitly cautions against generalizations both about the areas themselves (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 21) and groups of residents (ibid, p.11).
Another term used in Sweden is a “vulnerable area” [utsatt område]. In Norway, one more often speaks of an “area with complex welfare challenges” [komplekse levekårsutfordringer], similar to the Swedish designation, or also “vulnerable area”. In Denmark, we see this term employed in the 2018 strategy to denote an area that does not meet the full ghetto criteria.

When speaking of the individual countries, this report will use the terminology used in that country’s strategies and documents. It will otherwise use the terms vulnerable area, disadvantaged area or designated area as a generic short form term referring to areas which have various combinations of socioeconomic and other challenges which these policies aim to mitigate. Vulnerability is, itself, a contested term. It should be emphasized that vulnerability in this context is not seen as an inherent characteristic, but a contextual characteristic which is amenable to change.
3 Scandinavian theories of segregation: how is the problem of segregation understood in the three Scandinavian states?

In this chapter we will examine the recent policies targeting residential segregation in the three Scandinavian states. Our objective is to outline each country’s “public theory”, which we call their “theory of segregation”. In order to do so, we examine a) factual, b) explanatory and c) normative claims about segregation which are made in each country’s political strategy.

What is the problem? Factual claims about residential segregation

Policy documents in all three countries contain qualitative descriptions and administrative statistics about the current state of certain urban areas and the populations which live in them, in order to outline the policy problems the strategies aim to address. Such statistics make a policy problem “legible”, to borrow a term from James C. Scott (1998). They also provide a necessary basis for measuring change or improvement, and can thus be used in benchmarking and evaluations. The particular aspects which are highlighted through descriptive statistics also tell us about the dimensions of the policy problem which are seen as relevant and salient in each of the three Scandinavian states.

It is also relevant here to briefly address the framing of specific target populations. Vulnerable areas are likely to be quite heterogeneous and have different combinations of (local) social challenges. They are also likely to be internally quite diverse, and even where there is a high proportion of ethnic minorities (which can, in and of itself, be a highly heterogeneous group in terms of countries of origin and length of residence), there will also be a proportion of residents who are of Danish/Swedish/Norwegian background. How are residents addressed? Who are the main targets of the policies? We may recall here the argument that target populations are “socially constructed” and that the dominant construction may have positive or negative valence, that is, whether there is a normative claim inherent in it.

Denmark

While there was no explicit definition of a “ghetto” in the 2004 strategy, the Danish government subsequently elaborated criteria defining a “ghetto”, releasing an annual list of such areas. In the 2018 strategy, there is a tiered approach defining not just “ghettos” but also “vulnerable areas” on one end, and “hard ghettos” on the other. The area has to have at least 1,000 inhabitants.
Table 3.1: Danish criteria for vulnerable areas (March 2018 strategy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerable area fulfils at least two of the below criteria:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants or descendants with non-Western background exceeds 50 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of residents between 18-64 who are not in education or employment exceeds 40 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of residents with convictions in accordance with the Penal Code, Firearms Act or Misuse of Drugs Act exceeds 2.7 per cent of all residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The share of residents aged 30 to 59 who only hold primary education exceeds 60 per cent (only counting education completed or approved in Denmark)(^{17})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average gross income among residents aged 15-64 who are not in education is less than 55 per cent of the average gross income of the same age group in the region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Danish "ghetto" criteria (March 2018 strategy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A ghetto is a vulnerable area which also fulfils two of the below criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>share of convicted persons exceeding 2.7 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share not in employment or education exceeds 40 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants or descendants with non-Western background exceeds 50 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of immigrants or descendants with non-Western background exceeds 60 per cent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By applying these criteria, the Strategy (published in March 2018) identifies 57 areas as vulnerable; of which 25 are defined as ghettos. Of these, 16 are defined as “hard ghettos” on the basis of having been listed for four years in a row. Over all, approximately 228,000 people reside in vulnerable areas. This is presented as making up approximately 22 per cent of Denmark’s total stock of social housing (Danish Government 2018, 13).\(^{18}\) If we recall the previous strategies, we can note that the definition has changed in several ways, including through the inclusion of criminal statistics, by excluding any education completed abroad from the educational attainment statistics, and by creating the new category of “vulnerable areas”. If these had not been included, there would have been fewer ghettos than in 2010 (when there were 29).

In the latest “ghetto list”, issued 1 December 2018, the criteria have again been slightly amended (see below), and this results in an increase back up to 29 ghettos (Ministry of Transport 2018).

\(^{17}\) This criterion is amended based on past criteria through the exclusion of self-reported education and the raising of the cut-off value from 50 to 60 per cent.

\(^{18}\) This implies that all the designated areas are social housing estates, although that is not specified.
Table 3.3: Danish "ghetto" criteria (December 2018 "ghetto list")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries exceeds 50 per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND two of the below criteria are met</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of residents (18-64 years old) not in employment or education exceeds 40 per cent, calculated as an average over the past two years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of residents convicted according to the Penal Code, Firearms Act or Misuse of Drugs Act is at least 3 times the national average, calculated as an average over the past two years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of residents (aged 30-59) with only a primary school education exceeds 60 per cent of all residents in same age group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average gross income for taxpayers aged 15-64 in the area (excluding persons in education) is less than 55 per cent of the average gross income for the same group in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is notable that the Danish strategy contains very few references to research or evidence beyond the kinds of administrative statistics referenced here. A single exception here is a reference to “research has shown” that early intervention is best when seeking to strengthen children’s cognitive, social and emotional competences (Danish Government 2018, 24). There is very limited reliance on social science research in order to define the problem or make factual or explanatory claims about it – including any research commissioned by the government itself, or any evaluations of past strategies.

The social construction of target populations in this document is arguably relatively negatively laden and focused almost exclusively on persons of “non-Western background”. While it is noted that “many immigrants fortunately manage well” and “participate actively in their local sports club, our many associations and Danish society at large”, “there are too many that do not take active part”; and “far too many immigrants and descendants have ended up without attachment to surrounding society. Without education. Without work. And without an adequate level of Danish” (Danish Government 2018, 4). These are arguably negative normative claims about the behavior of immigrants and descendants. While the explicit targets of the strategy are “residents [borgere] in parallel societies” (Danish Government 2018, 5), it is further specified that “with this strategy we want to target also the measures aimed at residents [borgerrettede forslag], so that they only apply to the areas and the residents with the greatest challenges” (ibid.). Non-ethnic minority residents are barely mentioned in the document, so it seems that this more “targeted” approach entails only addressing ethnic minority residents. If one looks at the 2018 “Ghetto list”, the 29 included areas have a proportion of residents of “non-Western background” between 51 and 82.6 per cent. In 12 of them, the proportion is between 51 and 60 per cent – meaning that nearly half of the residents are of “Western” background (i.e. ethnic majority Danish or immigrants from “Western” countries). 34 percent of the total number of residents in the 29 areas are “Western”. The presented statistics do not specify whether there are differences between e.g. ethnic majority Danes and persons of “non-Western background” with regard to employment or educational attainment.

Sweden

In Sweden, we can note that the target areas are presented with somewhat less statistical precision than in the Danish strategy, and to start with it is emphasized that different governmental agencies may employ different definitions depending on their focus. One set of

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19 The Danish word *borger* means citizen, in both senses of the word – *lovlydig borger* as in “law-abiding citizen” and *dansk borger* as in “Danish citizen”. It is understood here to mean resident, and not to have a specific bearing on citizenship.
criteria, which have been used in previous area-based policies, partly overlap with some of the Danish criteria for a vulnerable area:
Table 3.4: Past Swedish criteria for area based policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment rate 52 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>long-term reliance on social assistance above 4.8 % of the residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school completion below 70 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no specific list of areas which are targeted in the strategy, since there is a dearth of comparable nation-wide data (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 11). Statistics Sweden has developed a database covering 38 areas which have been the object of area policies in the past, in cooperation between the state and municipalities. However, these 38 areas do not entirely overlap with a separate classification carried out by the Swedish police in its work targeting crime in vulnerable areas (ibid.).

The target population in this strategy is different from the Danish one. The focus in Sweden, as we will get to below, is foremost on socio-economic segregation and not on ethnic segregation, and therefore the policies are targeted at all residents in disadvantaged areas and not only ethnic minority residents. There strategy also cautions against generalizations about residents in vulnerable areas, noting that even though there are problems in these areas that can be considered in general terms, they do not necessarily apply to all residents. It acknowledges that there is a risk of stigmatization, but “at the same time the problems that exist require attention and action” [samtidigt behöver de problem som finns uppmärksammas och hanteras] (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 11). This suggests that the document strives to remain neutral in its characterization of the target population, and seeks to avoid a negative construction.

Unlike the Danish strategy, the Swedish strategy relies heavily on social science research on the phenomenon of segregation, both to describe its status, causes and effects. The word “study” appears 34 times and “research” 14 times, for instance, and there are extensive parenthetical references to Swedish Official Reports, research papers and other types of reports by researchers or by specialized agencies, including the Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi) whose mission is to initiate and mobilize research as a basis for political decisions.

Norway

The new Norwegian Integration strategy does not include an overarching definition of the policy problem of segregation in urban areas, but does contain key descriptions of the challenge. As the strategy notes,

“some areas in large cities have many inhabitants with large and complex welfare problems [levkårsproblemer]. A concurrence of low labor market and societal participation, discrimination, and poor living standards, acts as a barrier to participation” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 44).

The strategy highlights continued support from the central government for area policies in the major cities. It notes that while such policies are locally tailored, they tend to contain measures seeking to increase labor market participation, improve housing and the local environment, create meeting points and cultural activities, improve results in primary education, reduce drop-out problems in secondary education, reduce crime, and improve public health (ibid., 47).

While these aspects are not tied specifically to segregated areas, the strategy further highlights that children with immigrant background are strongly overrepresented in low-
income households (ibid., 44), that immigrants are more often victims of hate crimes and discrimination, that immigrants are over-represented in crime statistics (both as victims and perpetrators), and that immigrant families have somewhat more frequent contact with child protective services (ibid., 45). These aspects, along with somewhat lower average participation in civil society organizations, can be understood as aspects of the integration challenges the government seeks to address, within and outside segregated areas.

Since the Groruddalssatsingen is an actual local policy developed for a designated area, it does not have a general set of criteria. We can, however, look at the indicators which are highlighted in order to explain why the policy is necessary (see Table 3.5 below). These are presented in relative terms in the program, not as specific cut-off values (Oslo Municipality 2016).

Like the Swedish strategy, the Norwegian Integration Strategy makes reference to recent academic research. Interestingly, the Norwegian focus on evidence-based policymaking is also expressed in the iterative focus of the Groruddalssatsingen and the emphasis on how the entire policy approach should be an arena for learning. The Program Plan notes that

“in the Grorud Valley we find the best prerequisites for carrying out development work with an aim to ensure that public services are able to meet the needs and challenges of a diverse society. Experiences from this work will have great utility value locally and nationally” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 5).

Table 3.5: dimensions highlighted in Groruddalssatsingen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groruddalssatsingen</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many children in need of extra language classes in order to follow ordinary schooling</td>
<td>Higher share without education beyond primary school than the rest of the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher share of children who are overweight</td>
<td>Higher share of children in low-income families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower share of students completing high school education</td>
<td>Higher share of social assistance recipients and higher share of persons on disability benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher unemployment and lower employment rates than the rest of the city</td>
<td>Higher share of persons with immigration background</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The target population of the Integration strategy is necessarily immigrants broadly speaking, whereas Groruddalssatsingen targets all residents in the four boroughs. The focus is not on immigrants and descendants only, but they remain the primary target since many (though not all) of the living standard challenges divide along ethnic lines. Both documents address the populations in relatively neutral terms and do not construct them in explicitly negative or positive ways, for example through the above specification in relation to crime that persons of ethnic minority background are not only overrepresented in crime statistics as perpetrators, but also as victims.

Comparison

Core aspects of the problem description is the same in the three countries: certain areas can be distinguished, using administrative statistics, as having comparatively poorer outcomes on incomes, labor market participation, and education, and conversely have higher rates of dependence on social assistance. However, even here we can note certain differences in how the problem of segregation is described. As researchers have previously observed (Grünenberg and Freiesleben 2016), being of non-Western background is “an independent variable” in Denmark. This is particularly striking in the fact that an area can go from vulnerable” to be defined as a ghetto with reference to ethnic composition only, if the area is
more than 60 per cent immigrants or descendants of non-Western background. In the other countries, ethnic residential segregation is primarily treated as a byproduct of socio-economic segregation, and would normally not warrant policy interventions in and of itself if not also accompanied by other challenges. Notably, the Swedish policy reversal on dispersal of asylum seekers is justified not with regard to ethnic composition of neighborhoods, but “increased pressure on the welfare system in certain municipalities” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 21).

Denmark’s dispersal policy has aimed to avoid residential concentration since 1999 (OECD 2007, 165). There may be some movement toward the Danish position in Norway — again positioning Norway firmly between the two other Scandinavian states. The Integration strategy holds up two key principles which should direct settlement of newcomers (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 44):

- the government will place more importance on municipalities’ results in the Introduction Program and job opportunities when newly arrived refugees are settled
- To prevent segregation, and to promote integration in Norwegian society, newly arrived refugees shall as a rule not be settled in areas with a high percentage of immigrants

In the context of the Grorud Valley, two things are true: the boroughs have good results in the Introduction Program, as well as high percentages of immigrants and descendants in their populations. In accordance with the criteria as laid out on the Ministry website, the most important consideration should be results in the Introduction Program (“shall be accorded the most weight”), however this resulted in a dispute between the Minister of Education and Integration and the city of Oslo about how refugees should be dispersed in the city. Oslo had already amended its distribution key away from only taking into account each borough’s population, and in its 2017 Refugee Strategy the city announced it would direct settlement toward boroughs with fewer immigrants and refugees (Oslo Municipality 2017). However, this amended distribution would still entail some settlement in the boroughs in the Grorud Valley, partly in order to maintain local expertise in boroughs with good results on integration indicators. The Minister insisted that refugees should not be settled in areas with high percentages of immigrants and descendants (Juven 2019).

Another area of difference is that in the Norwegian and Swedish contexts, we see a heightened focus on public health and obesity. In particular, public health efforts among immigrants is a specific commitment in the Integration strategy (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 51). Furthermore, Groruddalssatsingen addresses obesity among children, and the fact that poor health outcomes also co-varies with many of the other indicators (Oslo Municipality 2016, 15). The link to public health is absent in the Danish strategy.

The way the strategies discuss crime also exhibits some variation. The Danish strategy is the only one to use crime statistics specifically as an indicator, although the other states note that vulnerable areas may have higher crime rates and that residents may feel unsafe in their neighborhoods. These descriptions of crime are also where the countries most explicitly point to each other. As noted above, the Swedish strategy highlights crime in Swedish vulnerable areas as a particular challenge which is worse than in other European cities (focusing on certain types of crimes). Conversely, in the Norwegian Groruddalssatsingen cross-Scandinavian and European comparisons are employed in order to relativize the Norwegian situation. It is emphasized that “in cities such as Stockholm, Malmö, Copenhagen, London and Paris, one has seen how increasing degrees of exclusion have contributed to significant

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20 [https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/skal-ikke-bosette-i-omrader-med-hoy-innvandrerandel/id2617022/]
riots and social unrest [...] Oslo has not faced the same challenges in its suburbs as other major Nordic cities” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 4–5, emphasis added). The parts of Oslo targeted by area policies are not clearly distinguished in crime statistics as less safe (indeed, the police suggests that much of reported crime happens in the downtown core, and the general statistical trend is a reduction in reported crime, see Oslo Police District 2018). However, these area has certain specific challenges with regard to youth crime which can explain the focus on prevention (see e.g. Mellingsæter 2018). Interestingly, while proposing the most dramatic and punitive policy changes, the Danish strategy also argues that its own situation is better than elsewhere, noting that “in parts of Western Europe massive challenges have arisen with ghettos and very ingrown parallel societies. We are not there yet in Denmark” (Danish Government 2018, 5).

Table 3.6: Comparative table: definition and factual claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common defining criteria</strong></td>
<td>Higher share of persons not in employment or education; higher share with only primary education; higher high school drop out rates; higher dependence on social assistance; low average incomes</td>
<td>Poor health outcomes and obesity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unique defining criteria</strong></td>
<td>Non-Western background of residents</td>
<td>Presence of specific types of crimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main target population</strong></td>
<td>Immigrants and descendants in designated areas</td>
<td>In principle all residents in designated areas</td>
<td>Immigrants (Integration Strategy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In principle all residents (Groruddalssatingen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social construction of target population</strong></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Explicit attempt at being neutral</td>
<td>Quite neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of research</strong></td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of examples from other countries</strong></td>
<td>Need for intervention in Denmark before we see problems like in other countries</td>
<td>Certain aspects of the Swedish urban experience related to crime are uniquely problematic</td>
<td>Norway’s urban challenges are (still) lesser than in other countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 The countries use somewhat different measures related to employment, but the general point is that fewer are employed.
What causes ethnic and residential segregation?

Explanatory claims about segregation

In this section, we will examine how the policy documents in each country represent the causes of residential segregation, and how segregation came about. Interestingly, while the empirical descriptions of the “problem” highlight many of the same aspects, as we saw in the previous section, the representation of causes is quite different.

Denmark

Overall, the Danish 2018 strategy places the emphasis on the country’s increasing diversity and changing ethnic composition. The document’s second paragraph notes that the share of Denmark’s population who is either an immigrant of non-Western background or descended from non-Western immigrants having increased from 1 per cent in 1980 to 8.5 per cent in 2018. Whether or not they are Danish citizens, people who have themselves migrated and their descendants are treated as equivalent for the purposes of this calculation, as demonstrated in the following quote: “The population growth comes from outside. Both immigrants and the descendants of immigrants” (Danish Government 2018, 4). While it is not explicit in the text, the impression that the reader is left with is that the challenge of segregation in Denmark is co-extensive with immigration from non-Western countries. From this broader picture of Denmark’s changing ethnic make-up, the following three explanations are highlighted on the following page, as responses to the question “what has gone wrong?” “At least three things”, the document continues (Danish Government 2018, 5):
1. “Way too few immigrants have seized the opportunities available in Denmark”
2. “[Denmark] as a society has not set sufficiently strict requirements" for work and self-reliance among immigrants, so “too many” have ended up in “long-term passivity”
3. Immigrants “have been allowed to clump together in ghetto areas” [har fået lov til at klumpe sig sammen i ghettoområder], and “[Denmark] has not clearly required them to take part in Danish community” [ikke har stillet tydelige krav om at blive en del af det danske fællesskab].

Figure 3.2: Danish causal model

It is interesting to read this in light of the previous strategy documents and note how the causal claims have changed over a 15-year period. In the 2004 strategy there was a strong emphasis on past policy failure – and not the actions of immigrants themselves – in the causal explanations for residential segregation. There is still, to some extent, a policy failure at the heart of the explanation, but it is now a different one: not a failure of urban planning, but a failure to sanction immigrants into adopting the correct behavior. In the absence of adequate sanctions, immigrants have “clumped together” and failed to engage with opportunities that Denmark has offered them. In this analysis, segregation is to a significant extent the fault of the residents themselves.

If we ask who it is a problem for, this has two sides. On the one hand, parallel societies in ghettos are presented as a “threat to our modern society”, as well as to the welfare state given low rates of labor market participation. That indicates that the existence of “ghettos” is seen as a problem for society at large and for the state. It is also emphasized that other residents (implicitly those of Danish and “Western” background) are “pushed” to move. It is interesting here to note the difference from previous strategies with regard to references to other residents (Danish Government 2018, 5).

While the areas targeted by this strategy are areas in which the majority of residents are of non-Western background", these areas are not exclusively populated by immigrants or their descendants. In the 2018 strategy, there is very limited attention paid to these other residents. In the 2004 strategy, there was an emphasis on attracting new residents with more resources (without emphasis on their ethnicity as such), and encouraging private investment and entrepreneurship. In the 2018 strategy, the emphasis is continually on removing residents from these areas, more so than attracting others. The “victims” of the problem are

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22 This could reflect that it followed a change in government, with a new coalition of the right after a long period of Social Democrat-led governments.
not only the state and majority Danes “pushed” to move, however. It is noted that the complex social issues are a problem for children growing up there, and that social control can limit the freedom in particular of women and children in these areas (Danish Government 2018, 5).

Whereas earlier strategy documents did harness evidence from research as well as experiences from other countries in order to explain the causes and development of segregation, the Danish 2018 strategy does not make reference to either existing academic research, or to experiences from other countries. However, it does rely on relatively extensive government statistics about the relevant areas, much of which is presented in graphic form. Overall, the strategy presents a rather clear and unequivocal diagnosis of the problem, with a small set of relevant variables.

Figure 3.3: Word cloud made from the Swedish anti-segregation strategy

Sweden

The first part of the Swedish 2018 strategy tells a complex and stepwise story of the causes of segregation in Sweden, founded on a wide range of research and with a broad sociological understanding of different mechanisms and how they interact with each other. This problem definition runs 25 pages and highlights five different dimensions along which segregation can be observed and measured: housing, education, labor market/employment, democratic participation, and crime. Each of these dimensions is presented with an outline of the current situation, an outline of contributing factors to how the current situation came about (i.e. its causes), and a section on effects.

It should be repeated that the focus of the Swedish strategy, unlike the Danish one, is not first and foremost on ethnic residential segregation. That is not at all to say that ethnic segregation is absent as a concern. Instead, it is emphasized that ethnic segregation “is best
explained by socioeconomic factors”, and that the main focus of the strategy is therefore on socio-economic segregation (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 10). In this understanding, ethnic segregation is a symptom or effect rather than a cause in and of itself. Immigration is not highlighted as an explanatory factor, although settlement patterns may be. Further, it is emphasized that “segregation can be an expression of failed integration”, but this is not necessarily the case. The strategy continues to say that “good integration probably contributes to mitigating certain negative aspects of segregation, but does not necessarily have direct effect on segregation in relation to housing and education” (ibid., 11). The understanding of the relationship between segregation and integration is therefore different, but not entirely in opposition to, the Danish problem definition.

The causal explanation which is advanced links together all of the areas of the strategy linked in a specific order: housing, education, labor market participation, democratic participation and civil society, and crime. However, a kind of ultimate cause of increasing segregation is highlighted up front: increased economic inequality over time. While capital gains and rents have increased significantly and concentrated at the top of the income distribution, incomes at the bottom have increased much more slowly. In particular, benefits increases have followed consumer price indices and political decisions as opposed to the increases in wages and capital gains, and the tax system has over time become less distributive (ibid., 16-17). This means that the middle and upper classes have pulled away economically from the least well-off. Such a class and inequality perspective is absent from the Danish strategy, however it fits neatly with the overarching focus on socio-economic segregation as opposed to ethnic segregation as an “ultimate cause”.

From here, five dimensions of inequality and segregation are interwoven to explain deepening segregation. Firstly, residential/housing segregation is linked to a long-standing failure to build sufficient housing. Access to the housing market has been uneven, and in particular those with low incomes have come to struggle more and more. Two further policy-related causes are highlighted in relation to housing: firstly, a failure of urban planning which has over time created a situation where different areas tend to be dominated by one single type of tenure. A notable example is the so-called “Million Program”. Many of today’s vulnerable areas were built during this rapid expansion of housing construction in the 60s and 70s (ibid., 21). These are areas with mainly rental units and limited local services – and as residents with higher incomes have left them for other areas with mainly owned units or single-family-homes, lower income families have been left behind.

A second identified policy failure relates to the long-standing policy of self-settlement for asylum seekers (EBO) and refugees with a permission to stay. As the strategy specifies, “an uneven distribution of asylum seekers, and the fact that new arrivals have mainly settled in certain municipalities, has led to increased pressure on the welfare system in those municipalities» (ibid., 21). The EBO policy has come to be seen differently since the 2015 crisis. After its initial introduction for rather pragmatic reasons in the 1990s, it came to be seen as a question of freedom of movement and fundamental rights to let refugees and even asylum seekers settle where they wished to (Borevi and Bengtsson 2015). In the past few years, however, the negative externalities of the policy – including poor housing conditions and deepened segregation – have come to be seen as a challenge in need of new policy solutions, and reforms are already underway. In 2016 legislation was put in place allowing the state to refer newcomers to particular municipalities, and in 2018, a Swedish Official Report proposing further reform of reception of newcomers was delivered to the Ministry of Labour (SOU 2018:22 2018). The strategy specifies that is a priority of the government to reform the EBO policy (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 53). In the January 2019 agreement on a new coalition government, it is agreed that “municipalities should be given a
possibility to limit EBO in areas with socio-economic challenges” (Social Democratic Party, Center Party, Liberal Party and Green Party 2019, para. 43).

A second dimension of segregation concerns education, and (socio-economic) segregation in schools is linked to residential segregation as well as to school policies of the past decades. The combination of increased housing segregation and school reforms which liberalized the possibilities to set up private (“free”) schools has led to a segregated school system, with particularly high differences in high school completion rates between native- and foreign-born students (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 26). This is linked again to the third dimension of segregation in the labor market (ibid., 28-32). The gap in employment is particularly high between persons who have completed high school and those who have not, and between native and foreign born. As we have seen, those factors are again linked to education and housing segregation. Increasing employment is seen as an important solution to segregation along several dimensions (ibid., 28).

The fourth dimension, democratic participation and civil society, is in turn linked to educational segregation, since electoral participation varies according to educational level (ibid., 36). It is also noted that there is a representation gap between native- and foreign born which is not mainly explained by socioeconomic factors, but in fact largely because of settlement patterns, since foreign-born persons mainly live in larger cities or municipalities where there are higher numbers of votes per representative (ibid., 36). In politics as such, the foreign-born are underrepresented and may lack access to political networks. While the Swedish strategy does not use the term parallel society, it is noted that “a deepened democratic exclusion in areas with socioeconomic challenges can harm trust in societal institutions. This can, in turn, lead to certain groups attempting to solve problems outside of societal institutions and the rule of law [utanför rättsstatens kontroll]” (ibid., 37).

This links the matter of democratic participation to the final dimension, namely crime, which the document notes has received significant public attention in recent years. This is addressed not directly via crime statistics like in Denmark, but in a more qualitative manner. The strategy notes that the Swedish police considers that “a criminal structure” has been built up over time in certain areas (ibid., 39), resulting from a long-term process linked to risk factors such as unemployment, drop-out and the creation of the kinds of parallel structures noted above. This leads to residents – in particular women and children – feeling unsafe.
If we were to summarize what is already a summary, we could note that the Swedish understanding of the problem of segregation is focused on structural forces which interact with each other in complex and nuanced ways. Megatrends such as increasing inequality is linked to unintended effects of past policy decisions in planning, education and settlement. Where individual choice is noted, it is mainly in relation to the decisions of the middle class and native-born persons, who decide to leave disadvantaged areas or apply to well-regarded schools. This leaves behind those who do not have the means or access to do so. It sees ethnic segregation as a symptom more than a cause, although it notes that there is significant co-variation. In painting such a complex picture, one might ask whether the Swedish strategy lays out a possibly insoluble problem.

Norway

In the Norwegian case, we will examine two separate documents for an indication of the understanding of “the problem”, which operate at different levels of government and different levels of analysis. The new Integration strategy does not address causes of segregation. Instead, when this strategy was launched, the Norwegian government also named an expert commission to examine living conditions and integration challenges in urban areas. As part of their mandate, the commission was asked to “map and discuss possible causes leading some urban areas to have an accumulation of challenges related to living standards”; and specifically to consider “correlations between such accumulations and characteristics of the housing market and tenure mix in relevant areas” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018b). While the actual exploration of causes here is “outsourced” to the experts, in what can be termed a problem-solving use of expert knowledge (see Boswell 2009), there is an indication that the way the housing market works and the way housing is distributed spatially is an important underlying issue.

Examining instead the local Groruddalssatsingen in Oslo (which is one of two current area policies in Oslo) we can note that the agreement between the state and Oslo municipality points to the “concentration of low-income groups” and “need for better integration”, and that
there is a risk of “negative spirals” being set off (Norwegian government and Oslo City Council 2015). In the Program Plan, there is a further discussion of the current challenges, but a more limited one on its causes. A few points bear noting, however. It is pointed out that “Oslo is among the fastest growing cities in Europe”, and as such the site of significant urban development, but that there are “both population groups and local areas which are not part of the positive development”. These areas have

“complex challenges as a result of the development of the city over the past 50 years. Infrastructure development, commercial development, increases in car traffic, changed shopping habits etc. have contributed to some residential areas seeing a gradual deterioration of their local environment. Price differentials in the housing market leads to a concentration of low-income households in the most vulnerable areas” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 4).

Like in Sweden, there is an emphasis on long-term megatrends in the economy, however the housing market is brought to the fore as the main mechanism that translates income inequality into residential segregation (aided by urban planning).

Figure 3.5: Norwegian causal model
Table 3.7: *Comparison of causal claims*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ultimate /underlying cause</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration from non-Western countries</td>
<td>Rising socioeconomic inequality</td>
<td>Inequality plus sorting mechanisms in the housing market?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other highlighted causes</td>
<td>Insufficient sanctions</td>
<td>Segregated housing market linked to educational and labor market segregation, linked to unequal democratic participation; all linked to crime</td>
<td>Interaction of urban policy, socio-economic inequality (labor market participation, education, health) and housing market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between integration and segregation</td>
<td>Treated as two sides of the same coin</td>
<td>Possible but not necessary connection</td>
<td>Tied to low income and housing market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Visions of the future: what ambitions for lowered segregation?

In this section we will briefly outline how the strategies see a future in which segregation is reduced. What is their vision of a less segregated, and perhaps more integrated, country? This touches upon what we have referred to as normative claims, since it addresses how the strategies present what “should be”. We will address three dimensions here; first the matter of reducing segregation, then briefly the emphasis on values, and finally the question of the link to immigration and immigration policy.

**Ambitions for reducing segregation**

The title of the Danish strategy is “A Denmark without parallel societies: no ghettos in 2030”, indicating the ambitious future vision of a society without ethnic residential segregation. This future society is further described as a “Denmark that holds together” [et sammenhængende Danmark] (Danish Government 2018, 4). The parallel societies that are described in the areas defined as ghettos in the strategy are indicated to currently not be representative of Denmark: “in those places where we have had parallel societies, Denmark will become Denmark again” (ibid., 6). Residents in these areas “shall be made into citizens who contribute in society – economically as well as in human terms” (ibid., 7), and other citizens shall regain “faith in a society without lawlessness, oppression of women and failure to contribute to society” (ibid., 7), indicating that these are the current views of the ghettos in at least some sections of Danish society and politics.

The Swedish strategy is less absolutist, and its vision of the future can be gleaned from the objectives listed for each area of the strategy. Overall, the strategy aims at bringing about a situation with lowered segregation, more equal conditions for living and upbringing, with good life chances for all during the ten-year program period. This includes:

- Lowered residential segregation with good quality housing for all and accessible social services
- Lowered school segregation, and less of a causal connection between the background of parents and school performance of children

38
- Increased labor market participation and lowered long-term unemployment
- Increased participation in elections and democratic processes, and better conditions for civil society organizations in areas with socioeconomic challenges
- Increased safety and lower crime rates in areas with socioeconomic challenges

One might expect this type of more incrementalist approach in light of the complex causal understanding with interlocking and mutually reinforcing explanations of segregation – with such a complex problem, even a multisector ten-year policy plan cannot aim to eliminate it entirely.

The objective of the relevant chapter of the Norwegian Integration Strategy is not directly measurable, and does not specifically pertain to segregation: “Immigrants should have an increased sense of belonging and participation in public life” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 43). If we look instead at Groruddalssatsningen, it has a set of goals, with an overall objective to contribute to “durable improvements in services and local qualities in areas of the Grorud Valley where the needs are highest, in order for more residents in this area to be economically self-sufficient and actively taking part in the local community and society at large” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 6). Each part of the program (local environment, childhood and education, and labor market participation) has its own objective:

- Strengthen the quality of the local environment, which should contribute to inclusive local communities where more people take an active part
- More children should have good conditions for upbringing, and more people should complete high school
- More people should take up ordinary employment and more people should achieve a durable connection to the labor market.

Interestingly, the two latter goals should both be achieved though improvement to services. The entire local strategy has a strong orientation toward learning and service improvement, through which public services are to be developed to better face a diverse new society.

Values emphasized

There is not room in this report for a detailed analysis of the values expressed in each strategy, but we can note certain differences in brief. The Danish strategy addresses ghettos or parallel societies as a “threat to our modern society when freedom, democracy, equality and tolerance are not accepted as basic values” (Danish Government 2018, 5), however there is no particular focus on measures that might increase democratic participation or reinforce these values. It is not explicit, but the assumption must be that once immigrants live in a more dispersed and less concentrated way, and have acquired an adequate level of Danish language, they will take up these values in a way that the strategy suggests they currently do not. It is also worth noting that the strategy practically recommends unequal treatment as a way to achieve equality, in the sense that it explicitly endorses policies that only target certain residents and not others (Danish Government 2018, 7).

In the Swedish strategy, there is a strong focus on a set of basic values undergirding the whole endeavor, and which are to be mainstreamed into all policies (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 43–47). These are: human rights and democracy; non-discrimination; children’s rights and youth perspectives; equality [jämställdhet], parity [jämlikhet]. Additionally, the strategy is tied toward Agenda 2030 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Democratic participation and civil society also makes up one of the five action areas of the strategy, with measures aimed at increasing political participation among persons in vulnerable areas. In Norway, increased democratic participation is highlighted as
an overall objective, but with a limited set of concrete measures associated with it, primarily aimed at increased civil society engagement in vulnerable areas and local involvement.

**What is the link to immigration policy?**

In the following we will briefly outline how the strategies frame the link to immigration and immigration control policies. It should be noted that an absence of such an explicit link does not mean that there is no link in practice – in all countries these strategies stem from broader reform efforts following the high arrivals in 2015.

The Danish ghetto strategy is very explicitly connected to immigration and immigration policy, in several ways. The temporal context for the strategy is tied to recent changes in immigration flows and policies:

“the government has succeeded in getting the inflow of asylum seekers under control […] through a long list of restrictions in immigration policy […] The strict immigration policy shall continue. It is this strict course which gives room to focus on breaking down parallel societies and lifting the task of integration” (Danish Government 2018, 6)

This is accompanied by a graphic showing asylum statistics for the period from 2011-2017. We can recall that the exact same argument was made in 2004 (Danish Government 2004), when the first strategy was launched following the 2002-3 immigration reforms.

The Norwegian Integration Strategy also mentions that “a restrictive immigration policy founded on the rule of law is also necessary in order to succeed with good integration” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 4). Beyond this general direction, the only aspect of immigration policy which is directly addressed is settlement of refugees, which it holds should, as a rule, not happen in areas with a high percentage of immigrants (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 47), as explained above.

The Swedish strategy does not address immigration, except as it pertains to reforms to settlement of asylum seekers and newcomers, and it appears that future levels of immigration is not seen as a relevant factor. The dispersal aspect is, as noted, mainly justified with reference to pressure on services, not ethnic segregation as such. However, it does note that the current lack of dispersal can delay integration not only of newcomers, but of their hosts (i.e. family members or acquaintances with whom they live).

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23 This argument was probably first made in the United Kingdom in the mid-1960s, when the argument was made by Minister Roy Hattersley. In the British context it is therefore referred to as the Hattersley equation or Hattersley formula.
Table 3.8 *Summary of normative claims*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambitions for reducing segregation</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Denmark without ghettos</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lowered segregation along different socioeconomic dimensions</td>
<td>Immigrants with higher sense of belonging and increased participation; Good local environment; more people complete high school and take up employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values emphasized</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghettos as threat to Danish values (will resolve itself?)</td>
<td>Important to uphold values in all policy work; concrete measures to increase democratic participation</td>
<td>Participation and belonging as objectives; mainly civil society and local measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2028</th>
<th>2022/2026</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit links to immigration policy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued low immigration required, and they should settle outside of these areas</td>
<td>Not addressed, with the exception of new reception policy to ensure some dispersal</td>
<td>Continued strict policies; refugees should as a rule not be settled in areas with high percentage of immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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24 This is mentioned in passing in the Integration Strategy, but is more explicit in other policy documents. It should be noted that the strict policies apply to asylum and family migration primarily, and not to other migration streams.
From problems to politics: comparing policy designs in the three Scandinavian states

In this chapter we will summarize the basic features of each of the countries' policies, with a view to identifying the key areas of policy intervention and comparing them across countries. We will then examine in some more detail the proposed policy designs in three areas: aspects of housing policy; employment policies; and early childhood education and language acquisition. By looking at these areas in more detail, we can highlight differences between the three Scandinavian states.

Mapping policy designs

In the following we provide a general sketch of the priority areas in each country. This involves giving a general overview of the top-line areas of intervention in each country. We summarize this overview in a comparative table.

**Denmark**

The Danish strategy is divided in four areas, where the two first are arguably intertwined and both relate to housing. The first area of policy intervention concerns housing construction, with proposed investments in physical alteration of residential areas and changes to planning in order to influence the composition of tenure types in a given area. There is a fairly substantive budgetary commitment (12 billion Danish kroner) set side to finance renovation, demolition and infrastructural changes. It is indicated that some areas could simply be torn down (Danish Government 2018, 13). Further measures to influence tenure composition includes the sale of public housing on the open market, renovations and changing family units into smaller units. The cooperative housing organizations are important actors in this, however the state may intervene if the housing organization and municipality does not act adequately (Danish Government 2018, 14). Residents would be re-housed somewhere else in the case of demolition (ibid.).

The second area relates to settlement. Unlike in Sweden, Denmark has a long-standing dispersal policy for refugees, through which municipalities are obligated to settle refugees. In this strategy there is an extension of the policy of directing settlement of newcomers, through a new possibility to deny family reunification for persons living in designated areas. However, these new measures do not only target newcomers. Firstly, the rule relating to family reunification is arguably an incentive to make the resident sponsor move out of the designated area. Secondly, municipalities are instructed to not direct recipients of social assistance who are in need of housing to the designated areas. Thirdly, recipients of social assistance will have their benefits cut to “integration assistance” level if they move to the “hardest ghettos”, and individuals currently receiving integration assistance should not move to these areas.25

The third policy area concerns crime and policing. Firstly, the strategy outlines measures which will increase the police presence in the designated areas, including with a view to identifying particularly “hardboiled” criminals. Secondly, and perhaps among the most controversial proposals in the strategy, it is proposed that the police can designate areas in

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25 Integration assistance is a form of social assistance for newcomers which is at a lower rate than general social assistance. In the 2019 law L140, it was renamed “self-reliance and repatriation assistance” [selfværet og hjemreiseydelse] in order to emphasize that protection in Denmark should be temporary. It was also decided that it should be further reduced by 2000 DKK per month (Minister of Immigration and integration 2019).
which there will be tougher penalties for crime for a certain period of time [skærpet strafzone]. In such designated areas, certain crimes would incur a doubling of the normal penalty imposed elsewhere. The purpose of this is to quickly address crime issues that give the designated areas a bad reputation.

The fourth policy area concerns childhood and education. At the pre-school level, daycare is made compulsory for children in designated areas, for at least 30 hours per week. Parents who do not comply, will have their child benefit held back. Dispersal policies should ensure that daycare institutions are not ethnically segregated. Upon entry into school, children in the designated areas will undergo language testing, and it is a requirement upon the parents that the children should hold a “functional” level of Danish. Absenteeism above 15 per cent in a quarter, or failure to attend language testing, is also sanctioned by reducing or holding back completely the child benefit. Furthermore, so-called “re-education trips” to the country of origin are proposed criminalized with up to four years in prison and expulsion from Denmark. It is clarified that the child should not lose their residence permit, to emphasize that it is the responsibility of the parent. This is coupled with further action against domestic violence and efforts to identify at-risk children.

Sweden

The strategy brings together a wide range of existing and future policy initiatives distributed across the five areas mentioned in the examination of causes of the problem: housing, labor market participation, education, democratic participation and crime. It is not possible to do the full range of initiatives justice in this brief summary, however we may outline the policies’ general thrust. Housing segregation measures include measures which aim to increase the diversity of housing in vulnerable areas so that there is a mix of “tenure types, size, type of housing and price points at area level” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 51). This will be achieved primarily through new construction, through simplified planning processes. There are also investments in research to understand the housing market better and investigate sustainability in planning, climate and social housing policy. Additionally, there are efforts to make the housing market more accessible for low-income persons. Finally, the self-settlement system for asylum seekers and newcomers (EBO) is undergoing reform to make distribution more even, with new powers to limit self-settlement in areas with socioeconomic challenges agreed in the January 2019 government platform (Social Democratic Party, Center Party, Liberal Party and Green Party 2019, para. 43).

Within the policy area of education, the overall objective is to lessen the connection between the socio-economic background of students and their school results. There will be a mapping of pre-school participation with a view to increasing it; and a review of school admissions rules in order to increase diversity in the student body (ibid., 57-58). School leaders will receive increasing funding to strengthen equality of outcomes, which should be directed to compensate for differences in socio-economic background. The Swedish Statistics Agency is developing an index to be used in distribution. There is a further focus on preventing drop-out problems in high schools, and newly arrived students may be incentivized to continue in education through higher grants (ibid., 59). There is also a focus on after school activities for children (ibid., 60). Finally, there is a focus on adult education in order to help newcomers into the labor market, and also to be able to support their children through education (ibid., 61).

The labor market related measures are targeted especially toward young people, women, the long-term unemployed and newcomers. A key vehicle for several of these measures is the Delegation for the Employment of Young People and Newly Arrived Migrants (Dua), which has a mandate to promote cooperation between Swedish municipalities and the Swedish
Public Employment Service, identify and spread best practices. The delegation was established in 2014, but has received several additional instructions subsequently. A new regulation concerning newcomers from 2018 sets out a duty to enter education for newcomers who are taking part in programs through the Swedish Public Employment Service. This emphasizes the “responsibility of the individual to obtain the skills that are required to be matched with employment or to be able to benefit from labor market related measures” (ibid., 66). Other measures targeting newcomers include funding for Swedish classes for asylum seekers as well as efforts against discrimination. In the January 2019 coalition agreement, there are significant commitments related to the labor market, including a reform of the Employment Service and a new work oriented integration program with a focus on work-oriented language training and short training courses, as well as a “start job” for newcomers and long-term unemployed with lower pay (Social Democratic Party, Center Party, Liberal Party and Green Party 2019).

Reforms targeting democratic participation are mainly concerned with addressing discrimination, gaining better understanding of lived experiences of residents in disadvantaged areas, and increasing knowledge about democracy broadly speaking. Institutions which are identified as important and which will receive funding, are libraries, civil society organizations and local “culture schools” (e.g. after school activities).

Finally, the aspects of the strategy related to crime address both lived experiences of safety and prevention, the situation of young children, and specific types of crimes (drugs, honor related violence, and organized crime). Through reforms already underway, there is an increase in the number of police officers and police budgets broadly, to allow them to better address organized crime with a particular focus on gun violence. With regard to drugs, the focus is both on cutting of supply and reducing demand through treatment and prevention. Prevention and early intervention is also key to the efforts targeting children.

**Norway**

Point 7 of the Norwegian Integration Strategy holds that the government wants to “counter segregation, promote common meeting places and understanding of basic values and norms in Norwegian society” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 45). Focusing in on the measures most directly tied to segregation under this headline, we find proposals to:

- Reform and improve settlement policy for refugees
- Further develop and support existing area policies (including in Groruddalen)
  - With increasing funding
  - By giving all children the opportunity to attend at least one after school activity
  - By strengthening mentor systems for at-risk youth
  - By addressing crime through targeting young repeat offenders, and having the police involved as part of area policies where necessary
  - By strengthening housing subsidies for low-income families
  - By increasing the knowledge about living standards and integration challenges through an expert commission
- Strengthen kindergartens as an arena for inclusion, including through better cooperation with parents

As such, we see a focus on childhood and education, crime prevention, the housing market, and directing settlement of refugees. If we look at Groruddalssatsningen as a concrete example of an area policy, it is a three-part strategy which addresses 1) childhood and education, 2) labor market participation and 3) the local environment. A key substantive
aspect of the childhood and education sub-program is early intervention and language acquisition. With regard to labor market participation, a key aspect is developing new forms of cooperation between the employment service and adult education. With regard to the third aspect, a focus is local participatory development.
Table 4.1: Comparison of policy proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway; national strategy and Groruddalssatsingen</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical alternation of designated areas; holistic plans to change urban areas; changing composition of tenure types through sale; demolition and rehousing tenants in extreme cases</td>
<td>Increase construction (especially of rental housing); plan for mixed tenure; social sustainability in planning; better understand market forces; review housing allowance rules</td>
<td>Changes to housing allowance; helping more immigrants buy their own housing</td>
<td>Primarily a focus on the local environment</td>
<td>Difference in housing market gives different options; Denmark’s measures are more assertive and the others work with the housing market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Dispersal of newcomers | No family reunification for sponsors residing in “ghettos”, municipalities should not direct recipients of social or integration assistance to “ghettos”; social assistance recipients who do move to “ghettos” will have benefits cut to integration assistance level | Better dispersal of asylum seekers and newly settled refugees (reform of reception/ EBO) in order to relieve pressures on services in certain areas and improve integration | Settlement of refugees in places with good integration results; avoid areas with high percentage of immigrants | Differences among Scandinavian states reduced: Sweden increases dispersal; Norway moves closer to Danish form of dispersal criteria |

| Crime | Increased policing; double punishment for crime in designated zones; eviction of criminals | Increase numbers of police; address organized crime (esp. gun violence and drug trafficking); prevention and cooperation to support at-risk youth; prevent terrorism recruitment; continue action against honor related crimes; increase sense of safety locally | Increased policing in designated areas; focus on young repeat offenders and recruitment to crime; prevention | Indirect focus through increasing experienced safety | More punitive approach in Denmark; more focus on prevention in Sweden and Norway. |

| Labor market | Immigrants have the responsibility to learn Danish and get a job: stronger incentives for them to do so (reduction in benefits to integration assistance level). | Targeted toward long-term unemployed, young persons and women; new subsidized “introduction jobs”, obligation to enter education for job seekers in some cases; language courses for | A key part of the Integration strategy as a whole (through training and education); but not specifically in the segregation chapter. New | Important focus. Cooperation between employment service and | Limited focus in Denmark; important priority in the other two countries. Education and |

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26 Note that it was decided in the 2019 L140 Law on changes to the Immigration Act and other legislation that the Integration Assistance would be renamed Self-reliance and repatriation assistance and that it is further reduced by 2000 DKK per month.

27 While there is very limited focus on work and employment in the Ghetto strategy; there have been recent integration reforms that do address this; including a so-called «basic integration education» and changes to benefits (such as the integration assistance) which are intended to act as incentives and make employment more attractive vis à vis receiving benefits.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Education and early childhood</strong></th>
<th>Dispersal of children with non-Western background among kindergartens; compulsory kindergarten 30h/week; compulsory language testing; parental duty to ensure language acquisition; sanctions against under-performing schools; criminalization of reeducation trips to country of origin (prison and expulsion); early tracing/identification of at-risk children; increased penalties for domestic violence</th>
<th>Investigate how to increase pre-school attendance; increase funding to school managers; incentivize newcomers to complete education through higher benefits</th>
<th>Access to afterschool activities for all children; expansion of system for free kindergarten for low-income families(^{29})</th>
<th>Early intervention; language acquisition in kindergarten; good teachers and school managers, free kindergarten for more people(^{29})</th>
<th>Punitive approach in Denmark, compensatory in Sweden, collaborative in Norway.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic participation and civil society</strong></td>
<td>No mention of civil society. Emphasis on parallel societies as a threat to Danish values and democracy, but no specific measures.</td>
<td>Funding for civil society organizations; important role of libraries and “kulturskolan”, research and understand lived experiences of democracy; address discrimination.</td>
<td>Civil society and social entrepreneurs as relevant actors; overall objective of participation</td>
<td>User involvement and participation locally</td>
<td>Important focus in Sweden. Sweden and Norway emphasize civil society and after-school activities. Little focus in Denmark.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{28}\) From 2019 this will apply from age 2 instead of from age 3. [https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/gratis-kjernetid-i-barnehagen-til-11-000-2-aringar/id2613552/](https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/gratis-kjernetid-i-barnehagen-til-11-000-2-aringar/id2613552/)

\(^{29}\) The income limit for access to free kindergarten is higher in the boroughs covered by Groruddalsatsingen than elsewhere, making kindergarten free for a larger proportion of children.
Comparisons of selected policy designs

It is not possible in the context of this limited project to carry out detailed comparisons of all the different policy areas. However, in order to complement the overall survey of policy areas and general policy directions, we will take a closer look at policy design in three areas: aspects of housing segregation; labor market integration, and early childhood education and language acquisition. These three areas cover different dimensions of segregation. This will allow us to highlight intra-Scandinavian differences in policy designs and instruments.

Addressing aspects of housing segregation

Among the thorniest aspects of residential segregation is the actual built environment, resulting from several decades worth of urban planning and construction. In the three Scandinavian countries – as well as in other countries in Europe – disadvantaged areas have developed over time in certain types of neighborhoods, often built during the post-war boom when rapid population growth required equally rapid construction. Especially in the Swedish policy document, the long-term effects of the “Million Program” are highlighted. Research has also demonstrated that this kind of housing market segmentation can result in higher segregation (see e.g. Andersen, Turner, and Søholt 2013). It bears recalling here that the Scandinavian countries have different housing policies, housing markets, and mixes of tenure types overall (see e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2006). This also applies in the disadvantaged areas targeted by these policy strategies.

Both the Swedish and Danish documents include the objective of increasing the mix of tenure types on disadvantaged areas, with the Danish approach being more forceful. One mechanism is the sale on the private market of apartments in “ghettos”. However, the Danish strategy actually argues that holistic development plans, which have been tried in the past, “will not immediately be able to change the basic challenge of the area, which partly has to do with a high percentage of social housing, partly the composition of residents”, and this is in fact why they argue for actual demolition and sale of social housing (see box p. 14 Danish Government 2018). The systems for allocation of social housing, and the fact that there is simply more social housing than in Norway, coheres with the Danish focus on influencing where municipalities house individuals. As noted, the designated areas make up approximately 22 per cent of Denmark’s social housing, implying an availability of other options.

In this case, Norway is the country on the other end. The disadvantaged areas have a smaller proportion of social housing. Immigrants are more likely to own their own accommodation than in both Denmark and Sweden (Andersen, Turner, and Søholt 2013). However, they likely own housing in the same areas, and in Norway “immigrant-dense neighborhoods emerged in areas dominated by cooperatives” (ibid). This is understood as at least partly an outcome of the combination of lower incomes and forces in the housing market, which limit the options for where one can afford to buy. The Norwegian experience, then, could suggest that increasing the diversity of tenure types in a particular area does not automatically reduce segregation along all dimensions, at least as long as ethnicity and lower incomes remain correlated and thus limit the choices in the open market – coupled with other tendencies in the housing market toward so-called “white flight”, “white avoidance”, or possible preferences among ethnic minorities (ibid). However, if more affordable housing is

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30 White flight or avoidance are terms used in the academic literature to denote the choice of ethnic majority residents to move out of, or avoid moving into, ethnic majority neighborhoods.
available across the city, it can give people at the lower end of the income distribution new choices.

In the Swedish strategy, there is some focus on construction – primarily of rental properties – like in Denmark, but the context is that there is currently a housing shortage, so the focus is on building *additional* housing rather than replacing existing housing. But, like in Norway, the focus is otherwise primarily on understanding market forces and mitigating their impact, through proposed changes in housing allowances/subsidies to increase individual choice. Furthermore, policy measures targeting education and employment are believed to increase incomes, and thus indirectly increase choice in housing over time.

This can be seen as a difference in emphasis on *structure* over *agency*. The Norwegian and Swedish strategies express an understanding of the policy problem in which the individual person’s choices with regard to where they live are limited by structural forces and barriers beyond their control. Policies primarily aim to mitigate the impact of these structural forces. One could argue that the Danish approach has a stronger emphasis on agency. The use of primarily punitive economic incentives are intended to change the behavior of current or potential residents in “ghettos”, but they can only work if there are other options available to them. The Danish housing market may afford alternative housing options in light of the higher proportion of non-market allocated housing, although previous research has suggested that access has been difficult for immigrants (Andersen, Turner, and Søholt 2013). There is also more agency on behalf of the state, however, in the emphasis on possible take-overs of housing organizations which fail to change and on demolition of entire estates.

**Addressing employment**

Integration policies across Scandinavia have been concerned with employment among immigrants, since these countries have comprehensive and expensive social safety nets, which ultimately rely on very high levels of employment to be sustainable over time (see e.g. Brochmann and Grødem 2012; NOU 2011:7 2011). Employment rates among different groups of refugees and immigrants remain lower than among the majority population, with e.g. refugee women lagging particularly behind (Liebig and Tronstad 2018), and addressing this employment gap remains an important priority. How is this expressed in the three countries’ strategies?

If we examine the Danish ghetto strategy, employment is most notable for its absence. This is not to say that there are no Danish policy initiatives aimed at increasing immigrant employment, however they are not a part of the ghetto strategy. At the end of the document, there is a list of 14 “other government initiatives”. Of these, there are five which could be seen as employment related, most importantly concerning the “Integration benefit” [integrationsydelse], mentioned in this report and introduced in 2015, which is lower than the general social assistance level and intended to incentivize immigrants to work. The strategy mentions that “as of 1 July 2018 the benefit will be lowered by an additional 3 per cent as a consequence of the Agreement about additional years in the labor market which the government and the Danish People’s Party (DPP) entered into in June 2017” (Danish Government 2018, 33). It should be noted here that following a further agreement between the government and the DPP, this particular benefit was further reformed in the L140 law proposal, passed through the Danish Parliament in early 2019. The reform entailed a further reduction of the payment, as well as renaming the benefit “self-reliance and repatriation benefit” [selvforsørgelses- og hjemsendelsesydelse] when paid to persons with international protection permits, to emphasize the temporary nature of their status in Denmark.
Additionally, the changes listed include amendments to eligibility criteria for child benefits, social assistance benefits and family reunification which are similarly intended to incentivize work (Danish Government 2018, 33–34). Finally, there is the "integration education" introduced in 2016 intended as a stepping stone to employment (ibid). It is notable, however, that measures intended to increase employment among immigrants primarily appear only in this annex. In the strategy itself, there is limited focus on employment, although it is among the key criteria used to define target areas (“proportion of residents outside employment or education above 40 per cent”, (box 4, Danish Government 2018, 11). The integration benefit is addressed several times, but often as a tool to direct where immigrants live. Recipients of the integration benefit should not move to a “ghetto area”, and persons who receive ordinary social assistance who move to a “hard ghetto” will have their benefits reduced to the integration benefit level (Danish Government 2018, 7). Increasing employment, then, should primarily happen through economic incentives and it does not appear to be seen as key to reducing segregation in and of itself.

This is in stark contrast to both the Norwegian and Swedish strategies. The Swedish strategy is particularly explicit, noting that “unemployment contributes significantly to segregation, and gainful employment is at the same time an important part of the solution to segregation problems” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 28). As a consequence, the strategy emphasizes a wide range of employment related policy initiatives targeted at different groups, most notably young persons, the long-term unemployed, newcomers, and foreign-born women. An interesting measure targeting newcomers, is that job seeking newcomers can be assigned to education, emphasizing their “individual responsibility for obtaining the knowledge required to be matched with employment or benefit from labor market initiatives or continue with further education” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 66). Employment is understood as having a wide range of positive effects, not just for the person gaining employment, but for their family as a whole, since there is a link between parents’ employment and children’s school results and health outcomes (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 32). The strategy also notes that education and employment among parents can make them better examples for their children and allow them to support them better (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 61).

Similarly, Norway’s overall Integration Strategy is heavily oriented toward skill-building with the objective of employment, following recent research which has shown that formal education is a key factor which allows immigrants to enter the labor market and also stay in employment over time (see Bratsberg, Raaum, and Røed 2017). We also see that one of the three action areas of the Groruddalssatsingen is employment, also with a focus on cooperation with adult education.

**Addressing early childhood education and language acquisition**

All three countries’ strategies are concerned with childhood and education, since children in vulnerable areas tend to have lower educational attainment and higher high school drop-out rates than national averages or other areas of the same city. This is seen as important to address, and both the Swedish and Norwegian policy documents highlights educational attainment as the key variable in order to influence labor market participation; in turn increasing incomes. Early intervention, and efforts to improve language acquisition at an early stage, are emphasized in all three countries (Danish Government 2018, 24; Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 57; Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 57; Oslo Municipality 2016, 15)

Here, then, is an area with general agreement on the problem to be solved – but different views on how to proceed. In Denmark, action to influence children’s education happens
through the parents, and partly in a punitive way. The Danish government proposes the introduction of compulsory kindergarten for children in vulnerable areas, and the municipalities should stop their child benefit payments if children are not registered or do not attend (Danish Government 2018, 25). In Sweden, the government notes that it is carrying out a study of participation rates with a view to propose further policies to increase them (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 57). Where parents are mentioned in the strategy, it is primarily in the context of how they might require support to be good parents (Government Offices of Sweden 2018, 76). There is limited mention of parents at all in the parts of the strategy that addresses education, and a key focus of the whole strategy is precisely to give children equal opportunities independently of their background through the “compensatory mission of schools” (ibid., 58).

In the Norwegian context, on the other hand, the measures are aimed at children and parents, with an emphasis on improving cooperation between parents, kindergartens and schools (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 46) and on working with the “team around the child” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 16). This is about how schools and other services should work together because “children and young people do not live their lives within policy silos” (Oslo Municipality 2016, 16). While there is, like in Denmark, a focus on increasing kindergarten participation, the policy measure adopted is the expansion of free core hours in kindergarten for low-income families. In 2019, this program is expanded to cover children from age 2, and in order to make free kindergarten available to families in the Grorud Valley the income cut-off is higher there than nationally. Here we see a policy based on “carrots” rather than “sticks” – in Denmark parents will have benefits taken away if children don’t attend kindergarten, whereas in Norway they are given free access.

Policy coherence?

To conclude this chapter, we will briefly discuss whether the policy approaches, as sketched in this chapter, are in accordance with the problem definitions we examined in the previous chapter.

As we saw, the problem representation in the Danish strategy has a clear set of criteria, with a strong focus on ethnic minority persons as a target population, and a relatively simple causal understanding which places a significant amount of responsibility on immigrants themselves, for example with regard to finding a job. In that sense, it is perhaps not surprising that the Danish strategy does not include a specific focus on labor market participation, and that the separate policy changes which have addressed this mainly focus on incentivizing individuals through benefits reductions. In the Swedish case, the problem understanding as it relates to labor market participation includes a strong focus on discrimination, and where there is discrimination it is arguably insufficient to incentivize individuals. There, then, the policy measures are more complex and address both the supply and demand side. Norway, on this point, is closer to the Swedish understanding, with a focus on both sides.

With regard to the three policy areas which we examined in more detail, one could say that the policy design in each country is largely coherent with the understanding of the problem of segregation and its causes. If we were to summarize, the Danish policies are more geared at affecting the behavior of individual immigrants – and the problem understanding is also largely based around the choices that immigrants have made. It is therefore logical to focus the policy solutions on influencing these choices. Since the construction of target populations in Denmark is also relatively negative, it is also not surprising, in light of the research of Schneider and Ingram (1993), that the policy design has punitive elements in the form of
sanctions. Since the Danish problem understanding is not focused on structural forces which might influence immigrants' abilities to make different choices, and since the housing supply is different so that other social housing is likely available independently of the income of the individual, it is also quite coherent with this understanding that there is an absence of attention paid to immigrants' employment.

The Swedish problem understanding is much more focused on structural forces which should be mitigated with policy, and following from this the policy proposals are quite geared at doing just this. For example, there is a focus on the role of the school system in compensating for socio-economic differences. Norway, again, is in a middle position, combining the focus on structure and agency.
5 Concluding discussion: Three approaches to segregation and integration

In this report, we have compared strategies aimed at countering segregation from the three Scandinavian countries. Cities across Scandinavia are segregated along ethnic and socio-economic lines. Although recently the Danish “ghetto strategy” has received most public attention, this is a policy area which has risen to the top of the political agenda in all three Scandinavian countries. Improving integration and reducing segregation are important policy objectives across the region. There are many commonalities in terms of how the problem is understood and the types of policies that are proposed to address it, but also some distinct differences. In the following we will summarize some key findings and discuss them.

Summary of the comparison

Common concerns

The three Scandinavian countries share a common concern with residential segregation in urban areas. In Denmark, the concern is very explicitly with ethnic segregation. In Sweden, the focus is on socio-economic segregation, which is understood as an underlying variable which explains ethnic segregation. In Norway, the main concern is also socio-economic, although the specific ethnic aspect has recently been highlighted in the context of refugee dispersal policies.

All three countries are to some extent concerned with consequences of past planning decisions, and seeking ways to ensure more mixed tenure types and housing types in order to increase the socio-economic diversity of vulnerable areas, although the difference in housing markets means they go about it differently. All three countries are concerned with differences in crime and with increasing policy presence and safety in the designated areas. All three countries are concerned with early intervention among children to ensure language acquisition and school completion.

Similarities and differences in factual claims about segregation

The three states use many of the same criteria to define the policy problem; pointing out areas with what is often referred to in the Norwegian context as an accumulation of welfare challenges. This includes higher rates of persons who are not in employment or education, lower rates of high school completion, higher dependence on social assistance, and lower average incomes. In Denmark, however, urban areas can go from vulnerable to “ghetto” classification based on ethnic composition only, whereas in the other two countries this variable is treated as more incidental. Norway and Sweden also have a focus on health which is absent in the Danish policy. While crime and safety is a pertinent concern in all three states, only Denmark uses crime statistics specifically to designate target areas.

In Denmark, it appears that only ethnic minority residents are targets of the policy proposals, and any majority Danes resident in the designated areas are barely mentioned at all. In the other two states, the policies target all residents in the relevant areas (although the Norwegian Integration strategy is aimed at immigrants).

Differences in causal claims

The causal explanations of segregation in each country are quite distinct. In Denmark, the focus is almost squarely on immigration from non-Western countries, and the behavior of these immigrants and their descendants. According to the strategy document, there have not
been adequate sanctions or requirements upon immigrants, and so they have “clumped together”, to again use the language of the strategy document. The Swedish strategy, instead, emphasizes structural forces and in particular the fact that economic inequality is increasing over time. This is presented as interacting in complex ways with the housing market and urban planning, as well as school segregation, segregation in the labor market, differential democratic participation, and finally crime and safety. In Norway, there is a looser explanation of the causes of segregation, and an expert commission was tasked in 2018 with exploring this particular question. There is, however, a focus on the interaction of urban growth, inequality, and the housing market.

This suggests different views on the balance of structure and agency, with Denmark having a much clearer focus on the agency of immigrants in creating their own segregation. In Sweden, the focus is largely on structural forces such as socio-economic inequality and past urban planning choices (with the possible exception of the EBO self-settlement policy). Norway is also more attuned to structural forces, but places particular emphasis on the housing market.

**Different ambitions and visions for the future**

The Danish strategy is quite absolutist and aims to eliminate all “ghettos” by 2030. The Swedish and Norwegian strategies are more measured in their approach and envision lower levels of segregation and better socio-economic outcomes. This difference might be traced to the difference in problem understandings in combination with the different possibilities for action on housing: complex and multivariate causal understandings suggest a problem which cannot be easily resolved. In Denmark the problem is presented as much more straightforward, and in light of the much higher proportion of social housing there are also certain opportunities for political action which are not available in Norway and Sweden, such as moving tenants and demolishing entire areas.

**Differences in policy designs**

The broad strokes of the policy approaches are relatively similar, with attention paid to housing, dispersal of newcomers, crime and early childhood education in all three countries. Certain aspects which are prominent in Sweden and Norway are absent in Denmark; most notably a focus on labor market policies and on health. This is of course not to say that Denmark has no labor market policy targeting minorities and newcomers, and references to recent reforms are made in the last part of the strategy where a list of “other government initiatives” are mentioned (Danish Government 2018, 33). These policies are quite different in design from the Norwegian and Swedish ones, however, and more focused on negative incentives at the individual level.

The Danish policy, on the other hand, has a stronger focus on dispersal policies and on determining where not only newcomers, but persons of minority background more broadly, should live. The Swedish position on dispersal has changed since 2015 and it no longer sees the EBO (“eget boende”) policy as question of freedom of movement (on the past policy see Borevi and Bengtsson 2015). However, while the government is introducing new measures to direct asylum seekers and newcomers away from areas with high pressure on services, there remains a significant difference with the Danish approach. Denmark is increasingly seeking to influence not just where newly settled refugees live, but also persons who come through family reunification and beneficiaries of social and integration assistance. Norway is moving somewhat closer to the Danish position in introducing new dispersal criteria which explicitly address the proportion of immigrants and descendants who already live in an area (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 47). The Norwegian dispersal policy, however, remains targeted only at newcomers.
Here, again, we see a difference in the perception of structure and agency. In Denmark, immigrants themselves are also given much more responsibility for *resolving* segregation, through policies focused on incentivizing them to move out ghettos or punishing them for moving to ghettos. This can be seen as a kind of negative reinforcement. Discrimination or other structural factors which might work against such individual agency go largely unmentioned. The Swedish policies are more focused on mitigating the negative consequences of segregation and lessening the differences between areas. This is logical in light of the structural focus: the complex interacting forces which create segregation cannot easily be overcome by residents – or perhaps even policies. Norway, as ever, strikes a middle ground. The Integration Strategy emphasizes that “everyday integration requires first and foremost an effort from the individual immigrant, but also that immigrants are met with openness and given a chance to participate” (Ministry of Research and Education 2018a, 43).

**Differences with regard to social construction of target populations and policy design**

Past public policy research has suggested that policies will have more punitive aspects where the social construction of the target population is negative (Schneider and Ingram 1993). In this case, we do see that the target audience in Denmark is constructed in more negative terms and is also the subject of somewhat more punitive policies, which work on a logic of negative reinforcement as a mechanism for behavioral change. An illustrative example is how kindergarten attendance and language acquisition is addressed through sanctions of parents in Denmark, who will have their child benefit withheld if their children do not attend kindergarten. In Norway, positive reinforcement is employed instead, through the provision of free kindergarten spaces.
<table>
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<th>Denmark</th>
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<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
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<td>Immigrants and descendants of non-Western background in disadvantaged areas</td>
<td>All residents in disadvantaged areas</td>
<td>All residents in disadvantaged areas</td>
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<td>Specific list of target areas identified with administrative statistics on crime, education, labor market participation, and ethnic origin.</td>
<td>No specific list of areas; but focus on differences in employment, education, participation, and presence in certain areas of particular types of crime.</td>
<td>Area based policies, identified through statistics on a range of welfare challenges; including also health outcomes.</td>
<td>Commonalities on labor and education, but difference in emphasis. Quantitative vs. qualitative approach to crime. Focus on health indicators in SE and NO.</td>
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<td>Immigration from “non-Western” countries; immigrants who have failed to seize opportunities in Denmark due to insufficient sanctions and incentives for them to participate.</td>
<td>Socio-economic inequality underlies segregation along several dimensions: residence, schools, education, participation and vulnerability to crime.</td>
<td>Focus on the housing market in connection with inequality and urban policy.</td>
<td>In SE and NO ethnic segregation is seen more as a symptom of underlying socio-economic inequality which interacts with the housing market. Extensive reliance on research in order to understand causes, which is absent in DK policy documents.</td>
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<td>Minimal use of research.</td>
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<td>High ambitions for eliminating ghettos, which are seen as a threat to Danish values, by distributing immigrants more evenly. Immigration should continue to be low, and immigrants should settle elsewhere.</td>
<td>Ambitions for lowering segregation along different dimensions. Uphold values of equality while doing so. Important to increase participation. Limited focus on future immigration, but dispersal of refugees.</td>
<td>Reduced segregation, better employment and education outcomes. Sense of belonging, local participation. Continued strict immigration policies, dispersal of refugees.</td>
<td>Strict policy from the top in DK, more bottom-up and focus on participation in NO and SE – easier solutions to a simpler problem definition? Different views of immigration policy expressed, but all favor some dispersal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How can it be fixed?</strong></td>
<td>Physical change to structures, strict dispersal policies, strict incentives for immigrants and descendants.</td>
<td>Market oriented, helping people into the labor market e.g. through training; address discrimination</td>
<td>Understanding the housing market; education and employment empowering individuals; increase services</td>
<td>Negative (DK) vs positive (SE, NO) reinforcement</td>
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<td>One-way (DK) vs. two-way (SE and NO) models – but different structures in relation to housing</td>
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Concluding discussion

If we take a step back, we see three distinct national approaches to the challenge of segregation in the three Scandinavian states, which we have summarized in the above table. The fact that the three states understand the problem in distinct ways, with distinctive understandings about the underlying causes and important dimensions of it, also mean that they have adopted different policies in order to address it. We have noted in this report that there has been a change over time in the approach in Denmark, towards a stricter and more interventionist policy, increasingly focused on ethnic minorities and with a strong emphasis on negative conditionality. One some points, we see that the policies in Sweden and Norway are moving closer to the Danish position, most notably on dispersal of newly settled refugees. Could we expect further movement in the same direction?

There are at least three reasons to believe that the three countries will retain distinct approaches in their efforts to address segregation. Firstly, they have distinctive understandings of the causes of segregation, which leads them to privilege different policy interventions.

Secondly, and related to the choice of policy intervention, there are important structural differences due to the differences in the three countries’ housing markets. The presence of a large social housing sector in Denmark, which is where the designated ghettos are found, means that the state has policy tools at its disposal that are different from those of its neighbors. Danish authorities can intervene and re-house residents, tear down buildings and rebuild new areas. In Sweden, the social housing sector is smaller and there is already a housing shortage, and in Norway there is a much higher rate of home ownership which means that such interventions are out of the question.

Thirdly, there is a noticeable difference between the three countries when it comes to how policies incorporate research findings. One could say that the three countries have different “cultures” in how they relate to research based knowledge. Whereas the Danish strategy contains practically no reference to research, in particular in its discussion of causes of segregation, the Swedish government makes extensive use of research, and Norway has in fact “outsourced” the definition of the problem to an expert commission. Some of the difference between the Danish and Swedish documents in this respect are due to differences in style and length of the national strategies, however the finding of distinct national approaches to the use of expert knowledge in policy development is consistent with previous research (Staver 2014; Jørgensen 2011).

For Sweden and Norway to adopt the kinds of policies that Denmark is currently enacting, it seems that there would have to be research based evidence for their effectiveness. The research that these former countries currently harness in order to bolster their own policy approaches suggests a different path to lowering segregation and mitigating its effects. They both point to the key roles of education and employment, and they address structural forces which lead to these differences to begin with and which prevent individuals from simply choosing a different place to live or a better job through strict incentives.

The findings in this report cohere with many previous studies of integration and housing regimes in the Scandinavian states, in that it identifies significant differences between the three states. These policy areas – at the intersection of integration, segregation and housing
– differ in different ways between the three states and are ripe for further comparative research, including by further examining the use of expert knowledge, but also by examining in a comparative perspective “what works” for reducing segregation and/or mitigating its ill effects.
Bibliography


