

Jørn Holm-Hansen
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Working with partners: Mid-term evaluation of Norwegian People's Aid



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Working with partners: Mid-term evaluation of Norwegian People's Aid

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Abstract: The Evaluation concludes that NPA operates according to a well thought-out methodology tailored to avoid some of the most wide-spread and negative side effects of development aid. Organisational strengthening of partner organisations through formalisation of internal decision-making practices is one of the eight recommendations from the evaluators.

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Preface

This mid-term evaluation was carried out for the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). Field work was carried out in Honduras and El Salvador by Jørn Holm-Hansen. NPA partners and staff in Zimbabwe were interviewed in Johannesburg by Einar Braathen. Interviews were also made at NPA's HQ in Oslo.

The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research would like to thank all those having shared their time, information and insights with the Review Team. Everybody has been very helpful.

NPA staff has been of great help to the evaluators by discussing very openly and sharing their reflections. NPA has also been fast and well-organised in providing field work programmes and necessary documentation.

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Oslo, October 2014

Geir Heierstad

Research Director

Table of Contents

Preface.....	1
Draft list of contents.....	4
Summary	6
1 Introduction	11
2 NPA’s methodology.....	15
2.1 NPA and its point of departure	15
2.2 NPA’s partnership model in its contexts.....	17
2.3 NPA’s technical capacities.....	22
3 Country study: Zimbabwe.....	25
3.1 Political background and current situation.....	25
3.2 About the partners.....	27
3.2.1 General overview	27
3.2.2 The evaluation’s focus organisations	29
3.3 The activities supported by NPA	34
3.4 The NPA contribution.....	36
3.5 Results.....	38
4 Country study: Honduras	40
4.1 Political background and current situation.....	40
4.2 About the partners.....	41
4.2.1 General overview	41
4.2.2 The evaluation’s focus organisations	42
4.3 The activities supported by NPA	45
4.4 The NPA contribution.....	46
4.5 Results.....	47
5 Country study: El Salvador	49
5.1 Political background and current situation.....	49
5.2 About the partners.....	51
5.2.1 General overview	51
5.2.2 The evaluation’s focus organisations	52
5.3 The activities supported by NPA	54

5.4	The NPA contribution.....	57
5.5	Results.....	58
6	Conclusions and recommendations.....	61
	Appendix 1 List of interviewees.....	68
	Appendix 2 Literature and NPA documents consulted.....	73
	Appendix 3 Terms-of-Reference.....	76

Draft list of contents

List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full name
AIAS	African Institute of Agrarian Studies
ARPAS	Asociación de Radios y Programas Participativos de El Salvador
CAC	Comité Ambiental de Cabañas en Defensa del Agua y la Cultura
CCR	Comité de Comunidades Rurales
CDM	Centro de Derechos de Mujeres
CGT	Central General de Trabajadores
CiZC	Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
CNTC	Central Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo
CONPHAS	La Concertación Popular por un País sin Hambre y Seguro
COPA	Coordinadora de Organizaciones Populares del Aguán
CRIPDES-CCR	Asociación de comunidades rurales para el desarrollo de el Salvador
ERIC	Equipo de Reflexión, Información y Comunicación
FOSDEH	Foro Social de Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras

FUNDASPAD	Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Local y la Democracia
FUSADES	Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social
JPS	Juventud Popular de El Salvador
LIBRE	Libertad y Refundación
MADJ	Movimiento Amplio de Dignidad y Justicia
MDC	Movement for Change
MPR12	Movimiento Popular de Resistencia
ONEFREH	Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
ToC	Theory of Change
VAW	Violence Against Women
WCDT	Wadzanai Community Development Trust (WCDT).
YIDEZ	Youth Initiatives for Democracy in Zimbabwe
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZCIEA	Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZELA	Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association
ZimRights	Zimbabwe Human Rights Association

Summary

Jørn Holm-Hansen and Einar Braathen

Working with partners: Mid-term evaluation of Norwegian People's Aid

NIBR Report 2014:17

For the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) a just development is ensured when oppressed groups assert power and capacity to influence power-holders and decision makers. Consequently, NPA's international strategy consists in supporting the work of active groups – primarily popular movements – for democratisation and redistribution of resources. NPA has programmes in 25 countries. This evaluation takes stock of the achievements and shortcomings mid-term and is tailored to be of use in the preparation of a new strategic period.

The evaluation concludes that NPA operates according to a well thought-out and coherent methodology. The methodology is in conformity with NPA's identity as a solidarity organization with its roots in the Norwegian labour movement. NPA's International Strategy and Partnership Policy are based on an approach in which the local partners have the lead. Partners are self-driven. Project activities are demand-driven. NPA's role is auxiliary and enabling but not decisive. This means that NPA's support helps partners reach their goals faster and with a wider range than they would have done without NPA. In order to avoid the unintended effect of aid dependence, NPA makes sure the size of the financial contribution to each partner is modest.

To function optimally this methodology depends on a set of pre-conditions, the most important being the existence of genuine movements to link up with as partners. However, this type of movements - operating according to their own agenda and with

popular roots – does not seem to thrive in contexts of heavy development aid. Supply-driven aid activities tend to make movements turn to “commissioned activism” with shallow roots and little impact which is exactly what NPA seeks to avoid. In other words, NPA’s methodology makes the organization most at home – and probably most successful – in countries which the development aid sector does not primarily have its eye on. This evaluation’s case studies of El Salvador, Honduras, and Zimbabwe illustrate this point.

Nonetheless, financially NPA operates within the same frameworks as other development NGO’s, which means they are financed by governments that tend to crowd round the same countries and regions. NPA is also operating here, despite the fact that circumstances in these countries seldom fit well with NPA’s strategy and methodology. This fact creates some identity problems for NPA. Is it going to join the mainstream or stick to its well-established and coherent way of operating? The challenge is real because NPA is operating for full also in typical aid-receiving regions, like Eastern Africa. In sum, there is a certain tension within NPA between the core idea of the strategy and the dominating realities in the development aid sector. It should be noted that NPA’s country advisers are doing much in-depth analysis of potential partners in countries that are large recipients of aid. This is to ensure that partners are genuine movements with legitimacy in the sense that they are representing certain social groups.

The three case studies in this evaluation are from Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Honduras. They are all very much in line with NPA’s strategy for 2012-2015. The three country programmes show that NPA’s methodology works. This is a method of close follow-up by country co-ordinators and regional advisers, relatively small sums allocated to each partner, a well-thought out mix of partner types of organisations being brought together, and not least: the principle of partners being project owners. Interaction effects between partners are being created between popular movements and expert NGO’s. Aid dependency is avoided.

In El Salvador the programme contributes to the development of a well-functioning civil society in a period where democracy seems to get institutionalized. NPA has been helpful in bringing

community radios in the eastern parts of the country into cooperation with NPA's partner radio Izcanal. CCR has reorganised itself into a stronger organisation and the process was assisted by NPA.

In Honduras the programme contributes to the survival of popular movements and groups in a very vulnerable situation. For instance, through NPA's partner, CDM, young migrant women have been trained and many are now actively taking part in the trade union movement. MADJ, which is working for transparent governance, has been able to enter into cooperation with municipalities elaborating environmental plans.

In Zimbabwe the programme encourages a necessary adaptation to the new political situation characterized by a refurbished and improved constitution, peaceful although not fair elections, consolidated and legitimately elected ZANU-PF government, and opposition weakened due to splits in the former leadership of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The social movements have to be rebuilt, and a new agenda has to be pursued to combine the former emphasis on political-civilian rights/ democracy with a renewed focus on socio-economic rights and economic redistribution. NPA's strategy for 2012-2015 meets these needs almost perfectly, and some of its major partners such as *ZimRights* are in the country's forefront to adapt to the new requirements.

The evaluation shows two potential sources of problems for some of the partner organisations. First, there is a certain unwillingness to discuss organisational issues, like internal democracy. Secondly, some partners need to improve their capacities for making use of opportunities offered for political action through existing institutions.

The evaluators did not come across unintended negative effects of the project activities. NPA's working methodology is tailored to avoid the typical side-effects of aid, which could be summed up as local actors gradually turning their attention more to "donors" than to their constituencies, existing or potential.

NPA's accompaniment, or mentorship, is valuable because it helps structure the projects and focus on results. Not all popular movements are familiar with operating projects. Moreover, the accompaniment helps partners see new opportunities, e.g. in

internal organizational amendments or in linking up with other actors. Further, the political and strategic discussions with the country coordinators are valuable, partners claim. Also, like in the case of Honduras and Zimbabwe, having friends in the North gives some feeling of security against violent repression. There is one problem, however, which is related to NPA's hands-off approach.

The programmes are being closely followed up by the regional advisers in NPA's HQ, regional directors and country coordinators. The reports from the country programmes are detailed and analytical with a convincing emphasis on political realities conditioning the programme implementation. Still there is one major flaw in the programme reports. Although it is clear that NPA contributes to the partners' work through its accompaniment, reports should explain this concretely and explicitly. The process of tracing how the accompaniment actually functioned was one of the biggest challenges in this valuation.

The work being done in NPA's HQ on results based planning, monitoring and reporting is very promising and is about to strike roots. The NPA manual on "Observing Change" is a user-friendly tool in this regard.

The evaluation concludes with a set of recommendations:

1. NPA's methodology and approach position the organization one step ahead of many other NGO's when it comes to avoiding unexpected negative effects of its activities. Therefore, NPA when revising its International Strategy should retain core element of its current strategy.
2. More emphasis should be put on organisational strengthening – including issues pertaining to internal democracy – of partner organisations.
3. NPA should consider a two-pronged strategy with one approach for the programmes in typical aid-receiving countries characterised with weak and "aid-saturated" social movements and one for the countries where the present strategy works well. The strategy for the aid-receiving countries should retain the core elements of NPA's methodology.

4. NPA needs to be more focused on concretising results and its “value added” in all stages of its country programmes.
5. NPA should consider identifying some specific thematic fields of work to concentrate on during the next programme period, e.g. under the broader headlines of democracy building and fair distribution of wealth and influence.
6. Country programmes may gain from growing bigger. This, however, should not be done by increasing the sums per partner but rather include more partners.
7. For Honduras and El Salvador: The social movements in El Salvador and Honduras need to improve a) their policies on security; b) develop more space for open discussion internally in the groups and movements; c) strengthen competence on the policy fields in which the organisations involve themselves.
8. For Zimbabwe and Southern Africa: The movements especially appreciate NPA’s facilitating role in domestic and regional/international networking. NPA should consider expanding the opportunities for the partners to meet for shared learning and commitments. Moreover, NPA should consider scaling up its support to the SADC People’s Summit and/or to other regional meeting places.

1 Introduction

The evaluation

This evaluation has been tailored to be of use for the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in its mid- to end-term in-house learning and the upcoming new strategic period. Therefore, it combines elements from process evaluation and result evaluation.

The core issue in the evaluation is how the International Strategy is implemented. The strategy concentrates on democracy development in partnership with people's organisations. The core success criterion, then, is whether the joint activities of NPA and partner organisations enhance the leverage of oppressed groups. Here one could refer to the core meaning of "empowerment", otherwise a worn-out concept in the aid community.

NPA emphasises the importance of its partners' ability to mobilise, build alliances and influence political processes. Doing this, NPA concentrates on supporting ongoing political processes. Therefore, the evaluation has assessed (i) to what extent, how and why the political influence of the partners have been increased, reduced or not changed the last years, and (ii) in what ways partners' capacity in linking up with other initiatives, movements, and organisations are strengthened. To what extent NPA's support contributes to its partners' robustness in real conflicts is a criterion of success.

However, in addition to partners' external capacities, we have assessed (iii) whether their internal organisational capacities have improved.

Commissioning this evaluation NPA has been interested in getting to know more about to what extent the strategy is actually followed, but also to what extent it is being adapted to national and local conditions. An important question in this regard is the adaptability of NPA's strategy to different contexts. A basic

contextual factor here is the degree to which authorities in a given country are sympathetic to the claims of NPA's partners. The basic question, however, is whether there are genuine social movements with whom NPA can link up.

We have also taken the variety of partner *types* into consideration. NPA's traditional partners are popular movements and groups, but given country-specific circumstances, NPA engage also with advocacy groups, think tanks, issue-specific NGO's and the like.

Evaluation methodology applied

The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess if and how the NPA methodologies contribute towards achieving the desired changes. The NPA programmes seek to set certain mechanisms in motion that lead toward a set of objectives. In order to identify how (and whether) the mechanisms actually work, we have done a close-up and relatively in-depth study of the activities of some of NPA's partners. This has been done in three countries selected by NPA - Zimbabwe, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Case studies: The core methodological approach of the evaluation is case studies. This enables an assessment on how NPA's partnerships work in concrete contexts (how they interact with the surrounding social and political dynamics). It also implied doing interviews with organisations with which NPA's partners work. Making use of the case study approach allowed an in-depth analysis of how, in concrete terms, NPA's mentorship strengthen partners (the Terms-of-References emphasised internal capacities).

In the two Central American countries of study we looked into three sub-cases, i.e. partner organisations were studied in-depth. In Zimbabwe there were five sub-cases, including one organisation in Bulawayo/Matabeleland to cover the whole ethnically divided country.

The choice of Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Honduras for case studies was not made because they are representative of the variety of countries in which NPA is operating. The three countries are rather examples of countries in which NPA's partnership policy and working methods must be expected to fit in. None of the three countries are "drowned" by development aid and all three countries have genuine civil societies that respond more to their constituencies than to donors. Although sharing similar traits the

three countries currently differ when it comes to the working conditions of NPA's partners. For instance, the current FMLN government in El Salvador have close links to the NPA partners, whereas the opposite is the case in Honduras and Zimbabwe.

The partner organisations differ. The categories are popular organisations, network organisations, expert groups that support movements and CBO's, peasant organisations, and human rights advocacy groups. The fact that the contextual factors in the three countries are structurally different and the fact that we selected different types of partner organisations, made it possible to carry out comparison and contrasting, which proved to be conducive to the analysis, but also for the discussion and learning that the mid-term evaluation aims at enabling.

Theory of Change: NPA has developed a user-friendly and very focused manual for results-based planning, monitoring and reporting – “Observing Change”. NPA makes use of Theory of Change (ToC) to structure its project work. Also for the evaluation phase thinking in terms of ToC is useful because it enables a systematic analysis of how project actors assume the links between initial project/programme activities and the wished impacts. Moreover, it helps the assessment of how partners and NPA follow up the process towards change, and how they document outputs, outcomes and emerging impacts. Consequently, ToC is the methodological and analytical approach chosen for this mid-term evaluation. We have used it for the interview guides, data collection, discussion of findings, analysis and while writing up the report.

Data: The written data needed to undertake the evaluation were sought from various sources, mainly plans and strategies and earlier evaluations and reviews. Preparing the field work in Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Honduras we read through project documents (applications and reports) for these countries.

Interviews and meetings in the field where partners are operating constituted the main data source together with interviews in NPA HQ. The interviews were semi-structured and based on an interview guide tailored for each category of respondent, i.e. HQ, NPA personnel in the field and partner organisation.

There was a last minute change of the field work plan for Zimbabwe. NPA decided that the evaluator met the Zimbabwean partner organizations and some independent observers in Johannesburg rather than in their national and local environment. This led to few own observations but more time for in-depth interviews. It also meant that more organizations were covered by interviews – nine organizations and not only the five selected as sub-cases. The last day of the field works in El Salvador and Honduras all partner organisations came together with the evaluator and country coordinator for validation and discussion of preliminary findings.

In order to cover the breadth of NPA's goals, we made sure the concrete projects and organizations visited during field work cover all four priority areas of NPA, i.e. Fighting repressive state policies and actions; Defending/claiming land rights; Democratic and just public policies; Human rights (democratic rights, women's rights, indigenous people's rights). Likewise, we made sure different types of partner organisations are represented among the partners we visit during field work.

2 NPA's methodology

This chapter addresses NPA's basic approach to working with partners on the basis of experience gained so far in the programme period. Aiming to avoid some of the most harmful – and typical – side effects of development aid, NPA's approach – as reflected in its International Strategy and Partnership Policy – is truly ambitious. The organisation's determination to let partners take and keep the lead locally may be easier to follow up under certain conditions than other. Nonetheless, NPA is operating under a wide range of conditions, not only in countries with vibrant social movements and high level of political consciousness where NPA's method of work fits easily in. The question is to what extent the NPA method works in countries without social movements and political struggles based on the demand for fair distribution of influence and wealth. Is NPA's methodology working in settings where partners have to be "built up from scratch", where the society with which partners are supposed to interact hardly exists and demands for just distribution have a negligible number of supporters?

In addition to a discussion of NPA's fundamental approach and method, the chapter will address the organisation's technical capacities. In what ways are assumptions about links between activity and outcomes made use of in planning and analysis? What are the routines following up the process towards change? What are the approaches for monitoring and evaluation? How are outputs, outcomes and longer effects documented?

2.1 NPA and its point of departure

Being the Norwegian labour movement's humanitarian NGO, NPA has a core identity as a solidarity organisation. When doing development aid, therefore, the organisation wants to mark a

distance to socio-technocratic or charitable aid. In its International Strategy 2012-2015 NPA states:

“Development is not just a matter of economic growth, knowledge or the right technical solutions. (...) The crucial issue is how the resources are controlled and distributed.”

For NPA a just development results from oppressed groups asserting power and capacity to participate and influence power-holders and decision makers. This means that NPA takes side politically in the countries of operation. It is ready to challenge prevailing power relations in its countries of operation.

As outlined in NPA’s Partnership Policy, the partners engage in a two-way cooperative relationship. NPA aims at working *with* its partners, not *through* them. These are important distinctions, and the evaluation is looking into the concrete challenges that may occur as a result of this approach.

In its international strategy NPA’s main goal is to see strong actors in civil society working for democratisation and redistribution of resources in the 25 countries in which the organisation has development programmes. Therefore, NPA’s success can be measured as to what degree it contributes efficiently to the capacities and impact of its 247 partner organisations influencing political processes and decision making, and to what degree NPA’s and partners’ efforts influence the Norwegian and international development agenda, investments and public opinion. The question, then, is how the NPA methodologies contribute towards these aims. Do they strengthen partners’ capacity in linking up with other initiatives, movements, and organisations? Have partners’ internal organisational capacities been improved?

At times the aid community tends to underrate the importance of conflict in creating development to the benefit of technocratic and conflict-free project-type solutions. NPA is different, basing its approach on the insight that democratic participation and fair distribution of resources are typically results of political and social struggle. To what extent NPA’s support contributes to its partners’ robustness in real conflicts, therefore, would be a relevant criterion of success.

NPA underwent a major strategic shift in 2007. The new strategy abolished the thematic organisation of the activities switched to two general and overarching objectives – democracy building and fair distribution of wealth. This was considered to be an adaptation to the current world situation, with popular revolts, migratory trends, struggle over natural resources, and larger share of the populations living in middle income countries. NPA was among the first NGO's to make similar steps, and it was welcomed by MFA and Norad.

Operationally, however, the new strategy has proven to be demanding, among others because it opens up for a very wide variety of cooperation types. NPA considers itself to be good at political analysis and also analyses of actors, but in many countries it is still difficult to identify the optimal four or five local partners, the ones able to change things locally/at country level.

2.2 NPA's partnership model in its contexts

According to NPA's partnership model, partners are supposed to take the lead, leaving NPA with the task of accompanying them. NPA's Partnership Policy established five criteria for selection and assessment of partner organisations:

- Policy of the organisation
- Unity of the organisation
- Capacity to influence, have impact, and make changes
- Capacity to relate to, and make alliances with, other actors
- The technical and administrative competence of the organisation

In Latin America an additional criterion is being applied. Here, the organisation's capacity to operate under changing political circumstances is included.

Ideally NPA's accompaniment is political and not merely focused on project management issues. However, in some of the NPA's programme countries organisations are weak and NPA's accompaniment has to be on economy and management and less on other issues. Gradually steering the cooperation from

technicalities to political analysis and action, therefore, is a core concern for many country programmes. NPA constantly communicates to less developed partners that it is important to venture beyond management aspects of organizational development and get started with its political aspects.

Another core concern within NPA is to find a viable balance between “adding value” and avoiding paternalism. The local partners are to have the leading role while planning and carrying out the activities supported by NPA. At times this makes it difficult to identify the efforts made by the NPA country programme. This is a problem whenever results are reported to the funding agencies. Moreover, there is a risk that NPA being so careful not to push methods on the partners that opportunities of actually adding value are missed. The case studies of three of NPA country programmes made as part of this evaluation found that NPA is adding value, but the evaluators too had difficulties in pinpointing exactly how. This is despite having put the question throughout the field work. The general answer to the question is that value is added through informal conversations between NPA partners on political developments and on management issues.

Thematically, NPA concentrate on democracy building and fair distribution of wealth but unlike most other international NGO’s NPA does not concentrate on one particular policy field, like environment or child rights. Neither has it cultivated one particular methodology for its project implementation across country programmes.

Country advisers and country co-ordinators interviewed as part of this evaluation display great willingness to discuss the dilemmas of partner selection. In some cases, in the immediate aftermath of the “opening-up” of a country to foreign aid and NGO’s, temptations may occur leading NPA to link up with any organisation with a minimum of credibility and only at a later stage weed out the most evident mistakes.

The long process of establishing partnerships in Egypt after the Arab Spring is one example that NPA takes problems of legitimacy seriously. NPA prefers to work with partners having a membership base or at least a constituency among ordinary inhabitants.

The agreement with the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) that NPA do not include trade unions among its partners, limits some of NPA's possibilities to enter into cooperation with genuine organisations. On the other hand, NPA is welcome to work on human rights perspectives of trade unions and labour. The partnership with CDM in San Pedro Sula, Honduras (to be discussed later in this report) is a successful example of how this can be done, and of how oppositional elite groups can contribute significantly through interaction effects with organisations with a popular base. Likewise, two years ago NPA started up a country programme in Egypt. Here, NPA considers the trade union movement to be the most legitimate organization after the Brotherhood. Not being "allowed" to enter into direct cooperation with these unions NPA has supported the women movement that forms part of the broader movement in which the trade unions also participate. Here NPA and LO cooperates well and LO draws on NPA's knowledge about the country and its movements.

In many country programmes, one of the main challenges consists in bridging the gap between oppositional elite and popular movement. Elite organisations – often advocacy groups – should ideally, if accepted as NPA partners, have linked up with organised layers of the society. The typical NGO that mainly communicates with the aid community and foreign embassies is not normally among NPA's partners. As the evaluation will show below in the chapters on Zimbabwe, Honduras and El Salvador, elite organisations/NGO's that link up with popular movements and provide expertise are fully within NPA's partnership thinking, and creates important interaction effects within the country programmes.

NPA gives priority to popular movements. This, however, may not be sufficient to ensure that partners have sufficiently developed roots in its constituency of people, they be landless farmers, environmentalists, indigenous people or other. NPA has many partners that are popular movements and organisations but without a formalised membership, and without paying members. The organisation's rank and file participants, therefore, may enjoy little in terms of formal rights to define the priorities and policies of the movement. In such cases the question of representativeness and legitimacy could be raised, but also the question of

sustainability and robustness in periods of stress. The last few years the World has seen several examples of power shifts in which protesting movements have played a decisive role. The movements may have popular support but lack strong organisation. Therefore, the revolutions easily are taken over by other groups or, small groups may reap unproportional benefits. Movements with a stronger organisational structure might possibly be a counterweight to such developments.

This is why a debate is ongoing within NPA whether or not to stress the need for partners to strengthen their internal membership functions, e.g. by introducing a small membership fee that would boost the feeling of rights and obligations among the participants. This idea was, while aired by the evaluators in El Salvador, Honduras, and Zimbabwe. It was not shared by all NPA's partners in El Salvador and Honduras, who found the idea to go against the local cultural code in addition to discouraging people from participation. CNTC in Honduras is an exemption as they operate with membership fees. In Zimbabwe, the NPA partners are familiar with the idea, and many of them oblige their members to pay fees although economic hardships make the collection rate low. Also the problems resulting from a lack of formal representativeness and possibly poorly developed internal democracy did not to be on the agenda in the case countries. As a contrast, NPS's programme in Egypt, concentrates on two issues: organizational freedom and organizational forms. These are issues on which NPA most likely is well positioned to add value: How to "organise an organisation"; the meaning of qualified membership; procedure for exclusion etc.

In many countries NPA is operating under very difficult conditions. In Vietnam, for legal bureaucratic reasons NPA's partners are all registered as research organisations and not NGO's. In Egypt, for legal reasons, NPA's partners are registered as firms. In Mozambique one of NPA's partners is Africa's largest membership organisation with 40 000 members, and organization with high legitimacy. In general, however, membership organisations are unusual. In South East Asia they do not exist, or they function more like public bodies.

NPA has a coherent strategy and partnership policy with a solid foundation in the labour movement's idea of solidarity. The

challenge, however, consists in bringing the strategy into the 25 different country contexts. One of the paradoxes is that a strong presence of development aid in a country reduces the applicability of the strategy. Serving donors rather than potential constituencies often is what otherwise honourable organisations end up with.

One country adviser mentioned the case of Palestine, formerly a territory thriving with civic activism. With massive aid emerged a new civil society created by the donors and the international community. The old civil society has been hollowed out and paralysed by the influx of aid. There has been made attempts at measuring the role of civil society by counting the number of NGO employees. Palestine has 6000 NGO staff altogether. “The civil society is not where aid is”, to quote the country adviser. In short, aid intensive contexts are not conducive to easy implementation of NPA’s strategy.

NPA by far largest country programme, South Sudan, offers a context that agrees very little with NPA’s strategy. For historical reasons NPA has a strong position in South Sudan thanks to its prolonged solidarity work and emergency assistance. NPA is now an important provider of developmental aid with a focus on civil society development, including development of mass media. Also, NPA supports the state-constituting SPLM party with the aim of making it democratic. NPA links up with the very rare civic initiatives in the area, among them a women’s organization and the pro-transparency ‘land alliances’. These organisations are, however, not likely to be able to set their own agenda independently of the international community that helped create and uphold the South Sudanese state structure.

Latin America is the region where NPA’s strategy is most easily applicable because the region is replete with genuine and determined social movements and a relatively weak presence of development aid. However, genuine movements that operate independently of the aid agenda exist also outside Latin America, like in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines or Bangladesh.

There is a strong tradition in NPA for strong autonomy in the countries of operation. Therefore, much hinges on the leaders of the land programmes. Different traditions live side by side. In East Africa for instance, cooperation with USAID and deep scepticism

to USAID live side by side. In Rwanda, partners tend to be more in favour on projects on service delivery than on democracy building and fair distribution of wealth. In short, the degree to which the principles of NPA's strategy has been internalised vary between the country programme officers. In the three countries of case study for this evaluation, however, country programme coordinators have a close affiliation to the NPA approach. In these countries, NPA is clearly distinguishable from most other international NGO's.

Norwegian trade unions have entered into cooperation with NPA partners. In South Sudan for instance, NPA is cooperation with the Industry Energy trade union. With the assistance of NPA 'oil task forces' have been established, and Industri og Energi has expressed willingness to help organise South Sudanese oil workers. Unfortunately, the political and economic crisis in the county has made it impossible to follow up on this initiative. In the three case countries for this evaluation (see below), experiences are more promising.

2.3 NPA's technical capacities

Despite having a very consistent strategy, NPA's country offices, as mentioned above, are heterogeneous, and preconditions for implementing NPA's strategy vary between countries. Among others staff in country offices differ and recruitment is not controlled by the HQ. In Latin America staff is recruited on the basis of documented professional competence and experience. The Latin American staff usually has a strong political commitment whereas in Africa they usually have a background from development aid. The country programmes in highly politicised South Africa and Zimbabwe are honourable exceptions from this rule, though.

It requires some efforts to make geography advisers in the HQ and country offices make use of the same concepts and in a similar way. For the purpose of harmonizing the use of operational concepts, the HQ is currently working on a manual in organizational development.

NPA's country reports for Honduras and El Salvador, and Zimbabwe stand out as being well-written and analytical. Still some

more concrete information on results and their attribution to NPA's support is needed.

Norad as a funder has a disciplining function. The country reports – that form the basis for NPA's report to Norad – must conform to some general standards. Norad needs to know what NPA partners spend funds on, and leaves it to NPA and its accountants to document this. Moreover, Norad demands documentation of results and NPA's country reports need to include this for NPA to be able to report. Also, at times when pushing partners to work on their strategies and use them as tools, NPA is referring to Norad requirements.

Several evaluations have concluded that NPA needs to improve monitoring and documentation of outputs, outcomes and longer effects. NPA's manual for results-based planning, monitoring and reporting – “Observing Change” has been made to meet this need. It replaces a system based on log frame that reportedly mainly caused irritation among its users. The present manual is user-friendly and encourages a focus on results in a broad but still specific sense. The manual warns against talking in terms of “successful” and “various”, but tell concretely what was successful and when possible quantify. Reporting is very much up to the country offices but there is a requirement that they refer to the four levels of input, output, outcome and impact.

In some of the Latin American country offices the new manual was met with suspicion at the outset, associating it with elaborate systems of indicator management, control from above and neo-liberalism. At a regional seminar in 2012, however, the manual was explained and after some discussion welcomed as a tool facilitating concrete reporting. “Observing Change” is being used during elaboration of programme proposals as well as annual reports and has proven to be helpful in meeting the demand for information on results and how NPA see the link between activities and results. NPA Latin America has a baseline based on the six criteria in the partnership policy for selection of partners (see 3.2 above) and is using them systematically for monitoring purposes.

Local evaluations of country programmes are being carried out by the country offices and partners in cooperation with the country advisers in the HQ. The HQ adviser on monitoring and evaluation contributes on the Terms-of-Reference.

NPA is planning a follow up to «Observing Change» for operational purposes focusing on learning, risk analysis and reporting on un-expected results and non-results. A major challenge in this respect is to develop an organisational culture that encourages problematic issues to be brought to the fore and discussed openly.

3 Country study: Zimbabwe

3.1 Political background and current situation

Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe has gone through a political, social and economic transformation the last two decades, and the last two years have been important. Politically, the struggles of the pro-democracy movement have born some important fruits. A ‘de facto’ one party state has been replaced by a more plural system with free although not fair elections (in 2013). A new constitution with a bill of rights and democratic aspirations of the people written into it has been in place since 2013. The civilian-political rights have never been in a stronger position since the independence in 1980. Nevertheless, there have not been any significant changes in the composition and strategic interests of the ruling elite of the country. The dictatorship of the ZANU-PF elite continues although in softer and more constitutionally legitimate forms.

Socially and economically, a radical land reform has been carried out and all but wiped out the white commercial farmers (the ‘white settler class’). Not only have the ZANU-PF elite, but also hundreds of thousand peasants benefited from the land reform. 70 % of the land is now held by small farm producers (Raftopoulos 2013:980). However, the unjust distribution of the natural resources of the country – minerals and irrigated land – has forced an increasing number of its work force into the informal economy to survive.

The opposition represented by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) saw their electoral victories being ‘stolen’ by ZANU-PF in 2002 and 2008. After the elections in 2008, external pressures from SADC/South Africa backed by USA and EU led to a negotiated settlement (Global Political Agreement) between ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties, and a Government of

National Unity (GNU) was formed. With the creation of the GNU it was hoped that political reforms would start and that power would be equally shared amongst the three main political parties (ZANU-PF and the two MDCs). However, despite the formation of the GNU, there was no meaningful change to policies. Repressive policies such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the Broadcasting Services Act, the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act, the Official Secrets Act continued to affect the rights of citizens to gather without police clearance or else face terrorism and treason charges. This created pessimism regarding the fairness of the next elections.

When realized as Harmonised Elections (combined local, parliament and president elections) on 31 July 2013, in 2013, frustrated parts of the electorate either stayed away or voted for

ZANU-PF. Although opposition parties claimed there were frauds and irregularities, the elections have been considered by independent observers as relatively 'free', yet not 'fair' in terms of equal and levelling field for the parties. Mugabe received 61 per cent compared to the 44 per cent he had won in 2008. MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai's vote plunged from 48 per cent in 2008 to 33 per cent in 2013. In terms of parliamentary seats, ZANU-PF increased its number from 99 seats in 2008 to 159 in 2013, while the MDV-T's number dropped from 99 seats in 2008 (with the smaller MDC formation winning 10 seats) to 49 in 2013. Moreover, the total number of votes increased by 25 per cent between 2008 and 2013; ZANU-PF's share of the vote increased by 83 per cent, while the voters for MDC-T had dropped by 2 per cent. Although these elections were carried out in a more peaceful and orderly manner than most people had feared, it left the democratic social movements if not shocked so at least perplexed. New agendas and new strategies were needed.

A leading historian and civil society activist, Brian Raftopoulos, has suggested a thorough reorientation of the democracy forces.

“As the constitutional movement gained momentum between the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the dominance of the human rights messaging took precedence over economic issues, a shift that contributed to the rupture between rights and redistributive issues that has continued to mark the

political discourse in the country (...).The politics of the land occupation movement in the 2000s profoundly marked the bifurcation between questions of human rights and economic redistribution.” (Raftopoulos, 2013:973).

A point of departure for the suggested reorientation is the new Constitution. Although it was a compromise document which maintained a disturbing concentration of executive powers, it also put in place important changes such as presidential term limits, more accountability of the security and judicial services, a more independent national prosecuting authority, limited devolution of power, and stronger citizenship rights. The referendum went ahead on 16 March 2013, with the overwhelming majority of voters, 3,079,966, voting for the new constitution, while a small number, 179,489, voted against. The total number of votes cast was 3,259,454. The referendum vote recorded the largest voter turnout in the postcolonial period.

What is most important is that the democratic movements and parties realize that ZANU-PF has strengthened its social base among the rural producers, workers in the mining (formal and informal) sectors, and among the urban poor. While ZANU-PF has put just distribution of resources on the agenda, the ruling party is not likely to deliver and satisfy the expectations of the people. To the contrary, as ZANU-PF now longer can use the threat from MDC to unite it, it can now discuss what should happen when the 90 year old Mugabe one day dies. It is split in a succession fight between three factions: Vice President Joyce Mujuru, Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Mugabe’s wife Grace (Mail & Guardian, September 12 to 18, 2014). In this situation, the democratic forces have an opportunity to regain strength by giving new energy to a unified struggle for both human rights and economic redistribution.

3.2 About the partners

3.2.1 General overview

NPA has operated in Zimbabwe continuously since the late 1970s, when it supported the national liberation movements ZANU and

ZAPU. It earns an enormous respect, even within the ruling party ZANU-PF despite the fact that all the partners of NPA in the recent years have been critical and/ or in opposition to ZANU-PF.

In 2013, NPA had ten partner organizations in Zimbabwe. They work with different *themes and issues*:

- Four of them mobilise broadly for democracy and human rights: Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Bulawayo Agenda (BA) and Youth Initiatives for Democracy in Zimbabwe (YIDEZ).
- Four work with rural women's rights (broadly defined¹): Wadzanai Community Development Trust (WCDDT), CHIDA, Women & Land in Zimbabwe/ Rural Women's Assemblies (RWAs), and African Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS). The two latter work particularly with rural women's right to land.
- Two work with socio-economic rights in the informal economy and in the mining sector, respectively: Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association representative (ZCIEA, in association with Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union, ZCTU) and Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA). Also ZimRights work increasingly in these areas.

The counterparts also differ as to *their organization structure*, or type of organisation: Some are membership-based organisations: ZimRights, ZCIEA, WCDDT, CHIDA and to some extent also Women & Land (an umbrella organization for local member-based CBOs, the RWAs.) Some are umbrella organizations for mass organizations or social movements: CiZC and Bulawayo Agenda (the latter has also direct individual members). Some are think tanks or NGOs (foundations): AIAS, ZELA, YIDEZ.

Finally, they differ much in the *scale and outreach*. ZimRights and CiZC are national organizations (ZimRights with provincial and

¹ Includes rural women's access to and control of resources, land, income. Property rights and analysis of power relations are key focus points in their work.

local branches) which have played important roles nationally to reform the political and legal framework. Bulawayo Agenda plays a role in some regions and districts particularly in democratizing the local councils. ZCIEA is a national trade union for informal workers with mainly local strength in certain places. AIAS, ZELA, Women & Land and YIDEZ and are based in Harare but work in certain communities and offer their knowledge as well as networking and mobilizing skills, while they also address national policy issues. Some are typically community-based organizations: WCDT, CHIDA, and the RWAs.

Only a few of the organizations have worked closely together before becoming partners with NPA. Cooperation had taken place between the 'old' political and human rights agenda (ZimRights, CiZC, and ZCTU).

3.2.2 The evaluation's focus organisations

(i) Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) was founded in 1992. It is the biggest human rights organisation in the country. It has 70 000 active members, but currently only 10 per cent pay the membership fee (5 USD per year for people with fixed income, 1 USD a year for others), allegedly because of people's economic hardships. The members are organized in 11 province associations.

Its staff is 36 including provincial coordinators in 10 provinces. 20 of the officers have agreed to shrink their jobs to half time (2 ½ days a week), to help the financial situation. It has a legal, information, education, monitoring & evaluation & advocacy, and administration department

ZimRights' vision is "to be the leader in developing and sustaining a culture of human rights in Zimbabwe". Its objectives include "promoting human rights awareness and respect for all with special emphasis on marginalised groups".

The organisation's activities have been centred mainly on public campaigns, lobbying and advocacy for the ratification and domestication of regional and international instruments for human rights; to watch the government institutions' observance of the human rights and to provide legal assistance to persons or groups who have seen their rights violated.

After the 2013 elections, ZimRights have changed its strategy. First, it has decided to engage with the ZANU-PF government. Second, it will focus more on issues of socio-economic rights.

ZimRights will depart from what the government wants to do to its own people, as expressed for instance in its “The economic blueprint of the nation”, and ZimRights will monitor its implementation. Furthermore, the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution need acts to be enforced, e.g. a parliament act to tax the mining companies and miners to ensure the just distribution of the mineral revenues.

ZimRights stands out among NPA’s partners by its will and capacity to adapt to changing situations in the national politics.

(ii) Zimbabwe Chamber for Informal Employees Associations (ZCHIEA) ZCIEA was formed in 2002 by ZCTU. It is a membership driven organization, with congress every 4 years and 177 000 members. (Only 2500 paid the membership fee of 6 USD last year). The recruitment base is calculated to be 6.5 million people, if small scale farmers are included. Most of the members are local informal traders. They are located in 485 trade area zones, typically in a township, village or town (sub-district level). They are organized in 30 territories, which are not congruent with the provinces. 50 per cent of the members of the ZCIEA committees at any level have to be women.

The objective of ZCIEA is to promote decent standards of living for informal workers. The main work is directed at the local councils, addressing issues that affected informal workers directly—harassments by police, local authorities, and tax collectors, based on outdated by-laws. They also fight for land plots for their stands. At the national level, ZCIEA lobbies for a new ‘master by-law’ to replace the current one from 1963 (!). Moreover, the organization wants to bring small businesses into main stream so-called ‘formal economy’, with adequate regulations, including coverage by a Social Security Scheme. In other words, ZCIEA mobilizes against the social exclusion caused today by the politics and economics of the country.

The relations with the authorities are usually good at the local level in medium-size cities and towns, although Harare (run by MDC-T) is said to be a problem. The relations with national ministries are

very strained – the Ministry of Local Government is “not friendly at all”. They developed apparently good relations with Ministry of SMEs, but it ended up with the ministry “stealing” ZCIEA’s ideas and setting up a competing organization. “Zimbabwe Chamber of SMEs”. ZCIEA involved itself in the elections last year, campaigning for members who stood as candidates. Quite many were voted in, not only for the MDCs. However, most of the elected persons forget about ZCIEA when they get elected. They do not answer ZCIEA’s initiatives. These experiences have convinced ZCIEA that they need to be “very political, without being partisan”. The organization goes now mainly for ‘stomach politics’ (*Politics zve dumbu*).

(iii) Bulawayo Agenda (BA) was established in 2002 in the second largest city of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. BA has been important in the mobilization for democracy in Matabeleland and has spread to other districts of the country. BA is an ‘alliance’ devoted to further alliance building for inclusive citizenship from below, using the local level as its main arena.

BA is a network and umbrella organisation. 37 organizations, most of them based in Bulawayo, are members. They include a city-wide resident association, a local radio station, a Christian legal society, women and youth organizations, and cultural associations. In addition BA has individual members organized in 12 districts outside Bulawayo, in six provinces. E.g. Gwanda Agenda, Matopo Agenda, Vic Falls Agenda. They are usually recruited among activists from CBOs. BA has a staff of 15 people, all full time. Most of them are development practitioners, with education in social sciences. BA has offices also in Gwanda and Gweru.

The aims of the organization are summed up in the vision and mission statement of the organization: “inclusive society, women and men; political and socio-economic and civil rights are respected, protected and fulfilled”. These are to be achieved through a combination of alliance building, direct mobilization and lobbying to influence local councils

After 2013 elections, the work with local councils became a challenge as ZANU-PF had re-conquered a large number of them, including the majority of local councils in Matabeleland. BA is in the process of adapting new tactics to this new situation. In general terms, they seek to combine engagement and diplomatic offensive

towards the local governments with popular mobilization. A two-pronged approach is applied: on the one hand to make people demand more; on the other hand target official authorities to fulfil their obligations and promises. The trick is to empower the communities to raise the costs for the local councils of not listening to the communities. At the moment, BA has good working relations with three local authorities where ZANU-PF is strong: Matopos, Plumtree and Nkayi.

BA has reviewed its strategy plan. The main change is to emphasize socio-economic rights and tie them with (local) governance issues. BA also wants to improve evidence based advocacy work, gender mainstreaming and financial sustainability. BA's budget for 2014 is around 300 000 USD. NPA is funding almost 25 per cent of its budget. Own revenues amount to around 10 per cent, mainly coming from its printing press. Membership fees were discussed in its last Annual Meeting. ("Everybody agree they have to pay, but disagree about the amount").

(iv) African Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS) is a trust registered in 2002 in Harare. It is a research institution and a think tank. The last five years it has downsized the staff, now they are six. In addition AIAS hosts people on short term contracts and interns (students). It operates an international network: of associate fellows from different countries: South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Mali plus Brazil and India.

The aim of the organisation is "to promote the knowledge production on agrarian issues that concern the majority of the rural population, the rural poor".

The main area of activities is research. AIAS' major project has been assessment of the land distribution, land use production and livelihoods after the Land Reform. It was based on primary and secondary data from 10 districts across provinces and ecological regions, as well as secondary data from the whole country. It has also studied agrarian labour - workers on commercial and small farms- and made some smaller studies including on women and land.

Another area is education: AIAS Agrarian Summer School brings in people from the international network to learn from other countries, like Brazil and India. A third area is networking to

stimulate both production and dissemination of knowledge, and to facilitate evidence-based policy dialogue and advocacy work. Its national network is called Zimbabwe Land and Agrarian Network.

The idea behind the Network is first to discuss the issues the participants are already dealing with, not starting from scratch. Then the aim is to dig deeper through studies and dialogue, and to produce a dialectic relationship between people's issues and academic studies, to create inputs for public policy. AIAS now works with women's organisations to apply the new Constitution and claim women's rights. A challenge in Zimbabwe is that disagreements end up in a racial, nationalist, or liberal discourse. AIAS tries to promote a social discourse, bringing political discussions closer to empirical reality on the ground. Zimbabwe needs more evidence-based policy making. AIAS' executive director emphasizes that "network building is confidence building... The government thinks our institute knows too much. The opposition think we are not critical enough".

Advocacy work is also on AIAS' agenda, now with women and land as the main reform issue. AIAS has never fallen in the category as 'regime change agents'. Instead they are agents for policy change. Allies are seen within the ruling party – there are some strong women there. Resistance to reform is expected among traditional authorities and in the administration of the local councils. At the national level there is a human resource gap – the economic crisis has moved experts to South Africa and abroad. There are few sociologists and lawyers and others to address the issues of marginalised people. The mass media are weak – investigative and critical journalism is very limited. The two ministries, of agriculture and of land, are not easy to deal with. But they respect knowledge. To overcome all the obstacles to reform, knowledge is key.

(v) Wadzanai Community Development Trust (WCdT) is a CBO in Domboshawa, a rural district outside Harare. The organization started out in 1994 when women in the community decided to build their own centre, to hold own workshops. It was part of Zimbabwe Women's Bureau. In 2006 it became an independent organization (CBO). WCdT now has a full time staff of eight, four working at the centre. It reaches out to more than 8000 people in

four wards. It is a member organization, with more than 1000 paying a fee.

The aim of the CBO is “to empower women, to let women come out of their shell and develop themselves”. It works with two major issues: 1. Against gender-based violence and repression. 2. Enhancement of women’s participation and leadership positions in representative bodies. The representative holds that women are left out of water committees and of offices nationally. Women pull each other down, not voting for other women. Women refuse to stand, but the CBO tries to convince them.

A challenge for WCDT is that it is a non-partisan organization in a ZANU-PF dominated area. There is persistent resistance from men in the ruling party. “They spread rumours and give us names, say we are MDC, shouted at us, ‘give us money!’.” A male member of parliament (MP) once mobilized against WCDT having a meeting, leading to a reduced turn-out (less than hundred women.) But these incidents are exceptions. WCDT has a good relationship with the female MP from ZANU-PF and with the District Administrator.

3.3 The activities supported by NPA

NPA has supported ZimRights until 2002, and then again since 2007/8. The last years they have received around 500 000 NOK annually. NPA funded its campaign to include a bill of rights in the new constitution. The recent years the emphasis has been on campaigns for marginalised social groups, e.g. sugar cane workers and informal miners (*makorokosas*), in selected districts. Chiredzi was one of them. NPA has also supported capacity building in results-based planning, budgeting and reporting. And NPA supports ZimRights hooking ZimRights up with CBOs through the networking activities of NPA.

ZCIEA has been working with NPA since 2008 and has for the last years received around 300 000 NOK annually. The funding has been earmarked for (i) campaigns to organize informal traders. (ii) Advocacy campaigns - petitions for new by-laws locally and nationally, and for allocation of land for stands to the informal traders. (iii) Capacity building, in partnership with the legal department of ZCTU: Training-of-Trainers to empower the

members, to get them know their rights. Much of this was training of paralegal officers.

For BA, the main activities have been: (i) Public meetings, (public forums, town hall meetings, community meetings) to create interface between policy makers and citizens. In 2013 the themes centred on laws governing elections, the new Constitution, and electoral issues: land, public services, public accountability. (ii) Civic education often linked together with the public meetings. (iii) Training and mentorship. Skills around advocacy, basic community research/evidence gathering, how to do civic education, community organizing, report writing, needs assessment/participatory baseline research/participatory planning. These training activities were initiated, funded or directly organized by NPA; and (iv) meetings in national and regional networks organized by NPA.

NPA entered into partnership with AIAS in 2012. It received around 260 000 NOK both in 2012 and 2013. The task has been to build Zimbabwe Land and Agrarian Network - a forum for advocacy on issues that concern small producers of farming. A small portion of the grant has been used on studies, incl. on women and land, to provide informed debates within the network.

As for WCDT, NPA was introduced to the community in 1995 when it gave them cement so they could build their centre. NPA really started to fund the CBO on a regular basis in 2006 when WCDT became a formalized and independent organization. It has received around 280 000 NOK annually for the last years.

In its work against gender-based and domestic violence, WCDT cooperates with other legal aid centres for women in bigger and more serious cases. It also involves men, e.g. a theatre group, a men's organization denouncing violence against violence, offer counselling to violent men, and the local police station which has a 'Victim-friendly Unit'. WCDT goes into the community with sensitization campaigns and work with local councillors to call meetings and train women. They have managed to get the MP, who is a woman (ZANU-PF), as an ally. Even the minister of women's affairs has come to one of WCDT's meetings.

WCDT's work with NPA to promote woman leadership started with receiving five pigs from NPA (2 male, 3 female pigs). The

idea was to give women a sense of power, bringing in cash to the home and deciding what to buy for the home. “We have to have food on our table, before we can go to all these meetings”. NPA argues that this type projects – related to livelihood or gender-based violence - was supported only to serve as entry points for working with systematic political training and mobilization in these communities. They can therefore be justified as being in accordance with the overall strategy of NPA.

3.4 The NPA contribution

The ZimRights representative said they had learnt from NPA that the small things matter to mobilise people.

“People feel they have been tricked by the talk of politics....We do not get into these communities if we only speak about politics, ‘go and register to vote’. That is the conclusion of our dialogue with the communities: start with the bread-and-butter issues!”

From this perspective, “*NPA pressed the right button in the right time.*” The work with socio-economic rights is a way of combining redistribution issues with democracy and human rights.

One of the partner representatives put it this way: “NPA understands our goals, our needs. Without political conditions, they support our own decided goals and fund our campaigns.” NPA is more than a financial support partner, and more than a capacity builder. NPA’s managers are seen as counsellors, someone to discuss intricate problems with, for instance regarding partisan politics and relations both with the ruling and the opposition parties. They provide useful feedback, both to narrative and financial reports. They are also perceived to help the partner organizations build teams and thereby help solving internal disagreements.

For BA, NPA strengthens its institutional capacity. NPA has taught the partner organization “better corporate governance” – improved procedures for board and annual meetings, higher skills in financial management, monitoring and evaluation, research. NPA also offers “mentorship”, through useful feedback on the progress reports, annual plans and quarterly agendas that have to

be sent to NPA. Compared to other donors, NPA strikes a good balance between ‘mentoring’ (value adding, changing the partner) the partner organization and

NPA adds strength to networking activities of the partner organizations. The Annual Partners’ Meeting (1 ½ day) organized by NPA forges links and alliances. NPA sponsors the SADC People’s Summit, the civil society parallel to the official summit of the Southern African Development Community. NPA invites its partner organizations to participate. The forum extends the networks in the region, and creates alliances to pressure member states such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland to comply with the human rights and the SADC charter.

For AIAS, “NPA support is an asset. Its socio-economic agenda supports the agenda of the network.” Some parts of NPA’s constituency are more easily mobilized into the network. AIAS tries to link the national network with its international one – through the Summer School, first week in January (in Harare) and some study tours. In this regards, NPA’s international network is useful for AIAS, particularly the Southern Africa network of NPA in the SADC People’s Summit.

Since 2006 NPA has done a lot to capacitate the staff of WCDT, who is women from the village without much formal education. The staff has learnt computer skills, accounts, results-based approach, communication – how to relate with each other as staff, with community, with other organisations –thanks to NPA. The WCDT representative says NPA in its monitoring of its activities is

“strict, but not too strict”. They listen to us, and learn from us too. NPA offers the right balance between teaching us and respecting us.”

NPA has connected it not only with three other CBOs funded by it but also with larger organizations such as ZimRights. The value of the network offered by NPA was shown when YIDEZ came in and was joined by young women in the community to build toilets at the local clinic, which did not offer acceptable sanitation. WCDT has formed a cluster with three other NPA-supported CBOs. They meet at least once a year to share experiences and

discuss common challenges. NPAs support to piggery has boosted people up, so they continue doing other (political) things.

3.5 Results

ZimRights has seen progress in its work with socio-economic rights. Informal miners (*makorokosa*) have been recognized by the law; their mining is now legal, and they have to follow environmental regulations. Farm workers have been sensitized. Sugar cane cutters in Hippo Valley, Chiredzi, have established shop floor committees. The South African company Tongaat-Hulett's paid 106 USD in salary per month in 2011. It was raised to 150 in 2012, to 160 in 2013, and to 170 in 2014. The workers have also been admitted food (*sadzwa*) served during work and improved safety measures (masks). Besides, the sugar cane cutters have started a struggle to get a piece of land from the company, to improve their life of cane cutter. Facing the new local councillors elected last year, the workers are in the process of getting water toilets into their houses and other types of upgrading.

ZCIEA reports that there has been a huge increase in membership after becoming a partner with NPA in 2008. ZCIEA had 43 000 members then, now they have 177 000 (although only 2500 paid their membership fee of 6 USD in 2013). The advocacy campaign has also been successful. Some authorities have given the members land, for their trading stands, on soft loans basis. Examples are Hwange, Triangle, and Chitungwisa where 2000 traders were forced out of the trading area; ZCIEA took the case to the court, and won. All 2000 got their trading stand. Regarding the training activities, they have allegedly led to less harassment. People know their rights, and they use their victories in court against certain municipalities.

BA thinks it has managed to reach most of its previous goals: A more inclusive society in terms of a reduced proportion of the population still politically marginalised, not registered for elections or not consulted on laws that affect them. The organization observes raised awareness, higher civic participation, and increased sense of accountability among elected people, mainly in local councils.

The support to AIAS has only taken place for 2 years. Yet it has resulted in a functioning network, *Zimbabwe Land and Agrarian Network*. It convenes annual meetings and board meetings. It has a website and has been registered as a trust. It has a core group of 25 organisations, but in Annual Meeting and big events there are 50 entities, incl. many women's organisations. Depending on further funding, substantial outcomes in terms of effective advocacy and real policy changes are likely to be produced in the near future.

In its fight against gender-based violence, WCDT has solved 185 cases. Women go back to their husbands, or the men are handled by police. It is difficult to get exact figures and information of other types of results. Not so in the area of enhancement of women leadership. WCDT reports that because of its interventions they got elected 1 MP, 5 councillors and 153 women into local committees (water, school). The five pigs they received from NPA have multiplied to 188 – the revenues from the piggery have made possible an internal lending where 12 women bought a 6-room house, which they let for rent. The women with pigs have become active community leaders! Other non-intended but positive results of WCDT's partnership with NPA can be mentioned: first, the project that was carried out with YIDEZ to install toilets installed at the clinic. Many more young women come to give birth now, and the mortality rate has been reduced. Second, WCDT goes to primary schools on the invitation of school masters to train boys and girls to fight violence against them.

4 Country study: Honduras

4.1 Political background and current situation

Although Honduras' economic structure and class relations are similar to those of its Central American neighbours the political life differs. Among others, Honduras did not have a strong guerrilla movement in the 1970' and 80's. It has not had a strong party on the Left but its two-party system has seen the Liberal party at times opening up to the Left by including social aspects on its programme. After the right-wing coup d'état against president Manuel Zelaya in 2009, the bi-partism has been challenged by LIBRE which is new party with a leftist rhetoric.

The country is extremely violent with violence often directed against political and social activism. The social movements of Honduras are relatively weak as compared to e.g. El Salvador, but within the movement trade unions constitute a stronger element here than in most of Central America. Despite being weak the movement tend to come back whenever they seem to have been crushed.

Honduras' political leaders have had a strong belief in encouraging foreign investments in maquilas as a strategy to boost the economy on long term. Therefore trade union activities in the maquilas have been met with even more obstacles than in other sectors.

The development in Central America towards peace accords in the 1990's had some potentially positive repercussions in Honduras, among them the establishment of a Ministry of Justice (Ministerio Público) and an Ombudsman for human rights, and not least the separation of police and army and the legalisation of the Leftist Partido Unificación Democrática (Mejía, Fernández & Menjívar 2009).

The coup against president Manuel Zelaya in 2009 was followed by a certain unification of the progressive forces in the country and a joint agenda through the Frente Nacional de Resistencia contra el Golpe de Estado. It is questionable whether the civil society has been able to capitalise on the momentum. One weakness is that the movements are driven by thematic approaches (anti-mining, unionism, ethnicity etc) with relatively little in terms of joint efforts to demand democratic institutions.

In Honduras, the ‘maquilas’ or ‘maquiladoras’ play an important role in the country’s economic strategy, and they currently employ some 110-115 000 workers, mainly women. They are factories located in free trade zone to enable import of raw material and machines duty-free. Working conditions are generally poor and unions not welcome.

4.2 About the partners

4.2.1 General overview

NPA has been present in Honduras since the 1980’s just like in El Salvador. Partners are selected on initiative of the country coordinator in close cooperation with the regional director. In the beginning partners were found among human right organisations to a larger extent than today where popular movements and issue-based groups are in majority. Today NPA’s priority is organisations with some sort of membership base. Still two partner organisations, CDM and ERIC, are neither membership based nor social movements, but on the other hand their function is to be supportive of the social movements through sharing of capacities and competence. NGO’s in Honduras need to be acknowledged by the state, i.e. legally registered. There are no such requirements for social movements. At times the authorities use this as a pretext not to engage in dialogue with them.

Among NPA’s partners there are two typical grass root social movements. NPA’s partner in El Progreso is the local office of the national peasant social organisation CNTC. CNTC in El Progreso organises small farmers who have occupied land. OFRANEH brings together almost 50 garífuna (afro-descendent) communities.

In line with NPA's ambition of bringing social movements and initiatives together three of its partners are network organisations. COPA unites 25 local organisations in networks in one of the country's most conflictual areas, Aguán where huge agrarian conflicts are ongoing. MADJ is a human rights and transparency organisation. The Red Comal is an alternative marketing network.

Popular movements in Honduras operate under difficult political circumstances. After the coup in 2009 the movements have rejected cooperation with the central authorities. Such cooperation was opened up during the presidency of Manuel Zelaya 2006 to 2009 and close relations developed. Since the coup NPA's partners have had divergent views on the opposition led by Manuel Zelaya and his allies in the LIBRE party. Some of NPA's partners support LIBRE but the majority is critical.

The movements reject the current government and do not participate in forums like the Foro Permanente de la Sociedad Civil and the Foro de Convergencia Nacional because they do not acknowledge the successors of the coup leaders from 2009. NPA's partner organisation MADJ (Movimiento Amplio de Dignidad y Justicia) is ready to try out the very few opportunities that open up for genuine cooperation with public authorities, e.g. in local government.

The total costs of the activities in Honduras amount to an annual 3.5 million NOK. Each partner receives between 180 000 and 800 000 NOK.

4.2.2 The evaluation's focus organisations

CDM (Centre for women's rights) is a well-established women's rights organisation fighting for equal rights between the genders. It is an NGO that used to get support from several donors, but as of now only three remain. This has resulted in cuts in number of staff. Economically CDM is dependent upon external support. CDM has activities in various fields like Violence Against Women, (VAW) reproductive rights, and civic participation, and since 2009 also labour rights. VAW is a huge problem in Honduras and the concept of 'femicide' has now been officially acknowledged as a phenomenon. CDM claims that femicide is on the rise, among others due to the large degree of impunity in cases of VAW. Also the fact that the police have little investigative capacity plays a role.

Honduras' murder rate is, embarrassingly, the world's highest, and authorities have been accused of being more preoccupied with finding ways to embellish statistics than with finding ways to reduce violence.

CDM's main office is in the capital Tegucigalpa and an office in San Pedro Sula. The cooperation with NPA is about labour rights and decent work in the maquilas. The project is run by the San Pedro Sula group. CDM's San Pedro team consists of lawyers who have specialised in labour law, which is a rare specialisation in Honduras – only 6 lawyers carry out lawsuits in that field of law. They train young female workers in labour rights and combine this with general gender consciousness-raising. During campaigns lawyers and psychologists take part to support the workers.

CDM used to work with traditional industries but is now concentrating on the maquilas. CDM works closely with the trade unions in the maquilas. After 30 years of struggle to organise in the maquila, there are now 14 unions although with a rather small membership, only a few surpass one thousand members. CDM has trained more than 100 hundred female trade union officials, among others in leadership and wage negotiations. Trade unions used to be quite 'machista' and not used to unionise workers in typical female work places.

Despite intense counteraction from the employers and government trade unions have been able to strike roots and as of today workers in 14 maquilas have trade unions, the biggest of them with 1100 fee paying members.

CDM together with several trade unions filed a complaint against Honduras on the grounds that labour rights in the RD-CAFTA agreement have been violated.

In addition to working with maquila workers, CDM has started up work with domestic helps and employees on airports.

CNTC (National Confederation of Peasant Organizations) includes 52 peasant groups with more than 700 families of 22 groups have achieved land titles. It fights for access to land among others through land occupation. NPA cooperates with the local of CNTC in El Progreso. CNTC (National Confederation of Peasant Organizations) was established 1985. Among its core field of work

are the defence of peasant families' rights to land, water and food. It supports the leadership development of peasants in decision-making. CNTC furthermore applies a gender perspective on its work by defending women's rights and leadership, and its Women's Sector is addressing issues of machismo within the organization and in communities in general. Moreover, CNTC develops policies for food sovereignty.

The CNTC El Progreso branch is criticising the national confederation for being politically too soft. The membership consists mainly of peasants who have occupied land organised themselves in peasant groups and set up enterprises. Enterprises consist of a maximum five families whereas cooperatives have up to 20 families. The first five peasant groups were set up in 2005. As of now there are 52 such groups. The enterprises appoint representatives to work in CNTC's local branch. CNTC El Progreso operates with membership fees and rates are decided upon by its Annual Assembly.

MADJ (Broad Movement for Dignity and Justice) was established in 2008. It considers itself not to be an NGO but rather a social movement. It has 27 groups (nucleos) in five of Honduras' 18 departamentos (regions) and is aiming a nation-wide coverage and structures at national level. Each group has a list of members, but membership is open for everybody.

Its main concern is what could be summed up in the otherwise somewhat worn-out concept of 'good governance'. In the case of MADJ this means struggle against corruption and other types of misuse of political power. On the basis of this the organisation keeps an eye on local government institutions and tries to bring to the fore conditions that authorities would like not to be exposed to the public. The information is shared in the communities that are affected. There are legal provisions in Honduras that give the public access to information, and MADJ makes pressure to put the rules into practice.

In some regions MADJ primarily links up with the struggle to protect natural resources, in others indigenous issues are in the forefront. Doing this MADJ does not brand itself as an environmental or indigenous organisation but is focusing on governance issues.

4.3 The activities supported by NPA

CDM: Earlier CDM used to reach out to people through work in the neighbourhood (barrios) but after the 2009 coup this got more and more difficult. Therefore CDM decided to start working directly with individual trade unions. NPA supports a programme on women and decent work. Activities consist in training and legal assistance. CDM has set up a school in labour rights. Trainings are 8 hours x 12 days and include issues like self-confidence, empowerment and feminism. The trainings are reportedly getting more and more complex as the government is introducing new legal regulations constantly, generally leading to less rights and worse working conditions. Since the 2009 coup no less than 100 legal acts on labour issues have been introduced.

At times it has been necessary to change plans, e.g. related to cases in court that required lawyers and monitoring. In order to balance the budget, the number of workshops and training had to be reduced. In such situations NPA has been very flexible.

CNTC: NPA's accompaniment has been helpful in linking the El Progreso branch of CNTC to other groups and movements in Honduras, among others to another NPA partner, MADJ. Among others, CNTC contacted NPA's country coordinator for assistance in analysing the nature resource struggle. Furthermore, NPA follows up by providing legal advice, in discussions on the political situation, organisational practice, and in some cases in solving internal rivalries.

MADJ: Schools in public communications have been enabled. Each of the local groups is involved in the development of the content of the schools. This has been an ongoing process that has led to consolidation of MASJ's local groups.

Also several studies have been made that later on have been presented in written and in popular meetings.

MADJ has had no large changes in priorities during the project period. When needed own resources have been used. An additional grant was given to MADJ in order to buy a car needed to reach out to the local groups.

NPA's partners make use of the fund allotted for political schools to strengthen capacities of their activities. For instance, Red Comal has run schools in trade based on solidarity. The fact that the schools are more structured and comprehensive than ordinary workshops has made it possible to give competence-building among the organisations' activists a boost.

4.4 The NPA contribution

Critical NGO's and social movements are vulnerable in Honduras due to the political regime. The links with well renowned foreign partners like NPA and The Electrician and IT workers union (El&It) contribute to reducing insecurity.

CDM: The centre has a well-established network in addition to the cooperation with NPA, and form part of an international network of labour right lawyers as well as solidarity groups with maquila workers, i.e. a US student union. The economic support rendered through NPA has secured stability for the project. CDM emphasises the political support from NPA through the county coordinator who shares his analyses and networks. CDM appreciates the fact that NPA's representative is knowledgeable about the situation they are working under and puts forward questions from outside. For instance, when writing up reports the accompaniment from NPA encourages a more analytical approach, which CDM considers useful. Also the links to Norway's trade unions through El&It is considered important. CDM considers the cooperation with NPA to be a political alliance.

CNTC: A computer centre financed by NPA. Capacity-building and pushing for women participating and taking on leadership tasks are among the elements of NPA's support emphasised by the CNTC leaders.

MADJ: Being linked up to community radio enables one hour weekly of information from MADJ. The idea of engaging in community radio is one example of discussion with NPA's country coordinator who asked whether MADJ had the capacity. MADJ also appreciate comments and suggestions from NPA's country coordinator on draft texts for publication.

NPA's Latin-America regional director based in Quito, Ecuador also follows up with frequent and in-depth discussion on skype and phone. He makes at least one annual visit to Honduras. The country advisers in the NPA HQ in Oslo follow up on reporting and infrequent visits to Honduras.

In general, the organisations report that they find the accompaniment from NPA useful because it encourages and enables an analytical approach that might have got lost in the ordinary, yet very busy, working day of the partner organisations. Also, the NPA network enables contacts with likeminded organisations throughout the country.

Some mention that they appreciate the cooperation with NPA because it enables activities "around" the core activities, like e.g. capacity-building of people with whom the organisation get in contact with through community radios.

NPA's partnership policy of not imposing itself upon partners is being appreciated because it reduces the risk of having to deviate from the organisations' own priorities to satisfy "donor" priorities. Organisations with wide experience with donors emphasises this point.

4.5 Results

CDM: Most of the women trained through the project are young, often migrants. Away from family and other networks they are quite vulnerable. Through the training they experience palpable personal growth in self-confidence and ability to cope with problems at work, but also in personal relations.

Trade unions used to be quite 'machista' and not used to unionise workers in typical female work places. CDM's work has gradually made traditional trade union confederations more concerned about the potential of unionising women.

During the ten years of the project 120 collective cases and 784 individual cases have been conducted. Moreover, CDM has published 15 publications on labour rights. It has been able to forge links to other organisations.

CNTC in El Progreso has survived under very difficult circumstances and has been able to keep up activities among small farmers who have obtained land after occupation. It has been able to increase from 21 to 52 groups in the period. 22 of the groups have achieved land titles. Moreover, the organisation has made great progress regarding gender equality.

MADJ has been able to establish itself and gain recognitions during its six years of existence. It is a dynamic organisation. MADJ attributes much of its strength and sustainability from the fact that its local groups are born from local struggles. It has established cooperation with one municipality assisting it in developing an environmental plan.

Red Comal has been able to engage with water boards (juntas de agua) to convince them that resource management could be more than just running small projects.

ERIC, which otherwise is a very strong organisation, report that working with NPA has been helpful in getting closer link to grass roots.

In all, the NPA's project portfolio with partners in Honduras is put well together to reach results. The partners involved complement each other in the ongoing projects. For instance, community radios are a common field of work where interaction effects are produced between partners running community radios and partners making use of them in their work. Likewise, the skills and competencies of the partners complement each other. The social movements in Honduras are vulnerable due to among others the repressive characters of the current regime. Therefore, the support through NPA is of importance. The level of political repression in Honduras is high but the involvement of international human right watchers and NGOs is relatively low. In this perspective, NPA makes more difference than the size of its portfolio otherwise would have indicated.

5 Country study: El Salvador

5.1 Political background and current situation

The transition period since the Chapultepec peace Accords of 1992 that put an end to 12 years of civil war has not solved the deep social and economic cleavages that underpinned the conflict. Nonetheless, El Salvador of today has developed positively in many aspects. The human rights violations that characterised the pre-1992 regime has been reduced significantly, although the commodification of security that has taken place have left former members of the military as owners of security firms that outnumber national police by more than four times. The informal mechanisms of control exerted through these firms are understudied (Hume 2014:393).

Since 1992 spaces for political activities have opened up, allowing FMLN to become a major political force (Hume 2014: 386) after having managed the difficult transition from guerrilla movement to political party. Elections are regular and largely fair, although the mass media are massively supporting the Right. Among the Central American countries El Salvador has not only the strongest Rightist party, ARENA (even after the emergence of rivalling GANA), but also the strongest and most consolidated Leftist party, FMLN.

Unlike neighbouring Honduras (until recently) and Guatemala, El Salvador's left of the centre social movements and groups have had a considerable interaction with the political sphere. Since 2009 the Left has been in power at national level and before that in many local governments. This means that the popular movements – among them NPA's ten counterparts – have had to revise their strategies. Forthright rejection of the authorities can now be replaced by more finely tuned strategies. The degree of patience with the post 2009 authorities is shaping much of the internal

debates over strategy among NPA's counterparts. The fact that FMLN has had to make concessions to the Right in order to keep the parliamentary majority has been received differently by NPA's ten Salvadoran counterparts.

FMLN lost the 2012 municipal elections (Merino 2013:17), but won the 2014 presidential elections with Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the first purely FMLN candidate to become president in the country.

The need to develop new strategies from fighting against authoritarian militarism to having to deal with neo-liberalism has been challenging. The adversary of the popular movements has undergone a transformation from landowners involved in agricultural export to being multi-sector diversified business groups (Bull and Kasahara 2014: 251).

The popular movements with whom NPA is cooperating belong to the fragmented centre-left. The fragmentation is partly organisational. There are many small and local groups. However, there are also political differences, mainly evolving around the issue of finding compromises with the Centre-Right, which has been a recurrent issue during Funes' presidency and also due to the lack of a FMLN majority in the Legislative Assembly. Also the development of FMLN into an electoral organism has disappointed some groups who would have liked the party to prioritise extra-parliamentarian social struggle.

Somewhat paradoxically, what has kept the social movements together is a shared support for a political party, the FMLN. This is due to the fact that in El Salvador the party - FMLN - is stronger than the social movements supporting it. So far, for instance, no major political leader has emerged from the movements.

The groups, NGO's and social movements are poorly linked to each other. Coordination takes place through networks (*redes*) and councils (*mesas*), e.g. on food sovereignty or mining. There are also so-called *coordinadoras* (or coordinating bodies), among them CONHPAS which is an NPA partner. The *coordinadoras* are important but make up only a fraction of the social movement.

5.2 About the partners

5.2.1 General overview

NPA has been present in El Salvador for more than 25 years. Partner organisations are being selected by NPA on NPA's own initiative. There is no "application process". Based on NPA's substantial insight in the political movements in the country and other sources knowing the potential partners, partners are selected according to NPA's general criteria (see above). The selection takes place between the country co-ordinator and NPA's Latin American office in Quito.

Today NPA has 10 partners in El Salvador. Three of them are mainly involved in media, communication and education/training (ARPAS, Izcanal and Equipo Maíz). Another three counterparts support local communities organising against looting of natural resources (FUNDASPAD, CRIPDES-CCR and CAC). One organisation (MAM) concentrates on the promotion of political participation of women. Two organisations are national coalitions of popular movements (MPR12 and CONHPAS). The *comandos de salvamento* (rescue commands) is considered to be NPA's sister organisation in El Salvador.

The 10 counterparts also differ as to what type of organisation they are. Some are national associations (ARPAS, CRIPDES-CCR, MPR12, CONHPAS). The *comandos the salvamento* is a membership-based organisation. MAM is mixture of a social movement and an NGO. CAC is a local grassroots organisation: FUNDASPAD and Equipo Maíz have some characteristics in common with think tanks although with a strategy to be of help for social movements. Izcanal is a community radio.

MAM, Comandos de Salvamento, CRIPDES-CCR, and Fundaspad have maintained relations of coordination and cooperation with municipal governments to design policies, give advice about relations with civil society, and conduct social auditing of the way they run their affairs.

Two NPA partners – the Cabañas Environmental Committee (CAC) and CRIPDES-CCR – have been playing a leading role in

the resistance against mining. The Juventud Popular has started a process to unite various youth organisations.

Also the political Right has its civil society organisation, notably the FUSADES, a think tank that has facilitated the Right's transition from militarised anti-communism to neo-liberalism.

The total costs of the activities El Salvador amount to an annual 3.5 million NOK. Each partner receives between 126 000 and 380 000 NOK.

5.2.2 The evaluation's focus organisations

Comandos de salvamento (Rescue Squads): The organisation has been operative since 1961 and has played an important role during earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and civil war in addition to regular rescue operations. Comandos have been working with NPA since 1983. The Comandos have 3500 volunteers, and 35-40 employees paid for by the State. The organization has 30 branches throughout the country.

The organisation's activities are parallel to the first aid and rescue services carried out by NPA in Norway, which is one of NPA's four main fields of activity. Originally a non-political organisation Comandos have taken a clear position on issues of health care and has linked up with initiatives fighting for public health, like the important Alianza Ciudadana Contra la Privatización. In some areas controlled by right wing ARENA, the Comandos claim they are not let in. Other ARENA-led municipalities, like Antiguo Cuscatlán, finance the local Comandos (salaries, petrol, electricity, and water) to do rescue work. The organisation is actively involved in pressing for reforms in the system of civil protection.

The Comandos have received funding for some equipment but the main type of activities supported by NPA has consisted in capacity-building. Most of this has been, and still is, in Comandos' core fields, such as pre-hospital rescue and vertical rescue (rescate vertical).

CONHPAS: The national coalition CONHPAS was established in 2008 with the intention of becoming a 'coordinadora', referring to its aim of bringing several sectors together. It is one of three relatively like-minded cross-sectorial coalitions, the other two

being CIRAC (Coordinadora Intergremial Rafael Aguiñada Carranza) and MPR12 (one of NPA's partners).

Differences between them partly have their roots in the fact that individual leaders belonged to different factions of FMLN during the guerrilla years, partly due to different expectations to FMLN in government.

CONHPAS has the ambition of bringing societal sectors together. The sectors involved in CONPHAS are the labour sector (p.t. 13 trade unions in all), community sector (geographically defined), sector of smaller salespeople, sector of folk artists, sector of youth, the peasants' sector, sector of the professions, the Church sector (more precisely pastors from the Lutheran Church) and the non-traditional sector (sellers of 'ancestral' herbal medicines). The leaders of the sectors involved meet once a week to discuss and harmonise activities. Harmonisation (Spanish 'concertación') was defined in the group interview as "getting to know each other across sectors and gaining understanding of each other's agendas". This may prove to be useful, it was said, e.g. in cases of conflicts involving municipalities. In such cases the labour and communal sector should come together.

CONPHAS is aware of the danger of going from being a social movement into becoming an NGO. FUNDASPAD has a technical role with CONPHAS which means they draft project proposals, arrange press conferences and administer the funds.

Radio Izcanal: Radio Izcanal forms part of ARPAS, an association of 22 "radios comunitarios", low-cost community radios. El Salvador has a large number of local radios defined mainly as radios with a local impact area. Community radios have a wider objective, which is to serve local communities by strengthening their capacities to act. These radios, however, are not micro-local, but each of them reaches out to a potential between 85 000 and 250 000 listeners. The aim is to break the information monopoly of the political Right.

Lately, as part of the cooperation with NPA, Radio Izcanal has taken an initiative to closer cooperation between community radios – members of ARPAS - in the Eastern parts of the country. Radio Izcanal aims at widening the outreach of the radios. Linking up with campaigns, among others for access to drinking water and

health services, the people running Radio Izcanal see their activity as being political. Radio Izcanal started up its cooperation with NPA in 2000, and the support from NPA has been used to strengthen the capacity for campaigning and organisation.

Together with ARPAS, Radio Izcanal has presented a law proposal on community radios to secure their legal status. Radio Izcanal is also campaigning for democratization of mass media in El Salvador.

Radio Izcanal is ready to cooperate with the present authorities in the field of popular education, but this would require some public financing.

5.3 The activities supported by NPA

The cooperation with NPA has enabled a variety of activities among the Salvadoran partner organisations. The three partner organisations of Comandos, CONHPAS and Radio Izcanal illustrate the types of activities in question.

Thanks to the support from NPA Comandos have been able to buy cars and an ambulance and cooperation with Norwegian medical students has been established. In 2011 NPA presented a suggestion to Comandos to start up with training in gender awareness. Despite being a male-dominated organization with no prior experience with gender activities the leaders of the Comandos received the idea well and late 2011 the first Gender Forum with participation female volunteers and staff. Later, a Women's Commission was set up. National level meetings of women in the Comandos have been arranged. Trainings have been arranged, involving both male and female members of the Comandos, focusing on the social roots of gender, links to violence against women.

The women's group has established psychological services for volunteers in the Comandos in order to help them cope with psychological stress. Also capacity-building in entrepreneurship, although in the traditional form of making jewellery has been arranged. The aim of this activity was to help contribute to the incomes of female volunteers. The Comandos claim that the gender trainings have resulted in more women taking part in

rescue work. As of now, there are still no women in the Directive Board of the Comandos. The Comandos stand out among NPA's partners by its strong emphasis on general, non-political, service-delivery

NPA's support to CONPHAS has been concentrated on mobilizing, capacity-building, organizational strengthening and political pressure (*incidencia*) with an emphasis on joint activities across the sectors. For instance, CONPHAS arranges an annual meeting for members of all sector included in the umbrella organisation.

CONPHAS has launched several initiatives. CONPHAS has gained strength in some of its sectors although some trade unions recently left the labour sector. Lately, CONPHAS has strengthened itself on regional level. CONPHAS has been actively pushing for a Law on the Public Sector (*Ley de Función Pública*) and a Law on Voluntary Dismissal (*Ley de Renuncia Voluntaria*) for workers in the private sector. In 2010, CONHPAS played an important role in stopping the approval of 12-hour workday promoted by big private business.

As for Radio Izcanal, the support from NPA has enabled the acquisition of new equipment which made it possible to get started with the regional cooperation earlier than it otherwise would have been possible to do. Radio Izcanal also point at the fact that the cooperation with NPA has strengthened the radio's links with other groups and movements in the country.

When it comes to NPA's methods used in order to mobilise, build alliances, and influence political processes in El Salvador long-term commitment, political insight and trust are striking features. These features combine to allow for good timing of activities. When a partner is in need of some reflection around its organisational practice or structures, NPA will be aware and able to include this in the project portfolio.

NPA's methods to improve the partners' internal capacities are also based on the long-term and close relationship which often enables frank discussions. In cases where NPA may be in doubt about partners' democratic practices, e.g. the degree to which rank-and-file activists or members are included in decision-making, NPA will never address the issue without including the leaders.

There is a need for training and education on politically relevant issues among NPA's counterparts. During the current framework period, the so-called "political schools" have been introduced taking the traditional 'talleres' (workshops) a step further. In line with the aim of being able to put forward feasible proposals more in-depth insight is needed than what could be offered by an individual workshop. The schools are arranged over 3-4 weekends, all of them with a political aim and involving some printed material.

Seven among the ten partners have some kind of permanent system for political education (Méridas, CAC, JPS, MPR12, ARPAS, Equipo Maíz, and Radio Izcanal). The four latter have political schools at regional as well as national level. For instance in order to prepare for the campaign against tax evasion MPR12, Equipo Maíz, CAC and ARPAS carried out political education on the issue.

For NPA supporting these activities, among others through development of methodology, has been prioritised. There may have been a tendency that partner organisations externalise the tasks of political education, but this is about to change. Equipo Maíz has assisted MPR12 for the last five years, but lately the plans for political education have become an issue to be discussed on an annual basis involving the leadership of MPR12. Moreover, MPR12 now has got their own trainers, in all 22, as a result of the cooperation.

Likewise, the partners' communication strategies have been supported. The activities on political education and communication are going to be integrated with each other with help from a team of Brazilian advisors.

In line with NPA's wish to support the strengthening of organisational efficiency and democracy the support includes internal in addition to external communication.

The general picture from the three organisation mentioned above as well as the other partner organisations is that NPA's support enables them to carry out activities they otherwise might have carried out, but perhaps at a later stage and in a smaller scale. Apart from the idea of strengthening the gender profile in

Comandos the activities are in line with already set priorities in the partner organisations.

5.4 The NPA contribution

The highly politicised civil society of El Salvador and the absence of traditional development aid that could have absorbed it and made it mere project implementers, make the country well-suited for NPA's international strategy.

NPA's face-to-face follow up is mainly carried out by the NPA representative residing in Managua, Nicaragua. He visits El Salvador 4-5 times a year amounting to an annual 8-10 weeks.

NPA's Latin-America regional director based in Quito, Ecuador also follows up with frequent and in-depth discussion on skype and phone to El Salvador and Honduras. He makes at least one annual visit to each of the countries. The country advisers in the NPA HQ in Oslo follow up on reporting and infrequent visits to El Salvador.

NPA's El Salvador programme is partly financed by the Norwegian Food and Allied Workers Union. The union follows up with information campaigns and solidarity actions among its membership. This contributes to the links between what is going on among rank and file union activists in Norway and activists in in NPS's Salvadoran partner organisations. The people-to-people element is potentially very important in cases of e.g. political coups or other repressive measures for which fast international protest would be needed.

In addition to strengthening the partners in their ongoing activities, NPA wants to contribute to the creation of an arena for political reflection. As mentioned above, NPA operates with five criteria for selection and follow up of partners. In Latin America a sixth criterion is being put to use. This criterion is ability to readjust to changing political circumstances. Organisations that might have been good at fighting a repressive regime may lack tools for the more fine-tuned needed when political allies are in power. Therefore, there is a need to improve capacities for political reflection and debate. In Latin America schools do not

prioritise social sciences, and people often need basic training in order to understand how political institutions function.

The discussion over the country programme is one of the opportunities for carrying out such reflection jointly between the various partner organisations. Through the links with NPA they are brought together. In some cases NPA – through its broader network – is helpful in linking partners with other groups. For instance, JPS which is in a process of establishing itself nationwide as an umbrella organisation of local youth groups - got to know about the CRIPDES-CCR in Chalatenango has a got an active youth section. Through the common link to NPA, JPS and MPR12 have got in touch. NPA's perceives its task be that of a facilitator of contacts, but it is careful not to push partners into networks that may prove to be artificial and without backing in realities.

NPA furthermore encourages the trickling down of the practice of systematic political reflection from the leaders to rank-and-file activists, local groups, branches and chapters of the organisations.

Ability to analyse the concrete situation as it evolves in El Salvador is a sine qua non for NPA to be able to contribute. The fact that the country officer has political skills, in addition to skills in programme management, is one of the reasons NPA's follow-up is efficient.

The fact that NPA's contributions are closely integrated into the partners' own activities and priorities – and mainly consist in more of already ongoing activities rather than introducing new types of activities – make the issue of identifying attribution tricky in El Salvador as it does in Honduras.

5.5 Results

NPA's follow-up has been conducive to strengthening each of the partners organisationally. Moreover, it has stimulated interaction between partners.

The organisational strengthening includes, among others the support to CCR's reorganisation. As a result CCR now has a decentralised structure based on sub-regions. The CCR leadership is now rotating between leaders of those sub-regions. This internal

reform was initiated through an “organisational diagnosis” financed in 2012 as part of the partnership with NPA. The result is in line with NPA ambitions of being of help in strengthening partners organisationally and strengthening the links between leadership and base.

Likewise, NPA assisted CAC carrying out an extensive auto evaluation which is an exercise benefitting from external guidance. In its follow up of CONHPAS NPA has contributed with insight in other organisations’ experiences.

As for Radio Izcanal, the idea of bringing together community radios in the country’s eastern region was originally a suggestion from NPA. The support from NPA has made the cooperation possible. The people running the radio emphasise the fact that the cooperation has enabled several useful links to other organisations and movements in El Salvador.

NPA contributed to Equipo Maíz’ initiative against tax evasion in 2012, in which also other partners took part. The women organisation Las Mélicas (MAM) used to suffer from low visibility outside of its immediate “catchment area”. NPA proposed that they carry out activities during the electoral campaign focusing on the achievements in the field of equal rights for women resulting from centre-left president Funes’ period. Today Mélicas have three associations at municipal level working on local gender equality issues. Moreover, they have their own “Feminist School”. NPA has helped them improve the work with the base.

The political education enabled through NPA’s support seems to have furthered a more fact-based type of argumentation and reduced the role of purely ideological argumentation. This is in line with NPAs objective of helping partners moving from ‘protesta’ to ‘propuesta’ (proposal). Moreover, NPA has been reminding partners of the importance of letting insights trickle down in the organisation.

The NPA manual on results based planning, monitoring and reporting “Observing Change” is being used by the country officer and has been found to be helpful in systematising analysis of results and in following up on partners encouraging them to report on outcome and possible impact rather than output. For instance, CCR contributed to the fact that two municipalities made a local

ban on mining. As seen from CCR's point of view this is an important victory, but what is the outcome? A Spanish language version of the manual has been printed but the partners have not been asked to make use of the manual.

NPA has financed three evaluations of its counterparts lately, one of MPR12, one about youth and one about popular movements (to be finalised in December 2014). One of the recommendations for MPR12 was to run the same type of political educational at regional as they do on national level. Hitherto they have been different. Another recommendation from the evaluations is to harmonise the curriculum of the partners' political schools with the partners' own core priorities.

6 Conclusions and recommendations

Findings

NPA's basic methodological approach as outlined in its strategy and its partnership policy are tailored to counteract some of the typical negative side effects of aid, like ngo-isation and the danger that partners gradually become project implementers for the donors rather than tools for their constituencies.

NPA's identity as an NGO for solidarity rather than aid makes it different from the mainstream of international NGO's. Nonetheless, NPA operates within the same context as the rest. This is a context where aid mainly is sponsored by governments in the countries where the NGO's have their HQ's, and these governments have clear priorities on what and where they want aid to be concentrated. Often the issues preferred by funding governments are issues favoured by other governments, and the geographical focus also tends to be shared. This results in a certain aid inflation in certain sectors and regions, which paradoxically creates conditions that are unfavourable for efficient aid as well as solidarity work. For NPA, preferring to work with self-going partners, this is a challenge.

NPA's objectives and methodological approach are impeccably clear, but the organisation does not have its focus on one of the policy fields often highlighted by international NGO's and their funders, like education, environment or gender, but cover them all. NPA's criterion for selecting a policy field is that the issues are focused upon by its partners. The lack of a policy sector profile makes NPA at times not fit automatically into the categories applied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

NPA's International Strategy and Partnership Policy fit very well in countries with a civil society that is genuinely rooted and that is politicised in the sense that it includes groups fighting for the rights of the under-privileged and not merely ethnic, clan or clientelistic interests. This makes Latin America the region where NPA's strategy most easily can be implemented.

The evaluation shows that NPA's partners in Honduras and El Salvador are very much in line with – and contributing to – NPA's overarching goals of fair redistribution and democracy. But countries in other parts of the world may also provide favourable conditions for NPA, like for instance Bangladesh, or the Philippines. In Zimbabwe the civil society was perhaps stronger and more politicized five to ten years ago, but the current political conjuncture makes some of the major NPA partners seek an agenda combining democracy and human rights with economic redistribution. Finding partners with roots and legitimacy beyond the elites and foreign funding embassies is a main concern for NPA's country advisers.

Given its international strategy and partnership policy NPA is not necessarily most at home in countries that are receiving the most aid. This is because genuine organisations and movements able to follow up on social conflict have difficulties in co-existing with aid. At times, the aid sector converts organisations into project implementing bodies, and it is inclined to favour un-political, socio-technocratic agendas, in other words the opposite of what NPA stands for in its strategy and policy.

In practice, however, NPA is willing and able to operate also in settings of intense aid and absence of strong social movements, for instance in South Sudan, which is the organisation's by far largest operation. Moreover, NPA has a strong tradition for relatively autonomous country offices and the profile may differ from country to country. Different traditions live side by side.

For NPA moving towards the mainstream of NGO's may be tempting among others since this would make communication with the main funder easier. On the other hand, NPA's current international strategy is addressing the weak spots of aid and building on it in its further work NPA will be able to be ahead of changes that probably will have to be made in the aid sector. This is a potentially strategic asset.

The case studies from Zimbabwe, Honduras and El Salvador show that NPA's methodology works in the sense that partner organisations have strengthened their capacities and have made use of the support to reach goals they otherwise might have had to wait longer to achieve. Given the prevailing conditions in Honduras the fact that the partner organisations not only survive but actually are functioning is an important achievement. Moreover, the partners have retained their identity and have avoided becoming aid dependent. NPA has contributed to this. The project contents are demand driven, initiated by the partners. NPA's hand-off approach works well from what the evaluation found in the case studies. On one point, however, the NPA methodology creates difficulties. The partner-driven approach makes it less easy to attribute successes to NPA's contribution in direct and concrete terms. Here, NPA ought to develop skills in verbalising what concretely it – undoubtedly useful – accompaniment actually consists in. This evaluation has identified a reassuring number of concrete instances of partners having received important accompaniment from NPA. Unfortunately this information was not obtained through in-depth conversation with country co-ordinators rather than from NPA's – otherwise good – formal reporting.

The evaluation nonetheless found clear evidence that NPA brought “added value” beyond the financial booster offered to the partners. The fact that NPA, and in particular the country co-ordinators, operate like discussion partners and someone from outside to comment on their activities is useful for partners. The accompaniment taking place in Honduras, El Salvador, and Zimbabwe is knowledge-based and involving trust that has been built up thanks to the country coordinators work but also NPA's partnership policies.

NPA has pushed the issue of political training. In Honduras and El Salvador the looser and inflationary workshops have been replaced by the more comprehensive ‘political schools’ that seek to make up for the lack of civic education in ordinary schools. Here NPA seeks a niche beyond the traditional repetition of slogans as well as the aid-driven training in project management. For NPAs partners and other movement in Central America there is a need for capacities in political analysis throughout the organisations. For

instance, in El Salvador movements need to reorient themselves in a situation where their allies in FMLN are in power.

In general, many of NPA's partners may benefit from political training in order to be more capable of coming up with concrete suggestions, and even at times open up for cooperation with the authorities instead of merely protesting.

It would be useful to develop capacities to make use of the political opportunities that open up also in cases when the opening is hesitant and ambiguous on the part of the ruling circles. In fact, this might be a field of work where NPA, with its Nordic background, might be able to contribute with insights and methods. The case studies show that progress has been made in this field among many of NPA's partners.

In Zimbabwe the need for training in political analysis has not been mentioned by NPA and its partners – probably because the educational level and social science skills are quite elevated among the activists. Instead NPA and the partners address the need for increased networking and alliance-building at the regional/international level, and NPA contributes to funding a regional civil society forum parallel to the annual summit of that Southern African Development Community.

The project portfolio and the composition of partnerships in each of the countries have enabled interaction effects in addition to the individual effects caused by each of the partners. For instance, NGO-types of organisations have been brought together with social movements, which has been of mutual benefit. Community radios in need of material for radio programmes have been brought together with organisations that have provided this and also have been offered a microphone for communication through radio.

The idea of introducing membership fees and formal membership registers is being rejected by most partner organisations in El Salvador and Honduras. To the extent this reflects a certain unpreparedness to address issues of legitimacy, representativeness and organisational democracy, this is unfortunate.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Several among the negative aspect of development aid, like e.g. “ngo-isation” has been addressed by NPA’s strategy and partnership policy. This makes NPA somewhat different from the mainstream aid NGO’s. NPA aims at being “something more” than just another aid NGO. On short term this may cause some difficulties in fitting in with the requirements for funding. On the other hand, NPA’s distinctive qualities position the organization one step ahead of many other NGO’s when it comes to avoiding unexpected negative effects of its activities. Therefore, NPA when revising its International Strategy should retain core element of its current strategy.

Recommendation 2: Most of NPA’s partners are in a vulnerable situation. Organisational strengthening should be prioritised in order to reduce the risk that they are side lined in a situation of democratic upheaval. This should be stressed by NPA despite some reluctance among the partners. Organisations could be strengthened through the introduction of membership fees and statutes. This, of course, must be balanced with the need to take security issues into regard. Problems related to the structure of internal organisational power should be addressed. Where are the resources of organisational power (Martí i Puig 2014: 237) concentrated and managed? In the hands of the leaders of the organisations, or members/ participants? Organisational structures and internal democracy are issues on which NPA has capacity. This also goes for the Norwegian trade unions involved, like the Norwegian Food and Allied Workers Union (NNN) and El&IT. They have extensive training programs for their activists, and some of this could be translated into training of NPA’s partner organisations.

Recommendation 3: We recommend considering the following: NPA is a non-state, non-governmental organization. Should it run after the government priority areas, or alternatively concentrate on some policy areas, methods, and regions in line with NPA’s own priorities? Alternatively, operate with a two-pronged strategy with one approach for the typical aid-receiving country with weak social movements and one for the countries where the present strategy is suitable. Today, NPA has programmes in countries that do not provide a fertile ground for NPA’s strategy. Often such countries,

e.g. post conflict states, are given priority by funders. However, here international NGO's easily end up trying to create movements and civil society, exactly what NPA strategy is not meant to do. NPA's strategy is to support self-going and prospective groups and movements. Here NPA most easily – cost-efficiently - can make a difference. One example is Honduras that has extraordinarily persevering oppositional social movements and little development aid or democracy support. Also outside Latin America there are countries with active social movements, like the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

Recommendation 4: NPA needs to be more focused on concretising results and its “value added” in all stages of its country programmes. The organization already has a user-friendly tool, the manual “Observing Change”, concerning communicating results. NPA is elaborating another manual to help concretise results-based management. It is important that these tools are put to use across all country programmes.

Recommendation 5: NPA should consider identifying some specific thematic fields of work to concentrate on during the next programme period, e.g. under the broader headlines of democracy building and fair distribution of wealth and influence. These would be cross-cutting issues across country programmes, like e.g. 1) Organizational development and internal democracy; 2) capacity-building in political analysis for activists in partner organisations (could be linked to topical issue in the country in question, like mining, relations between political party and movements, labour law, transparency/anti-corruption).

Recommendation 6: Country programmes may gain from growing bigger to enable more synergy and interaction effects. This, however, should not be done by increasing the sums per partner but rather include more partners (within the limits of what NPA is capable to administer). The current sums per partner in Honduras and El Salvador are sufficient to get activities going but in most cases without making the partners into commissioned NGO/movements. NPA's approach is to work with self-going organisations.

Recommendation 7 (specific for El Salvador and Honduras): The social movements in El Salvador and Honduras need to a) improve their policies on security to meet people's demand for

security as an alternative to the right wing's symbolic 'mano dura, that has proven inefficient in practise, but still reassuring rhetorically during electoral campaigns. Security is a class issue where the rich can buy a certain level of security, b) develop more space for open discussion internally in the groups and movements, to develop a culture for debate. This will strengthen the organisations and refine the politics, c) strengthen competence on the policy fields in which the organisations involve themselves. There is much competence as of now, but in order to counter the adversaries it is necessary to be constantly updated. E.g. the mining companies have huge resources and may produce much in terms of arguments that need to be countered with more than slogans. For b) and c) the cooperation between NPA and its partners is right on target, and deserves to be followed up.

Recommendation 8 (specific for Zimbabwe): NPA adds strength to networking activities of the partner organizations. The Annual Partners' Meeting (1 ½ day) is immensely appreciated by partner organizations. NPA should consider expanding the opportunities for the partners to meet for shared learning and commitments. Also much appreciated is NPA's sponsorship of SADC People's Summit and of Zimbabwean participation there-in. Given the high number of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa and the other SADC countries, and given the importance for local activists that SADC pressures its member states to comply with the human rights and the SADC charter, NPA should consider further support to the People's Summit and/or to other regional meeting places.

Appendix 1

List of interviewees

Names grouped together are group interviews

Oslo (fra IR):

Liv Tørres, NPA secretary-general

Beathe Thoresen, adviser – organisational development and politics

Kjersti Berre, advisor – result monitoring

Nina Bjerke Tawanda, adviser – Southern Africa

Eva Haaland, adviser, coordinator

Per Ranestad og Helle Berggrav, advisers – Latin America

Group interview with Martin Holter, adviser - Middle East; Rannveig Lade, adviser – Lebanon and Rwanda; Claudio Feo, adviser – South East Asia and Mosambik; Liv Bremer, adviser – South Sudan

In Johannesburg (with Zimbabweans)

Perpetua Bganya, NPA program manager, and David Takawira, NPA program officer, Zimbabwe

Okay Machisa, (national director), ZimRights.

Moses Chivanga, (local activist and sugar cane worker in Chiredzi), ZimRights

Mmeli Dube, (acting executive director), Bulawayo Agenda

Wisborn Malaya, (secretary general), Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association representative (ZCIEA).

Elijah Mutemeri, (national coordinator and adviser on informal economy workers), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU).

Apolonia Chonyera, (director), Wadzanai Community Development Trust (WCDT).

Thandie Chidavarume (national coordinator), Women and Land in Zimbabwe, and Benenia Jeché (chairperson), Rural Women's Assembly in Makonde district in Manicaland.

Mutuso Dhlwayo, (director), Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA)

Sydney Chisi, (director), Youth Initiatives for Democracy in Zimbabwe (YIDIZ).

Sam Moyo ,(professor and executive director), African Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS).

Joy Mabenge,(acting executive director), Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC),.

Thoko Mache, civil society leader veteran.

Brian Raftopolous (professor, University of the Western Cape and director, Solidarity Peace Trust). Zimbabwe-expert.,

In Honduras:

Roberto Barra, NPA country co-ordinator, San Pedro Sula

Yadira Minero Rodos, Mavis Bardales, Damicela Mayes – CDM, San Pedro Sula

Victor Fernandez, Justo Pastor Reyes, Servin Merlo, Mercy Ayala Claros, Maria Iraheta, Andrea Ester Paz, Osman Orellana – MADJ, San Pedro Sula

Magdalena Morales Canales, Amilcar Diaz Cruz, Karen Iveth Moreno Suarez, Francisco Godines Ruiz, Verbave de Jesus Soliz, Julian Aparicio, Fausto Rene Matute, Antonio Bautista, Isidiro Miguel CNTL, El Progreso

Isidiro Miguel – Cooperativa CARNEL, El Progreso

Maria Zoila Osegura Veliz, AIDEVISH (Asociación Intermunicipal de Desarrollo y Vigilancia de Honduras- El Progreso

Evangalina Argueta – CGT, San Pedro Sula

Noemy Yanes Salinas – CGT, San Pedro Sula

Liliana Morales – FOSDEH, San Pedro Sula

Group interview with Reyna Dominguez, chairwoman of maquila trade union SITRAJERSEESN.D and 15 unionised maquila workers, Cholomo

Gilda Rivera – Executive Coordinator, CDM, San Pedro Sula

Evaluation workshop in San Pedro Sula with counterparts: Justo Pastor Reyes, Servin Merlo – MADJ; Alba Luz Deras, Joksán Flores, Sandra Zelaya – ERIC; Francisco Godinez, Karen Suarez, José Luis Vasques, CNTC – El Progreso; Magda Saravia, Carlos Leonel George, COPA; Misael Cárcamo, Jorge Diaz – Red COMAL; Miriam Miranda – OFRANEH; Gilda Rivera – CDM; Sue Ocampo – Colectivo Jaboba Lastin

In El Salvador

Nestor Napal, NPA country co-ordinator, San Salvador

Robert Cruz (executive director), Efraím Antonio Mendel (treasurer), Roberto Cortez Campos (medical emergency specialist), Rosa Arrué de Mendes (health coordinator), Laura Dimar (press department), Marina Carranza (secretary), Juan Climaco (board member), Willmar Lobo (president of the Executive Board) – Comandos de Salvamento, San Salvador

Tomás Chávez – advisor on health policies to FMLN's fraction in the Legislative Assembly, San Salvador

José Cornejo and Julio Rosales – local chapter of Comandos de Salvamento, Antigua Cuscatlán

Marielos Deleón (coordinator labour sector), Francisco García (coordinator labour sector), Renán Manzanares (coordinator vendors' sector), Ouidia Xanehva Gómez (FUNDASPAD responsible for work with CONHPAS), Leonardo Peño Sánchez (coordinator farmers' sector), Carlos Rodrigues (coordinator

farmers' sector), Teodoro Ardon (coordinator farmers' sector) – Coordinating Committee CONHPAS, San Salvador

Carlos Rodrigues, Teodoro Ardon – Farmers' sector CONHPAS, San Salvador

Marielos Deleón (coordinator labour sector CONHPAS), Digna Morena Ventura (trade union INPE), Julio Cesar Aviles (general secretary trade union STSEL), Daisy Mirella Mejia Cedillos (trade union INPE) – Members of CONHPAS, San Salvador

Daniela Brunet (director) – Equipo Maíz, San Salvador

Roger Blandino – FMLN secretary for social movements, San Salvador

Sandra Juarez (member of directive board), Freddy Rosa (president), Basilio Chavaría (member of directive board), Rosa Hilda (member of directive board), Alcides Herrera (director of the association), Walter Maroquín (secretary) – Radio Izcanal, Nueva Granada, Usulután

Mayra Ramos Mejta (Radio Fonseca), Yasmin Paneda (Radio Tehuacán), Juan José Zucos Aguilar (Radio Secunda Montes), Walberto Gallegos (Asociación Mangle), Mario Martínez (Radio Mangle), Oscar Rodrigues (Fundación Redes) – Nueva Granada, Usulután

Leonel Herrera (executive officer), René Coto (member of directive board) – ARPAS, San Salvador

Francisco Valencia (director) – Newspaper Co Latina, San Salvador

David Bergan – NPA regional director based in Quito, Ecuador, interview in San Salvador

Evaluation workshop in San Salvador with counterparts: Alcides Herrera (Izcanal), Sandra Juárez (Izcanal), Ruben González (CAC), Francisco Pineda (CAC), Anna Dubón (CCR – Chalatenango), Juventina Ramírez (CCR – Chalatenango), Oscar Beltrán (ARPAS), Daniela Brunet (Equipo Maíz), Marcos Gálvez (CRIPDES-CCR), Roberto Cruz (Comandos de Salvamiento), Efraín Solís (Comandos de Salvamiento), Digna Morena Ventura (CONPHAS), Marielos De León (CONPHAS), Azucena Ortiz

(Las Méridas), Mercedes Henríquez (Las Méridas), Lidovina Escobar (JPS), Omar Fran (JPS), Nestor Napal (NPA), Roberto Barra (NPA), David Bergan (NPA)

Appendix 2

Literature and NPA documents consulted

Bull, Benedicte and Yuri Kasahara (2014): 'The transformation of Central American economic elites – From local tycoons to transnational business groups', in Sánchez-Anchoega, Diego & Salvador Martí i Puig, *Handbook of Central American Governance*, Oxford: Routledge

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Martí i Puig, Salvador (2014), Political parties – the left, in Sánchez-Anchoega, Diego & Salvador Martí i Puig, *Handbook of Central American Governance*, Oxford: Routledge

Mejía, Joaquín, Víctor Fernández & Omar Menjiva (2009): Aspectos históricos, conecutales y sustanciales sobre el proceso constituyente en Honduras, MADJ Diciembre de 2009

Merino, José Luis (2013): FMLN a la Presidencia de la República con Salvador Sánchez Cerén, San Salvador: Ocean Sur

Raftopoulos, Brian (2013). The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39:4, 971-988

Raftopoulos, Brian (2014). Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Election Period, in: *Africa Spectrum*, 49, 2, 91-103.

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Bantirgu, Akalewold, Alemmaya Mulugeta and Axel Borchgrevink (2012): Evaluation of Norwegian People's Aid Development Programme in Ethiopia, NUPI Report/March 2012

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New Dimension Consulting (2010): NPA Zimbabwe Programme Mid Term Evaluation Report. September 2010.

Norwegian People's Aid (2012a): International Strategy 2012-2015

Norwegian People's Aid (2012b): Progress report to Norad

Norwegian People's Aid (2010): Observing Change Results based planning, monitoring and reporting (PMR)

Norwegian People's Aid (2009): Partnership Policy

Norwegian People's Aid (1998): Strategy for women, gender equality and development – A strategy for NPA's international work 1998-2002

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): NPA Policy - Land and natural resources

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): NPA Policy - Organisation and participation

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Country Strategy Honduras (draft)

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Country Strategy El Salvador 2012-15.

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Country Strategy Zimbabwe 2012-15

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Zimbabwe Final Report 2008-2011

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Highlights to final report 2008-2011: Zimbabwe

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Zimbabwe Multi-Annual Budgets 2012-2015

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): 2013 Revised Zimbabwe Multi-Annual Budgets 2012-2015

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): 2014 Revised Zimbabwe Multi-Annual Budgets 2012-2015

Norwegian People's Aid (undated): Zimbabwe Progress Report 2012

Tjønneland, Elling N. and Gisle Hagen (2011): Organisational Performance Review of the Norwegian People's Aid, CMI Commissioned Report

Tjønneland, Elling N. and Tostensen, Arne (2011): Making Partnership Work - Vision and Implementation of a Development Programme, CMI report 2011/2

Tjønneland, Elling N. (2012): The Norwegian People's Aid, Oil and Development - A Review of Oil for the Common Good (2007-2011), CMI Commissioned Report

In addition:

Various reports from NPA's partners in Zimbabwe, Honduras and El Salvador

Appendix 3 Terms-of-Reference

Terms of Reference

Midterm Evaluation

1. Background

NPA development goals and strategic results (results frame)

Goal for Head Office advocacy, networking and support to programme:

To strengthen actors in civil society that can work for democratisation and a just distribution of resources.

Planned results for Head Office advocacy, networking and support to programme

- NPA and partners are together able to influence the Norwegian and international development agenda, investments and public opinion.
- Partners have access to technical and political strategic support to organisational development.

Goal for Development program:

NPA partners have ability and capacity to promote democratization and influence policies for a just distribution of resources.

NPAs projects/ programs are measured against these **strategic results** (results frame):

- i NPA's partners mobilize to influence political processes and decision making, in areas such as
 - o Fighting repressive state policies and actions

- Defending/claiming land rights
 - Democratic and just public policies (tax reform, agricultural reform, management of natural resources, land rights, consultation processes, constitutional reform, public service)
 - Human rights (democratic rights, women's rights, indigenous people's rights).
- ii NPA's **partners ally with other organizations**, sharing experiences, developing policy proposals and joint actions.
- iii NPA partners have **improved their internal organizational capacities**, such as information and debate, in quality of communication between leaders and constituency, gender equality, development of strategies, and in political education.

Purpose of the evaluation

The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess if and how the NPA methodologies (political dialogue, networking, funding, etc.) contribute towards achieving the desired changes in programs and partner organizations in South Sudan and Zimbabwe.

The evaluation will also list and assess the basic assumptions made in the chosen programs, and assess the effectiveness of the systems and routines for program follow up (monitoring of output and outcome).

The Evaluation will also look at the extent to which the program is in line with NPA's international strategy for 2012-2015.

The evaluation should include clear recommendations. If possible the evaluation should suggest some ways to improve the abilities of NPA and partners to influence on political processes.

Both intended, unintended, positive and negative experiences should be highlighted in the evaluation.

The evaluation will be a mid-to end term evaluation, and will provide input for in house learning and the upcoming new strategic period.

The TOR will be discussed and adjusted as soon as the team leader has been appointed.

1. **Evaluation scope and key questions:**

The evaluation should describe, analyse and assess, but not necessarily be restricted to, the following topics:

Partner organizations: Describe and assess

1. the main methods (approaches) used in order to mobilise, build alliances, and influence political processes.
2. the main methods or approaches to improve the internal capacities (unity and policy of the organization, technical and administrative capacities) of partners.

NPA: Describe and assess

1. how effective and relevant NPA methodologies are for strengthening organisation's influence on political processes and mobilisation/participation of constituencies.
2. the extent to which the NPA strategy/ methodology has been adapted to the specific country contexts.

Other questions:

- What are the main changes and results (short term, intended and unintended) as compared to plans, and ambitions in the respective programs?
- To what extent does the work methods and approach reflect NPAs international strategy and policies?
- To what extent do partners and NPA have routines for following up the process towards change (Results based programming or "Theory of Change") ? What are the approaches for M&E and documentation of outputs, outcomes and longer effects, especially in the above mentioned methodologies?

2. **Methodology**

The evaluation will start with a desk study of relevant strategies, plans, reports and evaluations.

It will also include field visits to the selected countries (South Sudan and Zimbabwe), interviews with NPA staff, partners and their constituencies/ authorities in selected countries, interviews with staff at NPA HO, and possibly representatives from donors.

The evaluation will not necessarily include all partners in the country programme. A selection of partners and processes will be agreed to ensure time for in-depth analysis.

The evaluation should have a strong learning aspect and should therefore apply participatory methods that will include various stakeholders.

The main findings should be presented at HO before the final version of the report is written.

3. Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will be composed by one external consultant who will be team leader and responsible for the data collection, field studies and the writing of the evaluation report.

One program staff members from the International Program Department and /or EO will take part in field studies and data collection in the selected countries. The staff member will also be part of the project group.

Management in NPA will appoint a project leader and a project group in NPA to whom the team leader will report.

1. Reporting

The consultant will make a detailed work plan, submit this and have the approval from the NPA before initiating the evaluation. A draft report is to be submitted to NPA for comments. A final report, including a section of the main findings, is to be submitted to NPA within two weeks after receiving comments to the draft report. The final report should not exceed 40 pages, including an executive summary. The report shall be written in English.

4. Implementation, time schedule and reporting: December 2013 – June 2014
5. Cost: NOK 800.000